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Abstract
The implied need for security and connected requirements by the use of e-learning systems has
only been marginally examined up to now. A problem of respective research is given by the
relation of abstract criteria and requirements from educational science with technical realisation
possibilities from informatics subdomains. The research project as presented in this thesis focuses
on this interdisciplinary field and investigates e-learning from perspectives of both disciplines to
develop a security concept that provides a sufficient level of security without negatively influencing
the learning process. This thesis, first, deals with the question of which data and functionality for
teaching with e-learning systems are reasonable. For this, design criteria for e-learning basing on
educational scientific findings are deduced and brought into relation with aspects of information
security. Special consideration is put into the learning process and specific requirements of learners
in order to prioritise learning in opposition to the pure use of informatics systems. Requirements
for an appropriate processing and storing of needed data and functionality are discussed.
Core component of this work is the investigation of threats for e-learning by using the fault
tree analysis approach. To conduct this analysis, certain demands resulting from educational
science and e-learning research are transferred to technical assets. These assets, thereafter, can
be used as root elements of subtrees within the fault tree analysis, i.e., harming such assets is
considered to be an undesired event that should be avoided. During the threat analysis process,
dependencies on base components of e-learning as web-based service are also considered and
discussed, e.g., web server or database system. A central aspect of this analysis is given by
mutual dependencies and different expectations of affiliated roles and groups of users in those
roles. Exemplary threats, as discovered within the analysis step, are discussed with possible
consequences and relevance for e-learning. The entire fault tree is presented in the appendix of
this thesis. In addition to the theoretical investigation, case studies of wide-spread and well-known
learning management systems are presented that demonstrate different practical shortcomings
in the security concepts of these systems. This thesis primarily deals with conceptual problems
in the software design, i.e., threats by abusing functionality that was meant to be present in the
software. These shortcomings in design imply a significant challenge for mitigation, such that the
necessity of an early integration of security deliberations and recommendations into e-learning
systems gets emphasised.
Basing on discovered threats for e-learning, respective recommendations are introduced and dis-
cussed that can help avoiding the majority of mentioned problems and threats. Knowing that
security mechanisms may require user interaction, and therefore, can distract learners from their
learning process, a proxy server approach is presented. This proxy server can overtake user in-
teractions following predefined rules. Thus, the user can be relieved despite the implementation
of sophisticated security mechanisms. A respective architecture, specification details, and reali-
sation deliberations are discussed together with related problems. This thesis is concluded by a
discussion of achieved results and open problems.
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Kurzfassung
Der Sicherheitsbedarf und die Sicherheitsanforderungen, die durch die Verwendung von E-Learn-
ing-Systemen gestellt werden, sind bisher nur sehr marginal erforscht worden. Problem bei ent-
sprechender Forschung ist die Verbindung von abstrakten Kriterien und Anforderungen aus der
Erziehungswissenschaft mit technischen Realisierungsmo¨glichkeiten wie von Informatik-Teilberei-
chen geboten. Das hier beschriebene Forschungsprojekt setzt an dieser interdisziplina¨ren Stelle
an und untersucht E-Learning ausgehend von beiden Disziplinen, um ein Sicherheitskonzept zu
entwickeln, das hinreichend starke Sicherheit bietet, wa¨hrend Anforderungen durch den Lernpro-
zess nicht vernachla¨ssigt werden. Diese Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich daher zuerst mit der Frage, welche
Daten und Funktionen fu¨r die Lehre mit E-Learning-Systemen sinnvoll sind. Hierfu¨r werden De-
signkriterien fu¨r E-Learning basierend auf erziehungswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen erarbeitet
und diese in Verbindung mit Aspekten der Informationssicherheit gebracht. Besonderer Wert
wird auf den Lernprozess und die speziellen Anforderungen von Lernenden gelegt, um das Ler-
nen gegenu¨ber der bloßen Verwendung eines Informatiksystems zu priorisieren. Anforderungen
an eine entsprechende Verarbeitung und Speicherung beno¨tigter Daten und Funktionen werden
diskutiert.
Kernbestandteil dieser Arbeit ist eine Untersuchung bezu¨glich der Gefahren fu¨r E-Learning mit
Hilfe der Fehlerbaumanalyse. Um diese Analyse durchzufu¨hren werden Anforderungen, wie sie
sich aus der Erziehungswissenschaft und der E-Learning-Forschung ergeben, auf technische As-
sets abgebildet. Diese Assets dienen im weiteren Verlauf der Analyse als Wurzelknoten fu¨r die
(Teil-)Fehlerba¨ume, d.h. als unerwu¨nschte Ereignisse, die vermieden werden sollen. In der Ge-
fahrenanalyse wird beru¨cksichtigt, dass E-Learning als webbasierter Dienst auf weiteren Basis-
komponenten wie Web-Server und Datenbank-System aufbaut und folglich Abha¨ngigkeiten von
diesen Komponenten existieren. Zentrale Aspekte bei der Analyse sind gegenseitige Abha¨ngig-
keiten und unterschiedliche Anforderungen und Wu¨nsche bei beteiligten Rollen bzw. Gruppen
von Anwendern in diesen Rollen. Mo¨gliche Gefahren, die sich im E-Learning ergeben und in der
Analyse aufgedeckt worden sind, werden exemplarisch diskutiert mit mo¨glichen Auswirkungen
und ihrer Relevanz fu¨r E-Learning. Der vollsta¨ndige Fehlerbaum wird im Anhang pra¨sentiert.
Zusa¨tzlich zur theoretischen Untersuchung werden Fallstudien mit weitverbreiteten und bekann-
ten Lern-Management-Systemen pra¨sentiert, die verschiedene praktische Unzula¨nglichkeiten im
Sicherheitskonzept dieser Systeme aufzeigen. In dieser Arbeit werden vorrangig konzeptbezogene
Probleme behandelt, d.h. Gefahren durch Missbrauch von Funktionen, die im Design der Software
so vorgesehen sind. Diese Fehler im Design stellen eine signifikante Herausforderung fu¨r die Feh-
lerbereinigung dar, was die Notwendigkeit einer fru¨hen Integration von Sicherheitsu¨berlegungen
und Empfehlungen in E-Learning-Systeme unterstreicht.
Ausgehend von aufgedeckten Gefahren fu¨r E-Learning werden entsprechende Empfehlungen auf-
gefu¨hrt und diskutiert, mit deren Hilfe sich ein Großteil dieser Probleme und Gefahren vermeiden
la¨sst. Mit dem Wissen, dass viele Sicherheitsmechanismen Benutzerinteraktion erforderlich ma-
chen, und damit auch Lernende vom Lernen abhalten ko¨nnen, wird zudem ein Proxy-Server
vorgestellt, der entsprechende Interaktionen nach vorgefertigten Regeln u¨bernehmen kann, um
den Lernenden zu entlasten. Hierfu¨r werden eine entsprechende Architektur, Spezifikationsde-
vi
tails und Realisierungsu¨berlegungen zusammen mit aufgetretenen Problemen diskutiert. Den
Abschluss dieser Arbeit bildet eine Diskussion der erreichten Ziele und offener Probleme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Today’s society is developing towards a knowledge society, i.e., knowledge and the actual degree
of information a company or person has gained can be a crucial advantage over competitors.
Consequently, the access to basic education in fields relevant for particular tasks and also access
to continuing education in this or related fields increase in value for persistence on the market.
However, when considering employees with little time available due to their business tasks, the
attendance to educational events can get very problematic.
E-learning offers an opportunity for these persons to schedule their own participation in courses
and work with learning material in accordance with their business duties. With respect to this
target group and the related lack of time, security and reliability of e-learning systems gain in
importance. Learners are not willing to spend time on wrong contents or lose time waiting for
a service to come up again after system failures. Although e-learning has already been in use
for several years and is still promoted as a future trend for learning (not only for the mentioned
target group), neither a systematic security analysis of this interdisciplinary topic is available
nor a framework to avoid security incidents. Instead, many e-learning systems on the market
contain conceptual problems that can easily result in security breaches that would have a bad
impact on the institution’s reputation if exploited. Recommendation X.800 of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) illustrates the relevance of security investigation by the following
reasons that are relevant to e-learning as well:
1. “society’s increasing dependence on computers that are accessed by, or linked by, data communica-
tions and which require protection against various threats;
2. the appearance in several countries of ‘data protection’ legislation which obliges suppliers to demon-
strate system integrity and privacy; and
3. the wish of various organizations to use [Open Service Interconnection (OSI)] recommendations,
enhanced as needed, for existing and future secure systems.” [ITU91, p. 32].
Especially in the context of increasing interconnections, security and reliability of e-learning
systems become essential quality factors. Connecting learners over the Internet in this case is part
of the goal to reach potential learners all over the world, and therefore, the situation of using
publicly available and probably insecure infrastructures must be considered for the analysis.
Although information security engineering and underlying technologies like cryptography are
almost omnipresent and well-known in informatics, they are mostly insufficiently incorporated or
neglected [Sol05]. Security frameworks and recommendations for business processes can be found
in numerous variants, but in most cases they are very generic and less applicable for the special
domain of e-learning. Thus, it is the motivation of the author to enable e-learning to become
an enduring and successful approach by considering security aspects that are specific for this
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domain and that are related to the primary goal of these systems: support the learning process
to the best extent possible.
1.2 Outlining Fundamental Terms for this Discussion
Since no widely accepted definition is available for the most relevant terms in e-learning, the terms
“e-learning”, “blended learning”, “learning environment”, and “interaction” will be clarified in
the following. In addition, relevant aspects of “information security” with related terms like
“threat” or “vulnerability” will be delineated.
Educational Terms
The term “e-learning” in this context will be used with reference to the definition by Kerres
[Ker01]. In his opinion, e-learning is a very generic term describing all variants of Internet-based
teaching and learning offerings [Ker01, p. 14]. Kerres indeed uses “Internet-based” not only
in the often mistakenly used sense of the World Wide Web (WWW), he also includes other
protocols and program types like e-mail, news systems, or similar to provide additional means
of communication and cooperation. Due to increased desires for personal contact during the
learning process (cf. [Lin77, LW91]), the term “blended learning” was introduced as an extension
to e-learning. Blended learning describes a current trend of merging presence education with
distant learning. However, numerous definition attempts can be found in literature. Stacey and
Gerbic analysed such definition attempts and created the following one:
“In our application of the term blended learning, [information and communication technology
(ICT)] may be used to either enhance the dominant mode of face-to-face on-campus inter-
action and or may provide a blend of synchronous and asynchronous media (that can also
include face-to-face classes) to complement a dominant mode of distance education.” [SG06,
p. 3].
The inclusion of face-to-face classes, of course, influences exercises as well as communication
efficiency. Although the definition by Stacey and Gerbic is very valuable in general, it includes
the case of having dominant face-to-face situations. This explicitly will not be considered as the
standard situation in this thesis. Thus, in the following, blended learning will be understood as a
combination of dominant distance education (e-learning) with a face-to-face part of at least 20%
at sensible points in time during a course, e.g., beginning and end of a course as well as prior to
a group division for collaborative works.
With this in mind, the term “learning environment” can be specified. Kerres provides a definition
as follows:
“A learning environment consists of different learning offerings and supportive arrangements
of personal and (infra-)structural kind. These arrangements should enable different learning
experiences and correspond to different learning needs.” [Ker01, p. 316] (translated from
German)
In this thesis a learning environment additionally is considered to be Internet-based with regard
to the e-learning definition as given above. Furthermore, activities of learners within a learning
environment gain in importance especially with respect to interactive multimedia components
made possible with modern informatics systems. Thus, the term “interaction” will be regarded
more closely. Schulmeister [Sch05] brings “interaction” in e-learning into relation with psycho-
logical learning theories, such that he clearly distinguishes interaction from trivial navigation
elements. While navigation only means to control which page to be presented and to control the
process of an animation or simulation, interaction in his opinion is meant as actually working
with a specific learning object, the topic, or the content of a page. Interaction in opposition to
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navigation, therefore, also includes the manipulation and changing of objects to gain new insights
and possibilities to work with and influence these elements.
These educational terms, on the one hand, will be used in the following investigation and dis-
cussion, since their specific meaning is crucial for a proper understanding of stated results. On
the other hand, the definitions already implicitly exclude certain types of systems and scenarios
that cannot be included in this investigation due to the limited space and time available for this
research project. Explicit exclusions of systems and limitations in the scope of this research will
be given in Section 1.4.3.
Information Security Terms
Information security is related to several terms like “asset”, “threat”, “vulnerability”, and “secu-
rity services”. An overview of the relation of (most of) these terms is given by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU):
“The term ‘security’ is used in the sense of minimizing the vulnerabilities of assets and re-
sources. An asset is anything of value. A vulnerability is any weakness that could be exploited
to violate a system or the information it contains. A threat is a potential violation of security.”
[ITU91, p. 32]
Parker [Par81, p. 39] introduced security as a “fuzzy concept”, since it is very difficult to handle
in a general sense due to differences in every domain. This is supported by several views on
security emerging in literature. Different dimensions of security can be distinguished and must
be considered for providing proper security recommendations as described in this thesis (cf.
Fig. 1.1). Thus, three dimensions will be examined more closely: temporal placement, logical
layers, and the impact of security mechanisms. First, the temporal dimension, for example, as
focused by McCarthy and Campbell [MC01], describes at which chronological position attack
mechanisms are placed:
“Today’s security systems tend to focus on prevention, but that addresses only one-third
of the need. [. . .] Without detection and response components, a prevention-only scheme is
destined to fail.” [MC01, p. 34f]
Consequently, not only security means and methodologies for preventing incidents, but also for
detecting attacks and restoring a system after a successful attack have to be implemented (cf.
[Par81, ITU91, Cen02]). In Figure 1.1 this is depicted by a classification of means and methodolo-
gies into “prevention”, “detection”, and “response”. Second, the layer dimension represents the
proximity to the hardware or network. Recent studies (cf. [HS07, BP07]) explicitly focus on the
human factor. Not all security aspects can be solved solely by technical means, i.e., user educa-
tion and psychological aspects [Wes08] also need to be considered appropriately for implementing
security successfully. Policies for formal security implementation and informal security aspects
concerning user behaviour (cf. [Dhi07, A˚SS07]) also must be integrated into a holistic security
concept. Third, with respect to lists of common protection mechanisms (cf. [ESS06]) it is obvious
that not all means are of comparable relevance for security. Hence, this dimension takes care of
technically necessary means in the case of “perfect” users, mechanisms of supporting character,
e.g., for enforcing security policies or implementing conditional workflows (for non-perfect users),
or less relevant mechanisms coping with human laziness and obliviousness.
Some authors (cf. [And01, Eck04]) base their definition of security on the existence and protection
of so-called “security services”, sometimes also referred to as “protection objectives”. A common
set of such (disjunctive) security services is given by the so-called CIA model including the
services “confidentiality”, “integrity”, and “availability” (cf. [VK83]). Other services as explicitly
discussed in [ITU91, ISO89, And01], e.g., access control or authentication, focus on specific
mechanisms implicitly included in the CIA model. The service of non-repudiation also will be
4 1. Introduction
necessary
supporting
desirable
prev
enti
on
res
pon
se
dete
ctio
n
temporal
dimension
basis
technical
policies
formal
factor
human
layer
relevance
Figure 1.1: Placement of security mechanisms by 3-dimensional vectors
used to emphasise the relevance of being able to trace activities and messages back to their
originating user [ITU91, ISO89]. This especially is needed in negotiation processes.
The definition of security as presented at the beginning of this security term section provides a
scaffold for threat analyses. First, assets will have to be identified, methodologies will have to
be used to discover threats and weaknesses, and all findings will be brought into relation with
the dimensions of security and to security services to provide recommendations for minimising
vulnerabilities.
1.3 Objectives
Despite the necessity for security considerations in e-learning, there exists no satisfactory analy-
sis or recommendation for deploying secure e-learning systems (cf. Chap. 2). Note that in this
thesis the term “e-learning system” is used as the most generic form of a specific software com-
posed of tools and specialised modules with the objective of enabling and supporting e-learning.
This term does not state any requirements concerning the architecture, programming language,
implemented features, or security concepts.
With respect to the lack of a proper analyses, the following tasks are not sufficiently conducted
up to now and represent central objectives of this thesis:
Identification of e-learning criteria
E-learning is an interdisciplinary field, on the one hand, including educational science with learn-
ing psychology and didactics, and, on the other hand, informatics with information security and
software engineering. In order to achieve a proper notion of security in e-learning, both disci-
plines must be considered and analysed concerning their impact on security in e-learning. Thus,
common criteria should be extracted and discipline specific issues need to be examined with
respect to mutually influencing research aspects in another discipline. Due to the vast amount of
specialised topics covered by these disciplines, research must be limited accordingly to achieve a
manageable subset. Note that criteria of both disciplines might interfere with each other, such
that in subsequent steps compromises might be necessary.
Threat analysis and demonstration of case studies
Criteria and dependencies should be considered as starting points for a theoretical threat analysis
to uncover possible problems and threat situations for e-learning. For this analysis process, a
systematic methodology must be applied to guarantee reasonable outcomes. Discovered threats
and possible attacks should be easily transferable to one’s own infrastructure. (Theoretical)
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analysis results must be approved and evaluated in practical systems using case studies. Existing
and widespread e-learning systems have to be considered for this evaluation. Their concepts
should be brought into relation with formerly gathered threats. Note that the threat analysis
represents the central task in this thesis.
Development of recommendations
Information security and educational science bring in two very different views on e-learning
systems. Topics from educational science are quite far from being technically manageable and
usable for technical deployment, but they build a certain base of necessities to be fulfilled in order
to offer acceptable e-learning systems. On the other hand, models and methods from information
security are strongly technically oriented and might restrict the usability of the system only for
the sake of security, i.e., they lack contextualisation for e-learning. Hence, an important task
in this research project is a transfer of abstract requirements to technically manageable aspects
for finding security mechanisms and measures that can be adapted appropriately. This process
aims at recommendations for secure e-learning systems that can easily be applied to practical
situations and that are sufficiently taking care of the learning process.
1.4 Achieving these Goals
1.4.1 Approach
For investigating such an interdisciplinary topic, the research methodology as sketched in Fig-
ure 1.2 will be used. This methodology is structured according to three different aspects:
1. related disciplines,
2. theory vs. practice,
3. phases and milestones.
First, regarding e-learning, we are confronted with two rather contrary disciplines. The “learn-
ing” implies pedagogical and related psychological findings to be considered, i.e., educational
science, while the “e” is related to informatics systems which in particular for this thesis will be
considered from an information security perspective. Since an analysis of this interdisciplinary
field needs findings and research results of both disciplines, the research methodology considers
these disciplines as columns beside the main column in the centre representing the actual research
project with its milestones. From the left column of educational science implications for func-
tionality are extracted. Learning theories and didactic principles (cf. [Dew38, Vyg78, LW91]),
expectations/objections according to target group characteristics (cf. [BM93, KHS05]), learning
process designs (cf. [Rot63, RS75, Lin77, Sto¨78]), and theories of learning and understanding
(cf. [Dew38, Vyg78]) will be considered for the investigation and be brought into relation with
findings during this research project. The discipline of information security contributes to the
investigation by classifications of security services (cf. [VK83, ISO89, ITU91]), security mod-
els (cf. [Dhi07, A˚SS07]), and analysis approaches for threat discovery (cf. [VGRH81, And01,
Eck04, DIN06]). For the elaboration of recommendations for secure e-learning systems, well-
known means for hardening applications (cf. [Ris05]), implementing security policy models (cf.
[BL73, LB73, Bel74, BL76, And01]), applying cryptography (cf. [Sch96]), implementing counter-
measures (cf. [ITU91, Eri03]), and using digital signatures for prototypical helpers (cf. [Sch96])
are used.
As second partition the central column is divided into theoretical and practical parts. Theoreti-
cally uncovered requirements and solutions will be transferred to practice and tested accordingly.
Since not every theoretical aspect can be transferred in the same simplicity, the assignment of
topics in this column takes place with respect to this fact in more or less clear side decisions. This
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Figure 1.2: Research methodology with related disciplines
subdivision supports the current situation of numerous e-learning systems already in use and the
necessity for theoretical analysis and conceptualisation of security concerns. Theoretically un-
covered problems can be verified in practice and existing systems can be helpful in completing
theoretical deliberations.
Third, this research can be regarded in single phases and milestones. The initial phase, i.e.,
bottom-most slice in Figure 1.2, is understood as Phase 0 and will not be considered for numbering
the steps belonging to the actual analysis process of this thesis. Phase 0 consists of a first survey
of the current situation and state of the art in e-learning. Practical projects as well as technical
implementations of e-learning systems were examined. Theoretical concepts, technical usage of
standards for metadata and content packaging, administrative aspects, and literature related to
information security in e-learning were investigated. Research objectives as resulting from this
initial survey were already discussed in Section 1.3. For the subsequent phases, an additional
alternative figure will be used to introduce and illustrate the current step in each chapter of this
thesis with direct relations to neighbouring analysis steps (cf. Fig. 1.3). These steps represent
identification mitigation
typical
activities
roles
assets
threats threatmanagement
Figure 1.3: Threat analysis process
the analysis as a whole. Starting from e-learning specific activities and data, stepwise more and
more threats and problematic concepts are to be uncovered. The respective structure will be
loosely based on auditing and evaluation manuals like [MK07, Sei06, SH06]. Thus, the following
questions will have to be answered in corresponding phases:
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Phase 1: “What functional parts belong to an e-learning system?”
The foremost aim in this phase is to identify typical functionality and related requirements of e-
learning systems. Connected to this, pedagogical models concerning the way of learning efficiently
as well as didactically relevant elements for technical systems will be included. For the creation
of such functionality and activity listings (cf. [Sta02, BDRW03, ES04, KSC05, HLT05]), practical
systems will be examined as well as additional tasks will be designed in theory. The theoretical
part is supported by expectations and objections of learners according to psychological and
pedagogical models with respect to theories concerning the learning process. The organisational
phases of the learning process in this thesis play a major role, since every phase of this process
should be transferable to the system (cf. Sec. 1.4.3).
Phase 2: “Who is involved and what has to be protected (from whom)?”
Concerning non-technical requirements to be fulfilled for successful e-learning systems, a transfer
to technically manageable assets is required for a technical threat analysis. For this, besides the
pure availability of functions and connected requirements, a consideration of differences among
various e-learning types and corresponding sets of affiliated roles is needed. With respect to these
roles, activities can be assigned to specific persons and related objections and expectations be
included for extracting assets to be protected in an e-learning system. The direct inclusion of
role perspectives is aspired for adequately considering interest conflicts between different roles
in the system and respective demands for compromises in a practical implementation. Assets as
extracted in this phase will be directly used for the subsequent threat analysis step, and therefore,
this phase provides a significant preparation step.
Phase 3: “What can harm introduced assets?”
Having clarified the “what to do”, “who will do it”, and “what data are affected” we can start
with a systematic threat analysis process in this phase. Due to an emphasis on personal, and
therefore, organisational aspects in learning, this threat analysis must take care of personal
requirements and human behaviour, too, besides a technical analysis investigating network and
hardware layer security problems and mechanisms. As a starting point for uncovering possible
threats, existing evaluation catalogues and lists of common weaknesses in (web) applications
will be applied (cf. [Swa01, SGF02, Gro03, BSI05, SH06, Her06, MK07, MBPC09, MIT10]).
Note that these catalogues and criteria listings are meant to provide a very generic approach
to do security audits on arbitrary systems. They are in no way specific to e-learning, such that
further refinement and extension is needed to take care of e-learning characteristics. Personal
experiences of the author as administrator of several heterogeneous company networks will be
used to complete the threat situations and bring conceptual weaknesses into logical relation with
active attacks. In addition to a theoretical investigation of threats, practically used e-learning
systems will be included in this analysis as case studies (cf. Chap. 5) to provide lively examples
on how discovered conceptual weaknesses can result in serious security problems. This phase is
intended to result in an illustrative representation of possible threats.
Phase 4: “How to react to identified threats?”
Usually not all threats can be prevented with comparable effort and by the same means. In the
final phase (cf. Chap. 6) a set of recommendations for a secure e-learning system will be presented
with respect to discovered threats. Demands from educational science and informatics will be
respected adequately. Limitations concerning practical realisations will be outlined. In addition
to the conceptual recommendations, a prototypical implementation of a security agent for an
automated processing of security relevant tasks will be presented. This agent can overtake critical
activities from learners and reduce their amount of non-learning related activities respectively.
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1.4.2 Evaluation Criteria
The research objectives as activities to be conducted in this research project were stated in Sec-
tion 1.3 due to the lack of an appropriate investigation of information security for e-learning
systems up to now. In addition, for the sake of quality assurance, final results of this dissertation
thesis will have to be evaluated. For this, criteria will be introduced in the following and be dis-
cussed in comparison to achieved results in Chapter 7. Note that evaluation criteria will not be
directly connected to the research objectives because of implicitly contained dependencies. This
means, the objective of criteria identification is implicitly included as basis of the threat analysis,
and therefore, for evaluating results this will be considered accordingly without separately eval-
uating these criteria. Furthermore, case studies are considered as part of the threat analysis and
provide a means for refining analysis results, such that this also will not be considered separately.
Hence, the main focus of evaluation is put on the analysis and the creation of recommendations
for secure e-learning systems:
1. Reasonable conduction of threat analysis with recognising e-learning specialities
An objective of this thesis is to analyse the security situation of e-learning systems and
to uncover related threats accordingly. For this, a systematic methodology is desired, and
therefore, the application of an appropriate methodology should be verified and discussed.
To meet special requirements as inherent in the considered application field of e-learning,
the actual analysis process has to include respective demands and specific aspects of e-
learning to be in contrast to generic security research, which only in parts could solve the
stated problem of describing a highly secure e-learning system.
2. Complete coverage of revealed threats by recommendations
With respect to the final recommendations for a secure e-learning system, discovered threats
should have been considered and handled by the integration of counter-measures. This
criterion, therefore, aims at the consideration of the actual coverage of these threats in
comparison to still unsolved threats. In best case, obviously, all threats can be managed by
appropriate counter-measures indicated by recommendations.
3. Reasonable compromise between effort and security gain of recommendations
Security mechanisms usually decrease available functionality and introduce additional in-
teraction demands that promptly could distract learners from their learning process. Thus,
it is necessary to balance, on the one hand, the effort of implementing and using counter-
measures with all possible negative effects on learning and, on the other hand, possible
losses in case of security incidents. Consequently, a reasonable compromise is necessary.
The success of the balancing process will be discussed according to this criterion in the
conclusion of this thesis.
1.4.3 Limitations
Since the terms “e-learning system” and “information security” describe vast areas of possible
research, this has to be limited to a manageable amount for this research project. The term e-
learning system as stated above does not restrain the applied technologies in any way. However,
in this thesis we focus on the most commonly used form of web applications using the protocol
HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) for the data transfer. A limitation of regarded technological
aspects is sensible, since different techniques provide different features and also introduce different
security problems. Examples for such technologies are Java applications communicating over the
Internet using RMI (remote method invocation), applications using CORBA (common object
request broker architecture), or web-based services, e.g., basing on SOAP (simple object access
protocol) or REST (representational state transfer).
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In addition to the actual technological implementation, the functionality and coverage of the
learning process provides a second criterion of limitation for this research project. E-learning
systems as investigated in this thesis aim at supporting the learning process in all its phases,
such that all tasks from bringing learners in contact with learning matter for the first time to
actual practising of already known contents and doing (self-)assessments will be covered. Simple
learning software supporting only single elements of the whole learning process will be considered
where appropriate, but are not in the primary focus of this research. This statement includes
specialised software products like assessment systems. Although assessment systems are of high
interest concerning security, they are only used for a very small period of time compared to
the learning process as a whole. Since usually only the last assessment for doing an exam and
being issued a certificate actually has to deal with increased security demands, and therefore,
must be incontestable, the former progress in learning and working with learning contents is not
regarded. However, assessment systems were exhaustively investigated by Graf [Gra03] and other
colleagues at the author’s university, e.g., Wismu¨ller and Hoffmann [HQW08, HW08, HWB09].
A third limitation has to be drawn concerning the term information security. Information secu-
rity consists of several subcategories that are not of equal relevance in this thesis. Security in
general also considers technical security, physical security, personal security (safety), or security
of sensitive data. With technical security we mean that computers are built appropriately with-
out technical failures and that the infrastructure provides sufficient resources to enable proper
working processes. Physical security means that no unauthorised person should be able to phys-
ically access computers, printouts of classified documents, or storage media with sensitive data.
Touching the area of safety, personal security regards means and mechanisms to be deployed
for protecting the users rather than an informatics system. However, in this thesis the term in-
formation security is strongly focusing on the security of data within e-learning systems. This
primarily means organisational aspects, but will include technical security aspects with respect
to availability and reliable data transfer.
Related to information security is the distinction between risk and threat analysis. In the defini-
tion of Courtney [Cou77], which is supported in similar words by Schneier [Sch03a], risk is defined
as the product of probability of an incident and the loss attributed to this event. Nevertheless,
quantitative analyses are considerably more difficult than simple threat disclosure analyses due
to the demand for estimations of an incident probability – which do not necessarily provide
additional support for creating a security concept. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System1
(CVSS) outlines this estimation problem by describing incident probability as combination of
three partial estimations. First, the general risk of a vulnerability to allow security incidents
must be rated by experts by providing comparable values between several security weaknesses of
a very different kind. Second, the temporal aspects concerning topicality and the diffusion rate
of knowledge about exploitation of the corresponding weakness have to be included. Third, the
actual infrastructure has to be taken into account. Practical systems and infrastructures have
their own very specific goals and related configurations, such that too general estimations will
not be accurate for these particular scenarios. Consequently, security experts from one’s own
institution are necessary for estimating values accurately. Hence, the fact of involving different
groups of experts, which most probably will result in different subjective estimations, and the
enormous number of influencing factors (among others temporal aspects) result in problems con-
cerning accuracy of probability estimations and durability of research results. Therefore, in this
thesis the term of threat analysis without considering probabilities in any way will be preferred,
if not mentioned otherwise, over the more critical term of risk analysis.
1http://www.first.org/cvss/ [02-02-2010]
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1.5 Principal Contributions
The remaining chapters and their principal contributions are as follows.
Chapter 2: Literature Survey
This chapter provides a literature survey focusing on interdisciplinary conference contributions
and monographs dealing with e-learning and computer-supported collaboration. As a result of
this chapter, a collection of activities will be presented that implies functionality and respective
dependencies in supportive e-learning systems from an educational science perspective. This
collection will be used in subsequent chapters as basis for extracting technical aspects to be
analysed in more detail.
Chapter 3: Preparation of the Threat Analysis
Requirements and activities, as given by educational science, need to be transferred to technically
manageable aspects. For this, first, different types of e-learning systems will be discussed with
respect to various sets of affiliated roles and functionality to be present. Second, based on formerly
introduced tasks, activities, and roles, assets will be extracted. Such assets mostly correspond to
data to be protected by an e-learning system. Thus, the result of this chapter will be a set of
assets to be considered in more detail during the actual threat analysis process.
Chapter 4: Analysis of Threats in E-Learning Systems
On top of assets given by the former chapter, conceptual and event-based threats will be analysed
using systematic threat analysis methodologies. Specific threats for e-learning directly connected
to given assets will be introduced, as well as more comprehensive and asset-spanning conceptual
and technical threats will be discussed concerning relations to e-learning systems. The result of
this chapter will be a visualisation of related threats concerning e-learning systems in general.
This analysis will be conducted for most generic systems not specifically making a distinction of
given types of e-learning, i.e., the union of functionality of all these types is investigated.
Chapter 5: Case Studies
Theoretical analysis results will be transferred and compared to practically implemented e-
learning systems. Considered e-learning systems will be examined concerning their current se-
curity concepts and the historical development of these concepts to illustrate different views on
security in e-learning. Selected threats as discovered in the theoretical analysis phase will be
verified in these systems to emphasise the relevance for practical situations.
Chapter 6: Recommendations
With respect to discovered threats and problems in this chapter, recommendations will be given
for implementing an e-learning system with an appropriate security level, i.e., sufficiently secure
but still supporting learning without exhaustive distraction by security means. Furthermore, a
proxy server acting as a security agent that overtakes security critical activities from learners
without distracting them from the actual learning process will be presented.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work
Finally, results will be summarised and evaluated according to stated criteria. Possible avenues
of future research will be discussed.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
2.1 Overview
The literature survey to be conducted in this chapter represents the first phase of the threat
analysis process (cf. Fig. 2.1). This phase aims at examining related work that already covers
or is in contact with single areas of this research project. In addition, it aims at identifying and
describing e-learning specific activities and requirements to be considered for subsequent phases.
identification mitigation
typical
activities
roles
assets
threats threatmanagement
Figure 2.1: Current position in analysis process – step 1
Since e-learning is an interdisciplinary research topic, the search space must be limited to reduce
the set of literature to a manageable amount of related work. This will be done in Section 2.2.
Closely related work, i.e., literature specifically dealing with information security research in e-
learning, will be considered in Section 2.3. However, since only few of such works exist at the
moment, the majority of this chapter will focus on more general activities and requirements for
e-learning, partially neglecting security for the moment. Section 2.4 will outline the structure and
nomenclatures to be used for this approach in subsequent sections. Examining the application
field of e-learning in a general manner is meant to practically define the term “e-learning system”
to a certain extent, such that further analysis steps can appropriately take care of respective
specialities. Thus, Sections 2.5 and 2.6 investigate available literature with respect to implications
from educational science and reasonable findings for security engineering. Finally, Sections 2.7
and 2.8 conclude this chapter and summarise discovered limitations and consequences to be
considered in further investigation steps.
2.2 Search Space
Due to the vast amount of articles and monographs in educational science, informatics, and, as
their interdisciplinary combination, in e-learning, some limitations in the search space for this
literature survey are reasonable. This will be done in the following according to two aspects:
period of time and research focus.
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This research project started in the end of 2005, and therefore, this will be treated as upper
boundary for this survey due to its timely limit for an initial investigation of the current situation
to that time. With respect to the rapid development in informatics and particularly in the field of
e-learning with its multimedia elements and development of web-based services going back more
than five years appears less sensible. Publications before 2001 will most probably be outdated or
referenced and elaborated by newer articles. This results in a time window of 2001–2005.
Since we strictly investigate the interdisciplinary aspects of e-learning, literature, for example,
concerning detailed technical possibilities without sufficiently taking care of domain specific spe-
cialities will be neglected. Hamid already pointed out that the “emphasis on e-learning in the
past has been on the ‘e’ [. . .]” and that there “is a need to shift the emphasis [. . .] to the learning”
[Ham02, p. 313]. Learning specific aspects must be understood, and, related to this, the actual
role of the “e” in e-learning must be considered appropriately. To cope with this demand, the
limitations in research topics and investigated aspects are ordered by a three steps approach.
First, monographs of educational scientists like Kerres and Schulmeister published during the
considered period of time will be taken into account. Especially the participation of Schulmeister
in the EVA:LERN project (cf. [Sch03b]) that had the aim of evaluating e-learning systems from a
didactic perspective motivates this first step. Second, national and international conferences di-
rectly addressing e-learning and computer-supported collaborative/cooperative learning (CSCL)
will be considered. Concerning related scientific conferences, first of all the World Computer Con-
ference in Education (WCCE) of the International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP)
will be regarded. This conference was held in 2001 and 2005 during the considered period of
time. Thus, it provides a development overview during this period. The international conference
of computer-supported collaborative learning was held in 2001 (as euro-CSCL), 2002, and 2005
during the considered period. Furthermore, the most important German e-learning conference,
DeLFI (“Die e-Learning Fachtagung Informatik”), was established and held annually since 2003.
In a third step, the survey will be expanded to digital libraries, such that appropriate articles
can be integrated into the discussion if arguments are not already confirmed by references of
former steps. Considered libraries in first place are the well respected digital libraries of the
ACM (Association of Computing Machinery) and Springer. In the ACM library published ar-
ticles are tagged, such that search can be refined by using keywords and category descriptors.
Categories in the ACM library particularly relevant for this research are K.3 (“Computer and
Education”) and its subgroup K.3.1 (“Computer uses in Education”). As second library Springer
as the official publisher1 of the IFIP will be included. This leads to results and proceedings as
published by all technical committees of IFIP, e.g., TC3 (“ICT and Education”) or TC11 (“Se-
curity and Protection in Information Processing Systems”), as well as covered working groups,
e.g., WG 3.6 (“Distance Education”).
2.3 (Closely) Related Work
Although in the outlined search space several articles and monographs can be found that ad-
dress single aspects relevant for this research, there is only little choice in explicit security in
e-learning literature. Among others, Eckert [Eck03], Kajava [Kaj03], El-Khatib et al. [EKXY03],
Warren/Hutchinson [WH03], and Ca´rdenas et al. [CS05a] present articles focusing on this inter-
disciplinary research. However, none of these articles presented results of a threat analysis for
this domain. Hence, their contributions will be considered in the following where appropriate to
gather recommendations and possible conceptual or technical weaknesses in e-learning systems.
For a closer definition of still open research questions, relevant monographs are examined. With
respect to available literature, only two monographs can be found matching stated demands, i.e.,
1Before 2003 Kluwer Academic Publisher was in this position. In 2003 Kluwer merged with Springer to Springer
Business+Science.
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the dissertation thesis of Graf [Gra03] and the book of Weippl [Wei05]. These documents will be
discussed in the following.
In his thesis, Graf [Gra03] aims at specific security mechanisms for learning environments. For
this, he started his work with a short consideration of learning related aspects like the learning
process or the general construction of learning material. The “learning process” according to his
thesis includes the access to learning resources, the actual learning activity, assessments, and
personal guidance for advising next steps [Gra03, p. 6]. In addition to basic concepts, he stated
problems related to web-based client-server architectures for deploying an e-learning system, e.g.,
the lack of persistent data storage due to missing state information or identification mechanisms
in HTTP. Note that Graf explicitly prefers the use of client-server architectures over stand-alone
clients, since by this distribution sensitive processes can be put on server-side where protective
measures can be applied and controlled more reliably [Gra03, p. 16]. An analysis of the threat
situation for e-learning is conducted in his Chapter 6 (10 pages). This chapter includes the
identification of assets, the identification of threats, and the rating of found threats. Obviously,
with respect to this small number of pages for the analysis it can be considered to be kept very
superficial. Subsequent chapters present and discuss possible solutions to mentioned threats.
In addition, for the entire discussion within his thesis, Graf explicitly excludes communication
and cooperation [Gra03, p. 2 and p. 8]. Learning in groups, as well as the use of computers as
communication medium, are mostly neglected, as are the management of personal data.
Graf contributes to this research by presenting learning specific security aspects [Gra03, pp. 95-
97], i.e., confidentiality of learning material and assessment results, authenticity of user activities,
integrity of learning material and assessment data, accountability, and copyright protection. So-
lutions as discussed by Graf include encryption enforcement of learning material [Gra03, pp. 123-
126], i.e., all learning contents are stored in an encrypted way on the server and client, such that
no direct access to unencrypted material is possible for (authenticated) persons or persons gain-
ing access to these data by other means, e.g., stealing storage media. Encrypted data can only
be decrypted again by an auxiliary program connecting to the server and requesting appropriate
keys. This even provides improved ways for learner surveillance due to possibilities for recording
every access request to learning contents. Note that such an encryption enforcement is usually
only advantageous for content providers and may be very distracting and limiting for (honest)
learners. For the aspect of copyright protection, Graf proposes the integration of digital water-
marks to identify the last authorised requester [Gra03, pp. 126-131]. Although this still does not
allow the prevention of unauthorised distribution of material, it enables the extraction of the
last legal user who most probably started the unauthorised distribution process. A major topic
of Graf’s thesis is given by web-based assessment systems [Gra03, pp. 141-166]. Graf developed
a framework for enabling assessments in controlled environments. Although a monitor is still
necessary during assessments, the framework basing on Java applets on client-side and Java ap-
plications on server-side takes care of fair and equal time constraints, such that no learner has
more or less time than another learner for doing an exam. In addition, interim results are always
transmitted to the server for providing fault tolerance in case of client errors that may make it
necessary to change the client machine.
Consequently, with respect to the short analysis phase that, in fact, raises questions concerning
the source of identified threats, Graf clearly puts the focus on a set of solution proposals. This
contributes to the research field of security in e-learning, but the base problem of a clear analysis
of possible threats in e-learning is not solved satisfactorily.
Weippl [Wei05], on the other hand, aims at an overview of research topic and divides his book in
three parts separating a superficial quick start guide, an in-depth consideration, and additional
resources. In the first part, Weippl considers role specific expectations and related security de-
mands. As roles for this consideration he proposes authors, teachers, managers, and students.
Authors, in his opinion, are mainly focusing on the confidentiality and integrity of learning con-
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tents, including basic assets like images and texts. Teachers would mainly demand security of
course contents or online exams. Course contents in this context refer to communication data that
are possibly stored for several years using long-term data retention, e.g., in the form of backup
tapes, such that privacy aspects are affected. If these tapes are not protected sufficiently or if
data are even stored without proper protection within the system itself, then messages could
get public and harm confidentiality demands. Managers in [Wei05] represent executives of an
institution whose demands are concerned with legal regimentation, business continuity, and pre-
vention of negative publicity. Finally, for students’ concerns, he mentions possibly unauthorised
read access to their personal notes, as well as exhaustive logging mechanisms recording every
single activity of students. For none of the mentioned roles he does provide a satisfactory threat
analysis.
In the in-depth part Weippl discusses technical security aspects including privilege management,
digital watermarking for protecting images, and cryptographic means. For this, he significantly
moves the focus from learning related aspects to pure technical issues. Although Weippl integrates
a security risk analysis chapter [Wei05, pp. 73-96], he does not actually conduct an analysis, but
only presents different approaches for doing this. Even subsequent chapters do not pick up this
missing point. Instead, general aspects like access control and organisational strategies, e.g., for
backups or deletion of files, are considered. Additional resources, as presented in the third part,
also do not supply a collection of e-learning specific risks, but only present encryption mechanisms
basing on PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) and exemplary plagiarism detection services. Thus, Weippl
also does not provide a systematic threat analysis for the domain of e-learning. He only presents
a set of general and less e-learning specific security issues and counter-measures. Due to this
general description, a transfer to specific e-learning scenarios is not possible.
Hence, both monographs as considered in this section did not describe a systematic threat an-
alysis. Also, none of these works introduced a well-founded collection of specific threats. This
still is open for further research. In fact, this thesis is aiming towards such an analysis to provide
an appropriate base for a subsequent investigation concerning the creation of counter-measures.
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will be used to investigate related literature and extract
respective expectations, requirements, and base conditions for actually conducting a satisfactory
and systematic threat analysis to fill the discovered research gap.
2.4 Terminology and Structure for Extracting Activities
The remainder of this chapter aims at extracting relevant activities and requirements from all
affected disciplines. Obviously, this includes the disciplines of information security as part of
informatics, and educational science for learning specific aspects. Since e-learning systems fur-
thermore include software components, software engineering also is reasonable to explicitly be
considered for an appropriate software design and related implications on e-learning systems.
This aims at the integration of well-known technical tasks for web-based systems and is meant
to bring these aspects into relation with particular demands for e-learning. To structure the col-
lection of relevant tasks and activities, a denomination for the three investigated research areas
(with focus on e-learning) will be used as follows: (A) educational science, (B) software engineer-
ing, and (C) information security. All of these research areas will be considered as possible sources
of related activities in e-learning. This also includes possibly contradictory activities, as well as
mutually implied ones. Thus, e-learning systems will be analysed from three different starting
points. Results will be brought together and harmonised in subsequent chapters. Note that due
to the importance of educational science for an appropriate consideration of learning related
requirements, class A will be further divided into five subclasses A1–A5, each representing a de-
sign criteria to be described in Section 2.5. As a second level denomination, A–C will be further
divided in order to separate organisational human-centred approaches from more technical ones.
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This separation is meant to simplify the transfer of identified activities to manageable aspects
due to a pre-clustering in abstract human-related or already concrete technical activities.
Combining these two levels and including three reasonable subcategories for each main class, this
results in a structure as follows:
Ax: educational science (x ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, see above)
Ax,1 learning process
Ax,2 learning support
Ax,3 learning management
B: software engineering
B1 usability
B2 functionality
B3 architecture
C: information security
C1 human factor
C2 program logic
C3 infrastructure
At the end of this chapter, a collection of tasks and activities in e-learning systems will be
presented. To explicitly mention the addition of a specific activity to some collection, activities
will be highlighted using the following terminology: (→ X[a],n,m: 〈name〉). In this example, task
“〈name〉” will be added to the nth subclass of class X , with X ∈ {A,B,C} and n ∈ {1, 2, 3}
according to the given itemisation. Index m is used as counter to uniquely distinguish the tasks,
and therefore, to allow clear referencing for subsequent discussions. The special case of using an
additional index a only applies for A1–A5 with a ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
2.5 Implications from Educational Science for E-Learning Sys-
tems
As indicated in Section 2.2, the focus for e-learning systems “in the past has been on the ‘e’
[. . .]” [Ham02]. But this, obviously, is suboptimal with respect to an adequate conceptualisation
and implementation of e-learning as also supported by the OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development):
“Technology alone does not deliver educational success. It only becomes valuable in education
if learners and teachers can do something useful with it.” [OEC01, pp. 24-25]
What “useful” can mean in the context of e-learning will be closer investigated in this section
considering literature primarily focusing on the learning process and related requirements. The
educational scientist Lipponen explicitly emphasises learners as a special target group for software
engineers, such that very specific activities have to be implemented and usability should be
adequate to support learning:
“Learners are not the same as the everyday people or experts, but need software designed
especially for the learners.” [Lip02, p. 78]
Schulmeister criticises in [Sch03b] that most evaluation catalogues to rate and test e-learning
systems are technology-driven. He claims this specific development focus without sufficiently
taking care of didactic aspects to be a “historical step backwards” [Sch03b, p. 151]. Consequently,
he took part in a project called EVA:LERN with the aim of creating an evaluation catalogue that
focuses on didactic aspects. For this, 23 international studies were merged, containing together
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876 criteria (including overlaps). This enormous number was reduced to 181 criteria best fitting
to their notion of a didactically driven evaluation (cf. [Sch03b]). An excerpt of these criteria will
be used in the following.
Eibl and Schubert introduced six design criteria for classifying educational science implications
for e-learning [ES08a]. In the following, five of these criteria will be applied as structure for the
investigation of relevant activities. The sixth criterion “equal opportunities” will not be consid-
ered in this place due to the lack of directly connected activities – despite its pervasive presence
and relevance in e-learning. However, it will be included again in Chapter 3 for discussing assets
basing on results of this chapter. Note that this classification with design criteria is independent
of the type of learning, i.e., self-study versus guided teaching. Thus, it can be applied easily to
respective e-learning scenarios:
A1) social support by cooperation and communication,
A2) activities of students as important step of the learning process,
A3) priority to meet learning objectives,
A4) flexible learning,
A5) integration into learning environment.
These criteria A1 to A5 will be used to structure the remainder of this section.
2.5.1 Social Support by Cooperation and Communication
Communication is an essential part of e-learning, since it enables discussions and agreements as
well as negotiation of common understanding [Sch03b]. Furthermore, it can foster soft skills like
group organisation or team work [Ker01, p. 281], and can have positive influence on learner’s
activity due to accountability to the group [Sta01, p. 46].
Kerres distinguishes three kinds of communication and cooperation [Ker01, p. 266]:
• informal exchange of information, i.e., persons communicate for the sake of social contacts
and not necessarily related to learning topics,
• project related collaboration, i.e., learners work together on the same project and try to
solve problems as community, and
• helpful cooperation, i.e., persons work on different projects but support each other with
their individual knowledge.
This emphasises differences in e-learning systems between simple communication facilities to al-
low social contacts and cooperative systems to explicitly work on assigned projects. However, note
that from a technical point of view the exchange of information for an informal communication
is not different to communication helping other learners with their specific problems. Wessner
presented a division that actually provides three, even technically different forms of cooperation
[Wes05, pp. 101-102]:
• generic cooperation, i.e., cooperation and every form of communication that is not bound
to a course and that is not necessarily related to learning contents (→ A1,1,1: generically
communicate),
• spontaneous cooperation, i.e., getting in contact with other learners or teachers with the
aim of receiving support within a course for a specific learning topic (cf. Sec. 2.5.4),
• intended cooperation, i.e., planned events during a course for letting learners work cooper-
atively on a given problem (→ A1,1,2: participate in intended cooperation).
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In general, for communication and cooperation, in the evaluation catalogue presented by Schul-
meister [Sch03b] whiteboard support, forums, and chat were mentioned as must-have criteria.
Other systems like e-mail or messenger systems are only marked desirable. Application sharing
is marked optional.
Communication in principle has two aims: First, it is a psychological need to get and stay in
contact with others [Lin77], and second, mutual assistance [BBR62, WFS02] by expressing one’s
own understanding and by discussing it with other peers:
“Many educators and learning researchers have found promise in Vygotsky’s (1978) social
constructivist ideas about learning in a social setting. His notion of the zone of proximal
development (ZPD) posits that children’s mental development can be positively influenced
by the assistance of an adult or more capable peer.” [WFS02, p. 245] (referencing [Vyg78])
Although mutual assistance is possible by already mentioned communication facilities, it provides
an additional task not to be confused with informal generic communication (→ A1,1,3: mutually
assist each other).
With respect to intended cooperation, the management of groups is required. This includes
properties of groups for adequately being able to work within the system and properties of learners
for creating groups of compatible members. According to Wessner groups can be composed by
learners, teachers, random, or automatically following certain patterns [Wes05, p. 29]. Haake
et al. also identified “four typical forms of group composition” that should be supported by
cooperative learning platforms:
“(1) explicit assignment of members to a group, (2) invitation to a group, (3) free access to a
group and (4) confirmed access to a group after a confirmation of the group itself” [HBH+04,
pp. 235-236] (translated from German)
They claim that all these modes should be available to the end user, since only the users them-
selves would be able to define their group desires and to choose the best way of creating the group.
With respect to tasks of users in e-learning, only the former two methods as given by Wessner
will be regarded in the following (→ A1,1,4: manage groups (as teacher))(→ A1,3,1: join group (as
learner)). However, the confirmation aspect will be kept in mind for the recommendation part.
A major task for teaching staff, including mentors and tutors, is the support of learners. This
is especially of relevance in distant courses, since no contact in person is given, and as such,
disappointments and cognitive problems cannot be recognised in the same manner as in presence
teaching. Communication styles and usage of computers as medium for communication are also
affected:
“Left to themselves learners might be reluctant to disagree or challenge [. . .] Tutors need
to encourage divergence within the group, suggest roles, introduce ‘starter’ and ‘wrapper’
activities and develop strategies to compensate for lack of non verbal and paralinguistic
clues.” [HW05, p. 3]
Schulmeister even mentions perpetual support in learning as a possible solution to mitigate
cheating, since a close contact between learners and teaching staff will reduce the probability
of not knowing the learners’ capabilities and interim solutions (→ A1,2,1: mentor learners in
case of problems). Hence, plagiarism and cheating attempts can be detected more easily and will
therefore be less likely to occur (cf. [Sch03b, p. 166]). In addition to supporting learners, Wessner
emphasises the role of a moderator for providing increased efficiency in cooperative processes
and for ensuring fairness during group works. Main tasks of moderators are management of
groups, providing auxiliary material, explaining assignments, observing interactions, intervening
for supporting the application of cooperative methods and social competences, and finally the
evaluation and reflection of the learning process within the group [Wes05, pp. 106-108]. These
subtasks will be subsumed to the main task of moderating learning group cooperation (→ A1,2,2:
moderate cooperation).
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A psychological study concerning the effects of awareness aspects and member portraits in co-
operative systems is given by Cress [Cre05]. Awareness (“Who is there?”) often is considered to
be necessary for appropriate cooperation (cf. [HB03]). Furthermore, member portraits (“What
person is behind this account?”) are considered to be helpful for creating a certain level of ac-
countability to the group (cf. [Sta01]). However, Cress stated this bipartite hypothesis to reflect
these common, general assumptions:
“Based on the [Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effect], we expect that providing
member portraits will lead to a higher number of contributions for people with individualistic
orientation individuals, but to a lower number of contributions for people with prosocial
orientation, revealing an ambivalent effect of member portraits as a group-awareness.” [Cre05,
p. 88]
Using a psychological placement test, the majority of the considered test persons was recognised
to be prosocial. In her study she could verify this hypothesis, such that in most cases, negative
effects could be more likely than positive effects. Member portraits as found in most practi-
cally used e-learning systems, therefore, will not be considered to be mandatory in this thesis.
Nevertheless, their management will be considered for the sake of completeness in Section 2.5.5.
2.5.2 Activities of Students as Important Step of the Learning Process
Due to the change in learning theories, the importance of interactivity for e-learning systems
increased significantly. To enable a high degree of activity of learners with the system, interaction
possibilities must be available to a large extent. Interactivity is necessary especially for reasons
of efficiency of learning, i.e., being able to actively deal with learning material instead of only
passively listening [FU04]. But note that interactivity can be seen from different perspectives.
While Geer states that
“Interactivity can be defined both in terms of social and content interaction.” [GB01, p. 250]
she mostly considers communicative interaction forms like different kinds of discussions and
collaboration as already discussed in the former subsection. Schulmeister, on the other hand,
explicitly states that interactivity in e-learning is not aiming to social interaction but to the
manipulation and usage of learning objects for learning purposes [Sch03b, p. 156]. In the following,
we will use the notion as given by Schulmeister.
Concerning the actually relevant level of interactivity in an e-learning system, no common sense
is available, i.e., interactivity can be regarded in different levels, all to be integrated in certain
degrees. Schulmeister [Sch02] introduced six interactivity levels that increasingly provide more
possibilities of interacting with learning material and the e-learning system (cf. Tab. 2.1). Es-
pecially noteworthy are the transitions from level III to IV as well as from V to VI. Levels
I-III do not allow modification of contents, but at most enable the modification of the content
representation (level III). In level IV, interaction forms are considered that allow adapting and in-
fluencing learning content. The latter mentioned transition adds the aspect of automated reaction
to learner’s input, such that the system can give feedback and acts as “partner” in the learning
process. The subdivision of Schulmeister was reduced by Schwidrowski et al. to four practically
better manageable and robustly applicable levels of interactivity [SES08, pp. 147-148]:
1. communication among humans using informatics systems,
2. interaction with informatics systems without changing learning objects,
3. interaction with informatics systems with influencing learning objects,
4. interaction with informatics systems including learner related feedback.
While the first two levels are considered for other design criteria (cf. Sec. 2.5.1, 2.5.5), the criterion
of activity of learners is mostly related to the latter mentioned levels. This means, learners must
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Table 2.1: Taxonomy of multimedia components [Sch02] (levels translated from German)
level description examples
I. regard and receive objects no influence on (re-)presenta-
tion of components
view images or play back au-
dio/video files
II. regard and receive multiple pre-
sentations
different static view on same
topic; no change of data
choose object from set of pre-
defined ones, pass through se-
ries of data
III. vary representation form influence representation of
dynamic data; no change of
data
turn and zoom of 3D objects
IV. modify content of component creation and modification of
content in certain parameters
simulations with changeable
parameters
V. construct object or content of
representation
apply tools for object or
model construction
construct geometrical figure,
create mindmap
VI. construct object or content of
representation and receive in-
telligent feedback from system
by manipulating actions
user input gets evaluated and
influences learning process
mathematical editors
get the possibilities to work with learning objects and influence their behaviour, e.g., to process
simulations with own entered values or to interactively influence further steps of an animation
(→ A2,1,1: interact with influencing learning contents). In addition, Kerres and Schulmeister
put emphasis on feedback mechanisms to provide learners with information about their learning
progress and possible problems. Note that this is not meant in the sense of so-called intelligent
tutoring systems, but only in the sense of intended switching points using self-assessment for
checking the learning progress. Schulmeister [Sch03b] rates interactive tests and exercises as
must-have criteria for e-learning, while (formal) self-assessments and possibilities to check one’s
own learning outcomes are only mentioned to be optional. Kerres states that assessments were
most relevant with the notion of behaviouristic learning theories, but lose their relevance with the
consideration of more actively characterised learning theories like constructivism [Ker01, p. 200].
Nevertheless, although the creation of (good) tests is time-consuming and expensive, this can
provide progress information for learners and can be used to determine or advise further steps
in the learning environment [Ker01, p. 201] (→ A2,1,2: interact with systems providing feedback).
Finally, for successfully and adequately passing through a course, learning paths should be defined
and evaluated. Schulmeister mentions these steps as (highly valued) desirable criteria [Sch03b]
(→ A2,3,1: create learning paths)(→ A2,2,1: evaluate chosen learning paths). Related to this, the
content aggregation model (CAM) documentation of the SCORM (Sharable Content Object
Reference Model) standard describes different kinds of structuring learning content by different
views of developers that can be directly transferred to different learning types:
“A content organisation can be seen as a structured map of learning resources, or a structured
activity map to guide the learner through a hierarchy of learning activities that use the
learning resources. One content developer may choose to structure the content organisation
as a table of contents for the learning resources, while another content developer may choose to
structure the content organisation as an adaptive guided path through a learning experience,
invoking learning resources only if and when they are needed. A third content developer
may create a content organisation where some discovery activities include a free form use of
some of the learning resources, while other activities are more formally managed.” [Adv09,
p. CAM3-8]
The option for learners to choose between sequentially structured courses or to freely discover
contents allows better adaptation to the kind of motivation, i.e., intrinsic of extrinsic motivation,
and learners’ previous knowledge which is related to the probability of being overstrained by too
much freedom [Ker01, p. 139].
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2.5.3 Priority to Meet Learning Objectives
Learning with books is related to well-known and physically tangible interfaces that can be
easily handled by learners, e.g., sequential structure of information, table of contents, or even
index pages for finding important aspects. In opposition to this, web-based systems could be
perceived as chaotic hypertext structures without revealing the actual amount of data but only
showing single pages with hiding the remaining ones. Thus, in this design criteria aspects are in
focus that support the orientation within learning contents and available learning paths, and in
addition, that provide (technical) support for learners to enable them to get back to the primary
task of learning with the system. Thus, technical problems and distracting functionality should
vanish and stay hidden in favour of effectively learning with the system. Note that the criterion of
keeping the priority on learning objectives in most parts is based on sophisticated and appropriate
usability concepts, i.e., only if the system is usable in an adequate manner, learning can take
place without much distraction. Nevertheless, not only generic software engineering aspects, but
also supportive elements from a less technical perspective are applicable.
Concerning supportive systems directly implemented into the e-learning system, Schulmeister
described (generic) online help systems as must-have criterion [Sch03b]. Schulmeister does not
demand help systems to be context-sensitive, i.e., it is not required to directly show relevant
help but only to offer a system where learners can search for appropriate information. In the
EVA:LERN catalogue, context-sensitive online help systems are mentioned as optional with low
value of importance. Thus, either one of these variants should be available (→ A3,2,1: maintain
(context-sensitive) online help). In addition to help information, Schulmeister considers a collec-
tion of common problems and emerging questions to be sensible (→ A3,3,1: maintain FAQ) as
well as sitemaps for better orientation within learning paths (→ A3,3,2: maintain sitemap).
Besides technical support systems and prepared help systems, human support can be very valu-
able in more complex problem situations. Technical systems that cannot be simplified beyond
a certain point to enable all possible learners to work with it efficiently introduce requirements
for proper support. For such a situation, Schulmeister mentions preparatory education for sys-
tem related aspects (→ A3,2,2: educate system related aspects). Furthermore, hotline support can
provide helpful information in case of urgent situations or problems not solvable by learners on
their own (→ A3,2,3: provide hotline support).
Concerning long-term improvement of courses, statistics, log files, and (generic) user tracking
are mentioned by Schulmeister [Sch03b]. Kerres seconds this approach of evaluating learning
behaviour like duration of learning, number of interrupts, way of using the system, and progress
within a course [Ker01, p. 112]. Taking records of user behaviour and possibly adapting system’s
reaction to previous behaviour is also indicated in the Learning Technology Systems Architecture
(LTSA) created by the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Learning Tech-
nology Standards Committee (LTSC) [IEE01]. Note that we have to distinguish (automated)
technical tracking (→ A3,2,4: track and evaluate user activities) and explicitly conducted surveys
using questionnaires and involving learners who take part in this survey voluntarily (→ A3,2,5:
conduct evaluation survey).
2.5.4 Flexible Learning
E-learning systems can be used with different objectives. While most platforms are only “abused”
as simple presentation systems managing documents or provide chaotic communication channels
(cf. [Sch03b, p. 152]), e-learning systems also can aim at supporting the learning process with
as much flexibility as known for presence teaching scenarios. In presence teaching, the process
of teaching, besides proper preparation and technical competences of teaching staff, requires
capabilities for a flexible adaptation to emerging problems and changing situations [Ker01]. From
a technical point of view, Wang mentions “essential features” as follows:
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“Essential features addressing multiplicity and flexibility will be discussed including: multi-
ple course representations, tools, communication types and channels, support, interactions,
flexible course structure, personalised communication and feedback system, and cultural-
sensitivity to better meet the needs of learners from diverse backgrounds.” [WR02, p. 575]
Thus, flexibility in e-learning systems can be considered in two perspectives. First, flexibility
in communication and level of user interactivity, and second, flexibility with respect to course
creation as well as integration of intended activities and cooperative elements. Concerning the
first perspective, spontaneous cooperation as mentioned above (with reference to Wessner [Wes05,
pp. 101-102]) provides flexible access to other (more experienced) peers and tutors for receiving
support in currently emerging problems (→ A4,2,1: participate in spontaneous cooperation). With
respect to the second perspective on flexibility, Gee et al. stated that it should be an aim to
design tools in a way
“to be flexible so that they can be used at a number of levels, from major pedagogical re-
engineering of courses through to enrichment of aspects of the learning process with engaging
and illustrative resources.” [GCC+05, p. 2]
This includes generic (re-)engineering of courses to adapt the structure and content accord-
ing to the current situation including specific target groups (→ A4,3,1: (re-)engineer courses).
Furthermore, Gee et al. propagate engaging and illustrative resources. In web-based e-learning
systems, this most probably requires the integration of plug-ins to interpret specific file formats
for animations with sophisticated program logic and appealing contents. In most cases, these
are superior to rather static web pages (→ A4,2,2: include illustrative dynamic resources). Note
that with respect to web accessibility (cf. [Bud04]) the use of plug-ins should be avoided due
to increased dependencies on client-side and reduced opportunities for persons with inabilities
to access information encoded in corresponding (mostly proprietary) file formats. Nevertheless,
HTML (hypertext mark-up language) and CSS (cascading style sheets) are not sufficient for pro-
viding flexibility concerning a high degree of user interaction, and as such, their exclusive usage
cannot be guaranteed for e-learning.
Wessner explicitly states requirements for good collaborative systems [Wes05, pp. 48-50]. In
particular, he claims the need for flexible transitions between different learning modes, e.g., indi-
vidual learning versus synchronous/asynchronous cooperative learning. On an earlier page in his
dissertation Wessner explicitly distinguishes four parts of such modes and methodologies [Wes05,
p. 15], i.e., articulation of lessons like structuring in phases, kind of process like analytical, syn-
thetic, or project-based process, social forms for dividing learners into small groups or teach them
all together, and finally action forms like discussions, demonstrations, silent work, or generic pre-
sentations. Ferstl and Ulrich [FU04] second this subdivision by presenting comparable forms. For
flexibility in e-learning, mostly transitions between action and social forms are of interest. Kerres
additionally divides action forms into presentational, activating, and structuring forms [Ker01,
p. 179]. While presentational action forms include multimedia presentations, audio or symbolic
information, and visualisation elements for procedures and processes, activating forms include
animations with interactions and communicative elements that demand learners to participate
in discussions and interact with presented material. Structuring action forms are mostly reduced
to meta-information, which allows better navigation and switching of current learning topics
(→ A4,3,2: use different action forms). Transitions of social forms are mostly related to capabili-
ties of simply creating or breaking up groups as intended for the course progress with individual
and cooperative learning phases. While different ways of composing groups were mentioned in
Section 2.5.1, for flexibility of e-learning systems, the integration of and switching between social
forms are considered. For this, of course, a specific set of possibilities for creating groups should
be available with best flexibility to be integrated into the course and to be best manageable at
least by teachers for intended cooperative phases (→ A4,3,3: apply different social forms).
22 2. Literature Survey
2.5.5 Integration into Learning Environment
Obviously, user interfaces and possibilities for users differ in working with books or paper notes,
versus e-learning systems with an informatics system as single interface for managing the pre-
sentation of learning material and storage of notes. In this context, one major aspect for the
integration of e-learning into a learning environment refers to all tasks and activities to be inte-
grated in e-learning systems in order to bridge the gap between presence teaching and e-learning.
This means, presence teaching with decentralised note taking and learning with paper-based
material, such that annotations can easily be applied, needs to be transferred to e-learning ap-
propriately. With respect to space and time independence for learners, e-learning systems have
to centrally store all relevant data for providing increased flexibility. Thus, every learner spon-
taneously can connect over a nearby computer and can access all of his notes and materials. A
second aspect touching this integration is given by connections to foreign systems, such that a
single portal can be provided for the learner while all other system components are encapsulated
and hidden behind a single user interface. This aspect is rather related to an architectural view
with respect to software engineering, and therefore, will be further discussed in Section 2.6.1.
Starting from the very beginning, learners browse offered contents and navigate through the
material. This was already introduced as interaction of very low level, i.e., interaction without
changing learning contents (cf. [SES08]) (→ A5,1,1: interact without changing learning contents).
Activities that are well-known for traditional learning and hence should be transferred to e-
learning are the management of bookmarks (→ A5,1,2: manage bookmarks), the management
of personal notes including sharing of notes with other learners (→ A5,1,3: manage personal
notes), and the management of annotations (→ A5,1,4: manage annotations). All these items
were explicitly listed in the catalogue presented by Schulmeister [Sch03b]. Kerres particularly
encourages the use of annotations, since writing annotations to learning material supports the
creation of cognitive structures which is not given in the same manner with passively perceiving
other media like films [Ker01, p. 248]. With respect to cooperation as discussed in Section 2.5.1,
user profiles and portraits can be advantageous for individual learners to feel more comfortable by
knowing at least some more details about possible communication partners (→ A5,2,1: maintain
user profile and portrait). This in particular may be desirable for some learners to voluntarily
disclose cognitive problems to teachers who are not known in person. Sharing intimate and
possibly embarrassing facts most probably will be easier for learners if they feel comfortable
and are familiar with a communication partner. As a final task, we consider the management
of course participation (→ A5,3,1: manage course participation). While this is rather obvious in
presence teaching, it explicitly has to be integrated in e-learning systems. This means, teachers
should be able to manage a list of participants fulfilling preliminary course requirements and
learners, on the other hand, should be able to enrol in courses they are interested in. The latter
case especially is of relevance with respect to commercial courses, such that participation also
affects billing mechanisms. From the point of view of orientation and status accessibility, a list
of courses where a learner is enrolled should easily be available, e.g., in form of a starting screen
(“portal”, cf. [Sch03b]) that even could be used to switch courses.
2.6 Security Engineering for E-Learning
Having considered tasks and activities from an educational science perspective, this section will
consider e-learning systems from the perspective of informatics, in particular from the viewpoints
of software engineering and information security. This includes relevant criteria for software
quality and modularisation concepts, e.g., a separation of modules using implemented interfaces
or service-oriented architectures. Also, features in e-learning systems for supporting learners will
be regarded, besides directly learning related tasks. In addition, due to the increased complexity
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with respect to constructivist learning theories, it is crucial to construct an e-learning system
as simple and modular as possible, such that deficiencies can be easily recognised and possible
security incidents be prevented:
“There are two ways of constructing a software design. One way is to make it so simple that
there are obviously no deficiencies and the other is to make it so complicated that there are no
obvious deficiencies.” (Charles Antony Richard Hoare, 1980 at ACM Turing Award Lecture)
Including all educational science requirements into the design, a very simple architecture is not
sufficient for supporting the learning process as a whole. Hence, an appropriate e-learning system
must be designed in a way that security is an inherent property, such that the non-obvious
deficiencies as mentioned by Hoare can be mostly eliminated instead of simply hiding them from
intruders.
In the first part of this section software architectural aspects will be considered, and in the second
part information security tasks will be added accordingly.
2.6.1 Software Architecture
The primary expectation of users, although mostly implicit, is the reliability of used software
and the ease of use. This in particular is necessary in e-learning with respect to avoidance of
distraction by malfunction or unreachable services:
“Learners need reliable access and user friendly tools.” [HW05, p. 3]
Examples for reliability in error-prone procedures are given by Caeriro-Rodr´ıguez et al. [CAL05]
who particularly mention concurrency and session controls. Thus, collaboration with using the
same resources must be prepared for ensuring data consistency despite concurrent access.
A possible means for providing reliability is given by modularisation and the reuse of practi-
cally approved modules. Increased reusability of components is advantageous due to a simplified
exchange of single modules without directly influencing other modules as far as interfaces were
respected accordingly. Hence, instead of rewriting modules or course data anew every time they
are needed, which is an error-prone process, already existing and reliable modules can be used.
Concerning activities in e-learning systems this is mostly related to the management of meta-
data for assets and learning objects (→ B3,1: manage metadata). In e-learning, reusability can be
regarded for different components. On the one hand, the reuse of learning contents and didactic
concepts, e.g., course structures and course concepts, should be possible. Note that the transfer
of didactic deliberations and concepts is much more difficult than a simple reuse of multimedia
assets like single videos or graphic files. On the other hand, activity and information modules of
the e-learning system are subject to reusability. This includes personalisation, i.e., the use of an
appropriate and minimal set of modules a user wants to access [SSK03, p. 225].
Concerning reusability of software components and modules, the Open Knowledge Initiative
(OKI) has to be mentioned. OKI aims at creating language independent interface specifications
to ensure appropriate modularisation and a simplified exchange of modules within an e-learning
system. In its basic aims OKI is very promising and versatile:
“The Open Knowledge Initiative (O.K.I.) is defining an architecture that precisely specifies
how the components of a learning technology environment communicate with each other and
with other campus systems. By clearly defining points of interoperability, the architecture
allows the components of a complex learning environment to be developed and updated
independently of each other.” [Edu02, p. 1]
But in fact, with respect to published specifications, OKI is strongly focusing on technical im-
plementations, i.e., interfaces of single modules are defined for classes in an object-oriented ar-
chitecture. Major criticisms on OKI specifications are, on the one hand, the lack of functionality,
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i.e., only very basic functionality for e-learning situations is considered, and, on the other hand,
additional wrapper functions are required for certain tasks in order to encapsulate basic system
calls. Especially the latter aspect, although desirable from a software engineering perspective,
breaks the conformity to OKI [Zeu08]. Furthermore, an OKI-based system after deployment ap-
pears as monolithic application (cf. [SSK03, Zeu08]), such that modularity is no longer given at
run-time.
Note that more recent documents published by core developers of the OKI specifications, e.g.,
Coppeto [CS05b], propagate OKI to be seen as a service-oriented architecture (SOA), which rep-
resents the current state of the art in architectural design. Service-oriented architectures describe
informatics systems in a more abstract way by only specifying services to be available using de-
fined interfaces – even if modules are distributed over the network. With SOA, a more abstract
view on relevant services is followed, and the focus is on flexibility due to missing dependencies
among these services. Note that the technical architecture and even the kind of technologies used
for realising such services are explicitly neglected for the SOA concept. Technological details are
only relevant for members of the technical staff who actually implement a service. Krafzig et
al. mention this as “decoupling of functionality and technology” [KBS05, p. 7] which, in fact,
simplifies porting of single services to other platforms and provide exchangeability of services as
far as interfaces are kept consistent.
Lehsten et al. [LTZ+08] outlined basic architectures, e.g., client-server-architecture, and claimed
that broker architectures can best solve emerging problems concerning appropriate flexibility for
the use of modules. Several services could be distributed over the network and be made available
using corresponding interfaces (→ B3,2: distribute and connect to services) to compose a proper
architecture including all relevant functional services, e.g., management capabilities, communi-
cation and cooperation facilities, and also mediating components for working with standards
(→ B2,1: provide and enable proper functionality). Connected services do not need to be visible
in the front-end application, which by Schulmeister is called “portal” [Sch03b, p. 143]. But this
portal can encapsulate and manage connections to external services (→ B2,2: manage connections
to external services). The broker service as mediator can be used for searching for appropriate
services, while the services themselves register with that broker in advance. For example, a li-
brary search system (cf. [Sch03b]) providing an overview of all topic related literature could be
integrated into the e-learning environment. In this thesis, access to external services will be con-
sidered in a generic manner without any limitation to a specific set of services, such that the
e-learning system can act as global system spanning several components, and therefore, leads to
an integrated learning environment [FU04, p. 105].
Another major aspect for e-learning systems is given by the adaptability to specific situations (cf.
[Sch03b]). This includes technical aspects like proper font and character encoding, e.g., Unicode
support, to enable learners to spell their names with the correct characters, and also to allow them
to communicate in their native language without using replacement strings [Jev06]. Concerning
different application fields and areas of study, various functional requirements could be stated,
e.g., natural sciences and mathematics usually need formulae for their content presentations, such
that input filters might be necessary to support easy formula integration, e.g., in LATEX syntax.
With respect to further specialities of the variety of study courses, e-learning systems, obviously,
should be easily extensible (→ B3,3: extend system) and modules should be manageable in a way
that they can be activated, deactivated, or even be replaced by other ones just as needed for the
actual learning scenario (→ B3,4: manage modules).
In addition to technical adaptations by including required modules, more organisational adap-
tations are desired. This includes the use of a globally defined appearance like a corporate de-
sign with templates clearly identifying the hosting company [Sch03b], but also adaptability of
per-course designs with respect to the learning group (→ B1,1: manage designs). Furthermore,
adaptability also can include personal adaptations to the appearance of a system (→ B1,2: per-
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sonalise appearance). User-centred personalisation can support learners by providing a system
that is optimally adjusted to individual preferences [SSK03], e.g., almost empty desktop versus
“chaotic” layout of all possibly interesting data. Learners in presence scenarios obviously differ in
their preferences, and so an e-learning system also should offer functionality to arrange their data
accordingly. Furthermore, appearance in this context includes the management of sessions, i.e.,
if a learner suspends the system and wants to go on later, then the system has to resume from
the position where this learner stopped the last time. Such a mechanism does not only guarantee
increased comfort for learners but also supports efficiency in the learning progress.
Functionality related to efficient learning is given by a possibility to register user accounts online
without the need of involving administrators to enter all relevant data [Sch03b]. Note that ad-
ministrative influence could still be desired in certain environments to confirm account creation
(→ B2,3: register user account online), e.g., for commercial courses. With respect to communi-
cation and cooperation, an archive of messages can be helpful to recall former messages in order
to prevent multiple similar discussions (→ B1,3: archive text messages). Stahl explicitly mentions
storage and archiving capabilities of computers as an advantage in the context of cooperation:
“[Computers] can overcome the limitations of human short-term memories and of paper-based
aides to generating or sharing drafts of documents.” [Sta02, p. 1]
Finally, to manage a possibly huge amount of information and to find required data as quickly
as possible, the implementation of a search engine is mentioned by Schulmeister as a desired
function with high value of importance [Sch03b]. Since this is only the demand for a feature and
not to be considered as regular activity in an e-learning system, the integration of search engine
capabilities will not be added to the task collection.
2.6.2 Security Concepts
With respect to space and time independence, as often advertised for e-learning, legitimate
learners should be enabled to connect whenever and from wherever they like. Consequently,
“nomadic users” as described by Sa´nchez et al. [SLM06] must not be restrained to a specific set
of client machines, for example, by applying IP (internet protocol) address filters only accepting
some known patterns (→C3,1: change client computer). Furthermore, multi-user systems might be
involved, such that several users could work from the same client computer. This leads to special
treatments with respect to web session management and storage of sensitive data on clients.
According to Warren and Hutchinson [WH03] e-learning systems should provide automated log-
out functionality (with destroying web sessions) to ensure that especially in case of computers
that are used by several persons no one can access data of a former user. In addition, they claim
that the complexity of such systems can lead to misconfiguration, which implicitly suggests that
systems even have to be (re-)configured at run-time when already practically used (→ C1,1:
configure system).
A basic concept for security is given by user accounts and fine-grained privileges to be assigned
to users. With respect to global system configurations, therefore, administrators must be able to
manage user accounts that were, for example, registered by users themselves as mentioned above
(→ C2,1: manage user accounts). Basing on these accounts, users have to authenticate before being
allowed to work with the system. If a user can successfully be identified, the corresponding set
of privileges will be granted (→ C2,2: authenticate users). For practical implementation, Gelbord
suggests the authentication process to be realised by the use of a PKI (public key infrastructure)
to clearly identify learners with more sophisticated mechanisms than simple password-based
authentication. Another advantage of a PKI is the integration of non-repudiation mechanisms.
If sensitive processes are signed by the user’s private key, then authenticity and integrity can be
verified (→ C2,3: deploy PKI).
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For the management of user privileges (→ C2,4: manage privileges), in e-learning there appears
to be an impressive consensus for using role-based access controls (→ C2,5: apply roles-based
access control) (cf. [Sch03b, KR04, Wei05]). But note that affiliated roles possibly follow different
points of view, and therefore, conflicts in their expectations and behaviour could lead to security
problems that need to be managed accordingly [Wei05]. Kienle and Ritterskamp [KR04] explicitly
state that the roles of moderators and participants must be separated to not provoke interest
conflicts possibly leading to abuse of privileges (→ C2,6: clearly separate duties). Furthermore,
role-based access controls must be applied with possibilities to separate subgroups within a
specific role [Sch03b], e.g., for cooperative scenarios different groups of learners (all assigned to
the same role “learner”) should work with only having the privileges to access their own group’s
results.
Despite all technical security means, users usually are the weakest part of the security concept.
This means, fallibility and obliviousness of users can lead to more problems than misconfigura-
tion of systems. Kajava and colleagues [Kaj03] (including [KV02a, KV02b]) investigated security
demands for e-learning mostly focusing on users of the system, i.e., how to teach learners to act
according to policies in order to not support security breaches by circumventing security mecha-
nisms. Related to security education, security policies can provide helpful information for users
on how to act correctly. Note that we have to distinguish formal and informal security policies.
Informal security policies address general rules concerning human behaviour, but cannot be eval-
uated automatically by the system due to their lack of formalised rules (→ C1,2: state (informal)
security policies). Formal policies, on the other hand, contain mostly technically oriented rules
that can be formalised, and as such, be automatically evaluated and enforced (→ C2,7: state and
enforce (formal) security policies). For example, such formal rules can demand passwords to fulfil
certain parameters, or state limits on how many and what sort of connections are allowed for
some server (cf. intrusion detection systems, [CS05a]).
A particular aspect mentioned by Graf [Gra03] is the content protection with respect to copyright
enforcement. Graf describes mechanisms for copyright protection and tracing approaches using
digital watermarking, such that information about the last legitimate request for these data is
stored within the multimedia asset, and therefore, illegal copies can be traced back to the last
requester who most probably will be the one who distributed the content (→ C1,3: apply content
protection).
Furthermore, Hentea et al. [HSP03] claimed assessments to be a main topic for e-learning. Al-
though in this thesis online assessments will not be considered (cf. Sec. 1.4.3), intended co-
operation and collaborative tasks among groups of learners also require the consideration of
mechanisms for preventing and detecting cheating attempts between different groups (→ C1,4:
prevent and detect cheating).
Another special case for requirements and activities is given by increased privacy demands. Borcea
et al. [BDF+06] present a system managing different so-called partial identities for a single user
in e-learning systems, such that each identity can be used for different tasks in a system or for
different courses. This is desirable in their opinion to explicitly decouple the situation of being
a learner in some course and of being a moderator in another course. No one should have any
disadvantage or be treated negatively, for example, by other learners only because of acting in
the role of a tutor or moderator in another course (→ C2,8: support privacy concepts). Note
that such a concept demands increased privacy and anonymity deliberations on a lower layer.
By the use of anonymous communication channels that are managed by a middleware, even the
e-learning system cannot be exploited to trace a learner and to link different partial identities to
observe users [BDF+06] (→ C3,2: ensure anonymous communication). El-Khatib et al. [EKXY03]
investigate similar aspects for e-learning in the form of traffic flow analysis prevention by Onion
Routing [RSG97, GRS99] and Mixes [Cha81], such that learners entirely can stay anonymous to
the e-learning system. This might be necessary for education within companies, where possibly
data protection legislation is affected, if learners can be observed excessively.
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2.7 Resulting Limitations for Practical Systems
Besides the sets of activities connected to e-learning scenarios, discussed requirements and expec-
tations of learners also introduce certain limits for security implementations. These limits must
be respected in order to receive acceptance on the learners’ side, which is essential for actually
improving the security situation in e-learning. Obviously, security mechanisms are only of effect
if practically used and not ignored or circumvented by users.
Limits and related consequences will be discussed in more detail in the following subsections. In
addition, they will be picked up for the creation of recommendations in Chapter 6 to provide
suitability of recommendations for the actual demands and expectations connected to e-learning
scenarios.
2.7.1 Complexity and Character of E-Learning Systems
E-learning systems in this thesis are understood as (compounds of) applications supporting the
learning process as broadly as possible. In opposition to wider definitions that even include
the simplest applications dedicated to learning or training very specific matter, e.g., vocabulary
trainers, this results in significantly more complex systems. With respect to discussed educa-
tional aspects and implications, as given for providing support for the whole learning process,
this results in functionality to be included for implementing almost all of the mentioned aspects.
Constructivist learning theories result in demands for a high degree of freedom including sophis-
ticated evaluation mechanisms and implementations that cannot be solved by static web-based
systems. Furthermore, increasing the interactivity level raises the demand for integrating dy-
namic elements like using the AJAX (asynchronous Javascript and XML (extensible mark-up
language)) approach, stand-alone programs, applets to be loaded within a web page, or anima-
tions integrated over plug-in extensions. In addition, flexibility on teacher’s choice is desired to
enable an appropriate organisation of the group of learners and to manage them in different sub-
groups with specific tasks. It is sensible to integrate switching points where learners can choose
between different presentation forms, exemplary case studies, or intensity levels, e.g., beginner
vs. expert level. This demands a sophisticated management of resources to enable contents of
different learning paths concerning the same topic to be related internally, such that at the next
switching point learners of all learning paths again are brought together to the same thread.
Modularity, portability, and platform independence are key concepts for successful reusability of
software components [Bal00]. Especially modularity is considered valuable to reduce the complex-
ity of a software product by splitting the entire project in several smaller and better manageable
pieces of software. This means, complex systems can offer great opportunities for customers, but
complexity also represents one of the best arguments for security investigation:
“The future of digital systems is complexity, and complexity is the worst enemy of security.”
(Bruce Schneier)2
Hence, stated requirements for functionality within an e-learning system will have to be discussed
with strong relations to security in the course of this thesis to cope with this “worst enemy”.
2.7.2 Security Restraints
Absolute security is only possible by absolute control, if at all. Hence, all activities would have
to be logged and controlled in real-time to not enable fraudulent use or at least detect and stop
it as soon as possible.
2Crypto-Gram Newsletter, March 15, 2000: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0003.html [03-11-2009]
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However, despite the stated necessity for exhaustive security deliberations, we have to respect
the secondary value of security measures [Wes08] and take care of the primary goal of e-learning:
support the learning process. This means, supervision could be interpreted negatively, and there-
fore, it can lead to rejection. Privacy is considered very valuable, i.e., absolute control interferes
with privacy and autonomy demands – especially of adult learners [KHS05]. Thus, security can-
not be implemented using all possible logging mechanisms; otherwise, learners could be repelled.
An important step to do is communicating planned supervision and mentoring intentions. Trans-
parency is required to inform learners about the organisational framework including aspects of
how the learning progress will be observed and where private communication is possible. In addi-
tion, especially for communication facilities, it is desirable to announce who is currently listening
to communication, e.g., in chat rooms, and what activity can be considered to be private or
teacher controlled.
Furthermore, all tasks besides learning, e.g., technical administration or interacting with security
mechanisms, should be comprehensive and be reduced to a minimum for not distracting more than
absolutely necessary. Security demands and implemented means must not be so time-consuming
and laborious that they become primary. On the one hand, this concerns technical reliability
aspects, e.g., reliable data storage, version control, and concurrency management in collaborative
learning. On the other hand, security relevant interaction like authentication and authorisation
should be kept simple to use.
The conflict of security aim vs. privacy and reduced distraction results in requirements for appro-
priate privilege management with transparent announcements of possibly observable activities.
Privileges have to be assigned, such that private elements are possible to enable personal generic
communication, as well as supervised learning phases with tutor access. These areas have to be
strictly separated. Privacy and demands for self-direction must be accepted as far as possible,
and as such, security demands need to be lowered to a certain extent in favour of more comfort
for learners.
“Security features usually increase the cost of a system and may make it harder to use. Before
designing a secure system, therefore, one should identify the specific threats against which
protection is required.” [ITU91, p. 35]
Hence, the threat analysis in this thesis is meant to actually investigate the threat situation for
e-learning and to provide decisions about the required security level. We need to realise that
missing acceptance of (and usage by) learners in the system is even worse than missing perfect
security.
2.8 Conclusion
First, typical activities and common tasks, as well as specific requirements for e-learning were
considered – without being limited to security in e-learning literature. Second, the informatics
research fields of software engineering and security engineering were examined concerning criteria
and common activities in web-based systems. Extracted tasks and activities to be implemented
in e-learning systems are collected and illustrated in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. For referencing
collected activities in subsequent chapters, the terminology as introduced in Section 2.4 will be
used, i.e., the place holder symbol “2” as depicted in the tables will be replaced by respective
indices.
Especially when regarding the amount of different activities for fulfilling demands from educa-
tional science, a certain degree of complexity in e-learning systems and a corresponding demand
for flexibility in its construction get obvious. Note that practical e-learning systems do not nec-
essarily implement all mentioned activities, but only a specific subset. Nevertheless, for a general
threat analysis, all mentioned activities will be considered in the following, such that for a con-
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Table 2.2: Activities in e-learning systems from an educational science perspective
A2,1,2: learning process A2,2,2: learning support A2,3,2: learning management
A 1
,2
,2
1. generically communicate
2. participate in intended
cooperation
3. mutually assist each
other
4. manage groups (as
teacher)
1. mentor learners in case of
problems
2. moderate cooperation
1. join group (as learner)
A 2
,2
,2
1. interact with influencing
learning contents
2. interact with systems
providing feedback
1. evaluate chosen learning
paths
1. create learning paths
A 3
,2
,2
1. maintain (context-
sensitive) online help
2. educate system related
aspects
3. provide hotline support
4. track and evaluate user
activities
5. conduct evaluation
survey
1. maintain FAQ
2. maintain sitemap
A 4
,2
,2
1. participate in
spontaneous cooperation
2. include illustrative
dynamic resources
1. (re-)engineer courses
2. use different action forms
3. apply different social
forms
A 5
,2
,2
1. interact without changing
learning contents
2. manage bookmarks
3. manage personal notes
4. manage annotations
1. maintain user profile and
portrait
1. manage course
participation
Table 2.3: Activities in e-learning systems from a software engineering perspective
B1,2: usability B2,2: functionality B3,2: architecture
1. manage designs
2. personalise appearance
3. archive text messages
1. provide and enable
proper functionality
2. manage connections to
external services
3. register user account
online
1. manage metadata
2. distribute and connect to
services
3. extend system
4. manage modules
Table 2.4: Activities in e-learning systems from an information security perspective
C1,2: human factor C2,2: program logic C3,2: infrastructure
1. configure system
2. state (informal) security
policies
3. apply content protection
4. prevent and detect
cheating
1. manage user accounts
2. authenticate users
3. deploy PKI
4. manage privileges
5. apply roles-based access
control
6. clearly separate duties
7. state and enforce
(formal) security policies
8. support privacy concepts
1. change client computers
2. ensure anonymous
communication
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crete e-learning system the respective set of threats can easily be extracted and transferred. With
respect to the quantity of identified activities, from a software engineering perspective modular-
isation and connections among several independent software components is reasonable. These
components can overtake single functionality to achieve flexibility and to improve reliability. In
addition, concerning information security aspects, numerous tasks and activities were mentioned
in literature that emphasise human interaction. Therefore, fallibility, obliviousness, or bad intent
can be considered to be the root of many security incidents in e-learning. The “human factor”,
i.e., activities of users and human error, is particularly indicated to be an important facet of
security in e-learning. Consequently, this has to be considered when creating appropriate recom-
mendations for e-learning systems in Chapter 6. Security education and technical support in case
of problems, thus, gain in importance.
In summary, numerous scenarios and related activities are conceivable that might threaten affil-
iated data and users, or that could influence other activities and result in distraction of learners.
Consequently, mentioned activities in the following chapter will be used to extract (technically
manageable) assets that need to be protected in e-learning. The direct deduction of relevant assets
from activities is sensible to ensure that the systematic threat analysis as described in Chapter 4
can specifically be conducted for the domain of e-learning without excessive consideration of
general software-based or hardware-based threats.
Chapter 3
Preparation of the Threat Analysis
3.1 Overview
Security is a relative term closely related to the actual threat situation. Approaches aiming at an
all-in-one solution for a general, highly secure, and still practically applicable security concept
usually tend to fail [Sei06]. To avoid such problems, the threat analysis as described in this thesis
will base on e-learning specific concepts and processes. Figure 3.1 sketches the current step of
identifying assets within the whole analysis process:
identification mitigation
typical
activities
roles
assets
threats threatmanagement
Figure 3.1: Current position in analysis process – step 2
Starting with findings and results of Chapter 2, assets and related roles for e-learning will be
deduced in the following. In this context, assets mostly represent valuable data elements or con-
cepts that are worth protecting in the domain of e-learning. These assets per se are independent
of the actually applied methodology for the threat analysis, since they only describe valuable
elements of the considered target systems. Hence, this step of identifying assets is independent
of the subsequent step of analysing threats.
Bear in mind that assets most probably will represent data of different kind. Obviously, from an
organisational perspective, assets have to be treated differently with respect to their actual value
within the examined domain, e.g., learning contents are different to private communication data.
Furthermore, data elements can be of different scope and value concerning legal aspects, e.g.,
data related to personal identity explicitly are covered by data protection legislation while other
data elements might not be protected by any form of regimentation. But despite such differences
in an organisational layer, from a technical perspective almost all of these data can be considered
uniformly as entries in database relations or other storage systems without any difference in their
semantics and relevance for the actual application. This especially implies that attacks against
corresponding storage systems will affect all data assets at once. Nevertheless, for the sake of
focusing on domain specific threats, in this chapter we will consider assets from an organisational
perspective with partly neglecting actual technical data organisation and storage systems for this
moment. However, technical threats still will be regarded within the threat analysis phase.
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3.2 Role Based Access Control
Since there seems to be general agreement to role-based access control schemes for e-learning
(cf. [Sch03b, KR04, Wei05]), in a first step we will take a closer look on required or conceivable
roles for e-learning. This also includes an examination of a possible minimum amount of roles to
not introduce interest conflicts reasoned by different duties and excessive privileges assigned to
a single physical person.
Starting with an identification of required roles, several suggestions can be found in literature.
In the IEEE Learning Technology Systems Architecture (LTSA) [IEE01] four entities are in-
troduced that can be transferred to roles: learner entity, coach, evaluation, and delivery. While
learner entity and coach can trivially be assigned to roles like learners and teachers, evaluation
and delivery can be considered as (independent) third parties for conducting surveys and for the
creation of learning material respectively. Weippl [Wei05] provides a similar division of roles. He
distinguishes teachers, authors, learners, and managers. In this distinction, teachers and learners
represent the main roles involved in the learning process, authors are responsible for the creation
and design of learning material, and, finally, managers represent executives of an institution who
are responsible for the whole system, but are not directly involved in the learning process in any
way. Furthermore, Kerres proposes several persons for the conceptualisation of didactic media
[Ker01, p. 171], since in his opinion it is generally not possible to let this be done by a single
person – neither by teachers nor authors. This especially includes persons with topic-related
expertise, persons with didactic design competence, and persons with topic-related didactic ex-
perience. According to Kerres, it also depends on the quality of this cooperation, whether the
resulting media concept will be adequate in content and didactics. Similarly, Bruns and Gajewski
[BG02] divide didactically experienced persons from those who actually implement the contents.
However, the most interesting approach of Bruns and Gajewski is the consideration of roles as
linked to different types of e-learning systems. In their opinion no uniform separation of roles
does exist, since everything depends on the regarded e-learning scenario (cf. Fig. 3.2). Besides
such variable sets of roles, some roles are introduced as omnipresent, e.g., administrator for build-
ing and maintaining the technical infrastructure and a responsible project leader for managing
the e-learning project as a whole. Despite their general existence, this does not necessarily re-
quire these roles to be still present at each institution after deployment of an e-learning system.
For example, the role of a project leader is to be in touch with persons not directly involved
in the learning process, e.g., representatives, public relation personnel, administrators of formal
concerns, technicians, or legal advisers. An administrator in this context is responsible for the
technical aspects like an appropriate infrastructure. Thus, technicians/administrators – possibly
only as consignees of the project leader – build up an infrastructure that is capable of planned
tasks. A further omnipresent role, although not explicitly mentioned as such in [BG02], is given
by learners. This role especially suggests a distinction of roles in global and local scope. This
means, all users in the system independent of their global role can be locally in the role of learners
within a course of some (other) teacher.
Starting with examples as given by Bruns and Gajewski [BG02], e-learning types roughly can
be divided into five variants as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Note that besides the pure presence
of roles, this figure also introduces the concept of internal and external roles. In this context,
“internal” refers to employees of the same institution that actually use the e-learning system,
while “external” means to pay third parties for doing the corresponding job. With respect to
differences in those e-learning types, the first type is considered as product that was purchased
by an institution to educate own members using small pieces of information. These e-learning
contents must not be too large in size, since there are no tutors present to support in case of
problems. Type 2 also considers e-learning content to be produced by external authors, but tutor
support is also available as a service purchased for the institute’s members. For types 3 and
4, the concepts of purchasable products and services were partly or entirely incorporated by a
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#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
e-learning types
external
tutors
internal
tutors
internal
authors
external
authors
no
tutors
internal
tutors
e-learning as 
product
e-learning as
purchasable
service
incorporation of
service and/or product
e-learning as 
knowledge 
management
rather small 
pieces of 
contents 
variable sizes of courses,
determined by business model and prices
small pieces 
of information
undefined
author
decentralised
experts
Figure 3.2: Different types of e-learning scenarios
regarded institution. Thus, either tutors were educated and designated to support other learners
within the own institution or, for type 4, even the contents were produced by internal authors.
Note that the size of courses in types 2 to 4 depends significantly on the business model and the
amount of purchased services. A special type of e-learning is given by knowledge management
(type 5; cf. [BG02]), since there is a central system that can be used to store instructions and
procedure descriptions by several employees to support others. In addition, instead of centrally
organised tutors, contact information to specialists within the same company can be given for
further support in case of problems.
In the following, assets will be directly deduced from activities as outlined in Chapter 2. Roles
will be involved to support the discussion. This primarily means, that respective viewpoints of
different roles have to be considered to take care of possible conflicts in expectations connected
to assets.
3.3 Identification of Assets
In Chapter 2 tasks and activities were introduced and classified using a strict thematic division in
disciplines and layers with respect to the proximity to users. In the following, former assignments
will be refined by additional classes to provide more accurate classifications. Thus, activities will
be reorganised and put in chronological order with respect to the learning process or an emulated
attack sequence. The additional examination procedures aim at a thorough coverage of important
aspects and a more meaningful identification of assets by combining all introduced activities to
describe a generic e-learning scenario.
3.3.1 Procedure
Eibl and Schubert presented design criteria for e-learning and explicitly outlined connections be-
tween these criteria and dependencies as given for software engineering and information security
[ES08a]. In the following, this approach will be refined with adapted sets of criteria for each dis-
cipline (cf. Tab. 3.1). Thus, design criteria for e-learning as presented in Section 2.5 are extended
by the criteria of “equal opportunities” to emphasise the aspect of various types of learners
and different technical and organisational conditions. For software engineering, a classification as
given by the standard ISO/IEC 9126-1 [ISO01] will be used. As a third set of criteria, information
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Table 3.1: Sets of criteria
e-learning software engineering information security
A1 social support by cooperation and
communication
B1 functionality C1 authentication
A2 activities of students as important
step of the learning process
B2 reliability C2 access control
A3 priority to meet learning objectives B3 usability C3 data confidentiality
A4 flexible learning B4 efficiency C4 data integrity
A5 integration into learning environment B5 maintainability C5 non-repudiation
A6 equal opportunities B6 portability C6 availability
security services as presented in the standard ISO 7498-2 [ISO89] are applied, extended by the
commonly used criterion of “availability”.
These sets of criteria in the following are put into relation with each other to extract direct or
indirect dependencies and to uncover common properties for building clusters for subsequent
examination steps (cf. Fig. 3.3). Note that this step is necessary with respect to different char-
acteristics of mentioned criteria. For example, reliability (B2) and availability (C6) although in
different criteria sets have more similarities than efficiency (B4) and maintainability (B5). Hence,
a simple transfer of columns in Table 3.1 to clusters for further investigation would be too vague
and imprecise. Thus, starting with the social situation and the communication context of learn-
ers, the term “situated learning” [LW91] especially demands that communication capabilities
that are implemented must be sufficient for sharing knowledge and for getting in contact with
other learners in order to succeed. The social aspect and learning in groups explicitly will be
considered in this thesis. Social support and cooperation (A1) primarily depend on appropriate
functionality (B1) with subcriteria like accuracy and suitability. To support the security of re-
spective functionality, data confidentiality (C3) is required to keep private messages undisclosed
to unauthorised persons. It should be left to the learners themselves to decide who is allowed
to view private notes. In addition to this, cooperation and communication facilities require a
sufficient level of reliability (B2), which demands efficiency (B4) and availability (C6) for appro-
priately working with this functionality. An e-learning system in this context is called available
if it is reachable over a network with sufficient resources every time it is needed. Hence, besides
the pure existence of connectivity also efficiency is ensured. Reliability adds demands for busi-
ness continuity and a minimisation of time periods for technical service. Failures, if any, may
only lead to short interruptions. Data integrity (C4) is required for ensuring data exchange with
unaltered message contents. Modifications of transmitted or stored data must be detectable. If
reasoned by technical defects, fault tolerance and error correction can be applied. If reasoned by
fraudulent usage, originator and context should be revealed with the help of integrity assurance
mechanisms. To provide data confidentiality (C3) and data integrity (C4), an appropriate access
control (C2) is required, which bases on a sophisticated authentication (C1) of users. Obviously,
it should be ensured that users cannot transfer or increase their assigned privileges even if they
collaborate – at least not without the perpetrator being identified. Another aspect is given by
learning-related activities. Since in constructivism learning is no longer considered as externally
transfusing knowledge but as a constructive process in each learner, this implies learning to be
considered as an active process. Activities of students as an important step of the learning process
(A2) also depend on a proper functionality (B1). In addition, access control (C2) is necessary
for not negatively influencing other learners during learning activities. It is absolutely essential
to guarantee that learning objectives are prioritised almost equivalently to presence teaching,
i.e., distraction by organisational and technical issues is kept minimal. Priority to meet learning
objectives (A3) refers to a software design that takes care of proper usability (B3) and protection
of own data and results. Third parties should be prevented by access control mechanisms (C2)
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Figure 3.3: Dependencies among criteria
from changing foreign data on purpose or by mistake. Furthermore, each e-learning system has
to be adapted to the special target group of learners including a learner-centred approach. Thus,
flexible learning (A4) describes possibilities to include and apply new activities fitting to required
didactic deliberations with respect to the actual target group. Besides functionality (B1), this also
depends on proper maintainability (B5) including modularisation and management of function
modules by realising the subcriteria of changeability. Learning is a process which needs a care-
fully designed learning environment. The integration of e-learning components into the learning
environment (A5), therefore, depends on flexibility in learning (A4) for not restricting teaching
methods or didactic considerations, reliability (B2) of the system to actually being able to use
it for efficient learning whenever wanted, and access control mechanisms (C2) to implement a
separation of duties and roles as known from presence teaching. Finally, to reach many learners
without increased restraints, equal opportunities (A6) are aspired including demands for avail-
ability (C6) and portability (B6) referring to possible system-related limitations. In addition,
equality is connected to usability (B3) demands for not excluding less experienced users. With
respect to mutual influence and possible denial of activities, non-repudiation (C5) needs to be
implemented for achieving equal opportunities in the sense of fair and equal treatment of users
without possibilities for cheating on them. Note that this again requires data integrity (C4) for
not being undermined.
Having outlined dependencies and relations between stated criteria for e-learning, we can cluster
them as sketched in Figure 3.3 by dashed lines. While the integration into the learning environ-
ment (A5) affects all aspects and layers of e-learning systems, the other criteria can be assigned
to one of three groups for identifying related assets:
I. e-learning (cf. Sec. 3.3.2),
II. information security services (cf. Sec. 3.3.3), and
III. web services (cf. Sec 3.3.4).
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Scenario
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taxonomy
Figure 3.4: Connection of Didactic Scenario, Scene, and Situation according to Baumgartner
[Bau06, p. 61] (translated from German)
In the following paragraphs, the procedures for examining these classes will be discussed, before
assets will actually be examined in corresponding sections.
Since “e-learning” consists of learning specific aspects, a structure following learning scenarios
and didactic deliberations seems sensible. Hence, an approach similar to the taxonomy creation
process of Baumgartner [Bau06] will be applied. Baumgartner uses concrete situations, i.e., per-
formed activities and finished courses, as a starting point for the development of more abstract
and freely applicable didactic scenarios (cf. Fig. 3.4). This development approach, on the one
hand, aims at the creation of scenarios that can be applied to actual situations and, on the other
hand, at the creation of appropriately usable taxonomy levels and methods. In the following, sim-
ilar to Baumgartner we will introduce organisational and learning specific situations that can be
used to deduce assets for a threat analysis. Furthermore, introduced situations will be brought into
relation with the skeleton of a learning process. Phases used for this process base on a three-steps-
model for organising classroom education in schools as presented by Meyer [Mey88, pp. 122-181].
In German, Meyer calls these steps “Unterrichtseinstieg”–“Erarbeitung”–“Ergebnissicherung”.
When translating this to English and adapting it from classroom education to e-learning, these
steps can be referred to as “preparation of learning”, “working on new content”, and “repetition
and assessment”. Note that in this thesis for the last step only self-assessment will be considered
(cf. Sec. 1.4.3). Besides the actual learning process, organisational steps prior to learning as well
as postprocessing steps will have to be considered for covering all related situations. With the ap-
proach of, first, regarding preparatory steps, second, phases of the learning process, and, finally,
postprocessing steps, this procedure represents a chronological structure from first contact with
the e-learning system to a final cancellation of participation. However, possible cyclic repetitions
within the process are not explicitly outlined in the following due to repeatedly affecting the
same system components and assets.
For “information security services”, no further transformation is required. Security services as
introduced in [ISO89] already provide technical descriptions and are manageable by technical
systems. Consequently, for an identification of assets related to security services, a procedure
regarding criteria C1 to C5 with corresponding assets directly connected to these services will
be followed. Criterion C6 will be neglected in this group due to its closer relations to generic
web services and dependencies on technical base systems rather than on organisational, system
internal security implementations.
With respect to similarities of e-learning to software engineering projects in general, and to web
applications in particular, for group “web services” a structure related to the multi-tier approach
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Table 3.2: Integration of e-learning into the learning environment
E-Learning
Information Security
Services Web Services
〈organisational steps prior to learning〉
〈preparation of learning〉
〈working on new content〉
〈repetition and assessment〉
〈postprocessing〉
〈authentication〉
〈access control〉
〈data confidentiality〉
〈data integrity〉
〈non-repudiation〉
〈network architecture〉
〈software components〉
〈data collection
and exchange〉
of distributing core services over a network seems sensible, e.g., putting the user interface man-
agement, program logic, and data retention on different physical systems. The distribution over
a network can be very different according to the size of an institution and the concept behind
the e-learning scenario. Interfaces and connected data, therefore, also have to be considered as
well as reliability aspects and utilisation statistics. A structure resulting from this multi-tier ap-
proach can be reasoned as follows: “network architecture” for the actually implemented physical
systems and the underlying network topology, “software components” representing software as
distributed over the physical network, and “data collection and exchange” for all sets of data
exchanged between these components and stored in corresponding software.
As stated in Section 3.2 assets in the following will be deduced from activities as outlined in
Chapter 2, i.e., references to the A–C entries as presented in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 will be
included where appropriate. In addition, identified assets will be highlighted in the text by giving
their title in brackets. Those highlighted assets will be collected and presented in the form of
a table at the end of this chapter. Table 3.2 provides a skeleton for the sake of illustration
comprising introduced groups. Substructure elements for the investigation in subsequent sections
are surrounded by angle brackets. These elements will be replaced in the final result table by
appropriate assets.
3.3.2 E-Learning
This group concerns all activities related to actual teaching and learning processes. Thus, assets
to be extracted in the following are related to learning and to the learners’ progress or comprehen-
sion. Note that assets usually consist of several subitems that can be combined to more general
ones for the sake of simplicity and manageability. Assets to be used for subsequent phases will be
highlighted accordingly. As structure for this subsection, organisational and didactic situations
in chronological order as presented in Table 3.3 will be used.
O1,1: registration
The amount of information to be stored during the registration process (cf. B2,3, C2,1) within
an e-learning system can vary significantly according to the underlying business model and the
aim of provided courses, e.g., issuing certificates. Typical data to be entered for a registration
include personal information like (real) name, postal address, phone number, or email address.
In addition, also personal system settings, desired courses, or certain options influencing a user’s
treatment within the system, e.g., a set of purchased services, may be stored. Once an account has
been created, internal management information like a registration number or date of enrolment
are stored, as well as a user portrait generated to provide other learners with shared information
about this new user. This user portrait, of course, can, and should be managed by the user himself
to share personal information on his own discretion (cf. A5,2,1). Concerning the identification and
administration of learners, data directly related to learners are required – even if these data might
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Table 3.3: Learning process and connected didactic and organisational situations
phase situation
or
g. organisational steps prior to learning
O1,1 registration
O1,2 seek and compare courses
O1,3 enrolment
di
da
ct
ic
si
tu
at
io
ns
preparation of learning
(incl. motivation, back up starting knowledge)
D1,1 clarification of organisational aspects
D1,2 test and include previous knowledge
working on new content
(incl. first acquirement of knowledge, consoli-
dation, systematisation, application)
D2,1 teaching basic information
D2,2 drawing connections to other topics
D2,3 application/transfer of knowledge
repetition and assessment
(incl. repeating, practising, self-assessment)
D3,1 repetition of (whole) topic
D3,2 (self-)assessment
or
g. postprocessing O2,1 evaluation of courses
O2,2 de-registration
not always be directly connected to the teaching and learning processes. Depending on internal
structures of an e-learning system, administrative elements might be included in the core system.
Thus, access to master data is necessary, e.g., for billing learners for participating in certain
courses. Also, such data are needed for administrative purposes like contacting learners on a
regular basis or notifying in case of certain events, e.g., the confirmation of course enrolments.
With respect to data protection legislation, information of this kind explicitly should only be
gathered for specific organisational purposes. No data may be collected only because of pure
technical capabilities to do so. Note that due to the sensitivity of these data, even unauthorised
disclosure of such information without further modification or exploitation, e.g., identity theft or
social engineering, can lead to a huge negative impact on the institution’s reputation. Processes in
the system, like user tracking and logging all user requests (cf. A3,2,4), can possibly be exploited
to extract patterns for identifying physical users behind recorded activities – even in case of
anonymous data retention. Hence, personal data as affected by mentioned activities essentially
need to be considered as an asset within an e-learning system (→ E1: personal data).
O1,2: seek and compare courses
Since courses and e-learning offerings can differ significantly, it is necessary for learners to seek
and compare courses prior to enrolment (cf. A5,3,1) to assure choosing the best fitting course.
This search includes a list of courses within a single e-learning system, or courses of different
systems. Courses can be compared according to specific metadata information (cf. B3,1) describing
their contents and organisational frameworks. For a learner, information about prerequisites,
content descriptions, objectives, and level of difficulty are of interest to enable an appropriate
decision concerning enrolment. With respect to prerequisites and larger learning modules, the
integration of formal requirements for enrolment (cf. A5,3,1) can be included in the metadata
to prevent learners from entering a course although not all relevant pre-courses were passed
successfully. Assets related to this organisational step are given by course data like metadata and
configurations concerning enrolment policies and possibly formal prerequisites (→ E2: course
data). Furthermore, formal requirements affect learning progress and results of former courses
to provide formal conditions to be checked against before allowing learners to join a course (→
E3: learning progress and results). Finally, personal data are affected with respect to their status
containing information about purchased services and included modules depending on the business
model (→ E1: personal data).
Note that the order of O1,1 and O1,2 can be changed according to the type of underlying e-
learning system, i.e., in case of smaller e-learning modules to be purchased, seeking and comparing
might take place prior to actually registering and signing a contract. On the other hand, for
larger modules, e.g., a study at a distant university, registration takes place prior to seeking and
comparing of provided courses for working towards the final exam.
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O1,3: enrolment
After a learner has compared courses and a decision has been made, he can enrol in this course
under certain conditions. While for O1,2 the payment for a specific amount or set of courses
can influence search functionality, the purchasing status in this specific step can be relevant for
providing access to a course. Furthermore, in case of limits concerning number of participants
or further restrictions, negotiation processes might be necessary, i.e., learners cannot finalise
their enrolment without administrative staff confirming this enrolment, and therefore, accepting
this application for participation (cf. A5,3,1). On the other hand, even in courses free of charge, a
mutual negotiation process might be implemented that prevents administrative staff or tutors of a
course to manually enrol learners without their confirmation. This results in different approaches
for enrolment, and consequently, different status information and data are required for managing
actual enrolment procedures. With respect to purchased services, enrolment should be provided
and billing mechanisms be integrated. In case of general services free of charge for a regarded
set of learners, at least status information need to be considered, e.g., the fact of being enrolled.
Access by affiliated persons to read or write such status information must be controlled, e.g.,
to prevent abuse by learners cancelling the names of other learners. Hence, assets affected by
this step are the actual list of participants, the maximum number of participants for the specific
course, formal requirements for being enrolled, and prerequisites to perform well within the
course (→ E2: course data) (cf. A4,3,1, B3,1). In addition, personal data are affected with respect
to purchased services and business model for regarded courses (→ E1: personal data). Learning
results of former courses (cf. A2,1,2, C1,4) have to be considered within this step in case of formal
requirements like successfully having passed another related course (→ E3: learning progress and
results).
D1,1: clarification of organisational aspects
Learners who have enrolled in a course in most cases only have information as provided by course
metadata (cf. B3,1), i.e., they know the title of the course, content descriptions, prerequisites,
and possibly learning objectives. But the more detailed organisational framework of what is ex-
pected from learners is not known entirely in advance. Thus, this first step within the actual
learning process is concerned with initial preparation and accommodation to the topic. Courses
in e-learning systems can be adjusted to specific didactic deliberations like organisation forms
(cf. A4,3,3) or activity types (cf. A4,3,2). Thus, on the one hand, the organisation of a course and
related demands for participants have to be outlined and communicated to them. On the other
hand, the structure of the entire course has to be adapted accordingly to achieve appropriate
switching points for changing organisation forms with not breaking the underlying learning paths
as constructed for the contents (cf. A2,3,1). With respect to the structure of a course (cf. A4,3,1)
and the increased difficulty to orient oneself in hypertext structures, course data also incorporate
preparative and supportive activities. This includes documentations, supportive manuals, per-
sonal support (cf. A3,2,3), and separate courses about how to work with the system (cf. A3,2,2).
Furthermore, orientation-related system components like a sitemap (cf. A3,3,2), public course
metadata (cf. B3,1), and informative online help systems (cf. A3,2,1, A3,3,1) can be integrated.
These aspects affect data concerning course organisation and metadata (→ E2: course data), as
well as initial learning contents (→ E4: learning contents) to motivate further steps within the
course and to reason the organisational planning.
D1,2: test and include previous knowledge
Even if formal prerequisites are fulfilled, informal requirements like previous knowledge cannot
be guaranteed entirely. Thus, despite stated requirements, different previous knowledge has to
be assumed which mostly relates to diffuse former experiences of learners. In this phase of the
learning process, therefore, a common ground has to be sought to start upon. Usually real life
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examples from everyday situations are supportive to motivate learners (cf. A4,2,2) and simplify
their first contacts to new contents (cf. A5,1,1). With this approach, learners get an impression of
the relevance of aspired objectives and might more easily accept to spend time on learning such
matter. Exemplary applications of these contents can be helpful and support a top-down approach
– even providing an overview of further relevant topics. This phase in its whole is closely related
to the asset of learning contents. This includes an appropriate start for learners with different
previous knowledge, corresponding application examples, and adequate introductions to provide
an overview (→ E4: learning contents).
D2,1: teaching basic information
After a clarification of former experiences and previous knowledge, new contents can be taught
in this phase of the learning process. Although learning contents are probably the most intuitive
kind of data in an e-learning system, further data are created in this step and have to be pro-
cessed accordingly. Basic knowledge to be taught includes primary definitions, general concepts
to build upon, or a superficial introduction to all related topics. During the users’ activities within
the system (cf. A2,1,1) data are automatically produced and stored by the system (cf. A3,2,4).
Furthermore, user generated contents have to be managed. In many e-learning systems learners
can write personal notes as reminders or to support their understanding of some contents (cf.
A5,1,3), they can annotate and highlight learning contents similar to text-markers (cf. A5,1,4),
and they can manage bookmarks to access relevant contents more quickly (cf. A5,1,2). Although
basic information is mostly related to pure textual definitions of terminology and basic concepts,
with respect to constructivist learning theories as discussed in Chapter 2, learning objects must
be designed in a way that users can interact with contents to a great extent (cf. [Sch02, Sch05]).
But high interactivity levels also lead to demands for reliable learning paths (cf. A2,3,1) to not
confuse learners in their way through the content. Whether content in general should be made
available to external users in addition to registered learners (cf. C2,2, C2,4), e.g., by providing a
guest role, depends on the specific situation and may introduce or even increase further issues like
copyright protection (cf. C1,3). Concluding these aspects, learners are in touch with several assets.
These include the learning contents with all subelements like correctness of contents, interactive
elements with the possibility of uploading data objects for influencing appearance (cf. B1,1, B1,2),
and user generated contents (→ E4: learning contents). Besides contents, the personal notes and
data created during the learning process are of importance, e.g., annotations, bookmarks, notes,
and reminders (→ E5: personal notes).
D2,2: consolidation and connections to other topics
On top of basic information, further information and topic related themes can be set to introduce
the actual topics to be taught in a course. For example, when assuming a course about assembly
language programming, basics as presented in step D2,1 could comprise the computation of binary
numbers including the complement arithmetic or processor architectures. Further connections
then can be drawn in D2,2 to program structures, conditional expressions as known from other
programming languages and their corresponding representation in assembly language, and so on.
Since in this step we can assume that basics are already known by learners, further didactic
methods can be applied to activate learners and let them work on the contents independently to
a certain extent (cf. A2,1,1, A2,1,2). Note that in this phase the consolidation of formerly learnt
concepts refers to simple applications of knowledge to consolidate respective data and procedures
and to internalise their applicability. Tasks and assignments in this phase are closely connected
to problems as used for the motivation of corresponding learning contents, but do not include
a transfer of concepts to completely different areas as dealt with in phase D2,3. Collaboration
phases (cf. A1,1,2, A4,2,1) and sharing of personal notes can be integrated in this phase to provide
peer reviews, mutual support (cf. A1,1,3), or contest situations to encourage learners to work
more efficiently. Besides peer support, of course, communication between learners and tutors
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need to be established for supporting learners during their learning progress (cf. A1,2,1) and for
preventing discouragement in case of emerging situations learners cannot cope with on their
own (cf. A2,2,1). For the sake of usability, exchanged messages should be archived and deleted
only on a user’s discretion (cf. B1,3) in order to provide easy access to former communication
threads. Besides learning contents and personal notes as already mentioned for D2,1, therefore,
collaboration and communication data are affected by this step. Note that communication and
certain collaboration steps can take place in almost all phases of the learning process, but in
this particular step, they can be explicitly made part of the learning path to achieve further
insights. This includes not only data like discussions during collaboration, proposed solutions, or
interim and final group results (→ E6: collaboration data), but also generic communication (cf.
A1,1,1), i.e., talking about private thoughts to maintain social contacts, or specific communication
concerning learning related topics (→ E7: communication data).
D2,3: application/transfer of knowledge
This phase aims at a transfer of earned concepts and procedures to new areas that are not
processed during former phases. Thus, learners should be prepared to apply their knowledge
to different situations and recognise the abstract concepts behind concrete learning matters for
adapting the concept accordingly. For this, different didactic methods can be used as well as
applications to enable learners to practically apply their knowledge, e.g., simulation systems, an-
imations allowing to influence its process by entering parameters (cf. A2,1,1), exploratory systems
with very high degree of freedom for interactions, or collaborative projects (cf. A1,1,4, A1,3,1) to
elaborate adapted processes for specific new situations. While exploratory systems entirely are
covered by interactive learning contents as described before in phases D2,1 and D2,2 including a
variety of available learning paths to integrate a reasonable degree of freedom (cf. A2,2,1, A2,3,1),
project work referring to collaborative systems can be considered in more detail. Collaboration
consists of several interim results, e.g., early brainstorming sessions, first grouping of ideas, refine-
ments of former results, and, finally, the result to be submitted and presented to the whole group
of learners. This may or may not be moderated by a tutor to support learners in their coopera-
tive learning process (cf. A1,2,2). In addition to this, almost the entire process of collaboration is
accompanied by communication among learners within the same group or even communication
between learners of different groups to share ideas and help each other with emerging problems
(cf. A1,1,1). Thus, communication messages are also of importance independent of their contents
with respect to mutual motivation or solution proposals. As assets for this phase, therefore, all
elements related to collaboration (→ E6: collaboration data) and communication data (→ E7:
communication data) can be mentioned.
D3,1: repetition of (whole) topic
Similar to D2,3 this phase aims at repeating and applying leaned concepts. In particular, this phase
takes all relevant aspects during the course into consideration, and therefore, covers more various
learning contents than the former phase. Typical realisations for e-learning include assignments
covering the whole topic or animations including different views for allowing some learning matter
to be seen from different perspectives (cf. A2,1,1, A2,1,2). Repetition primarily has to be done
individually to detect one’s own problems in understanding and gaps in knowledge. Thus, this
phase mostly is connected to appropriate learning contents and course data with respect to an
integration of repetition phases within the learning paths (cf. A2,3,1). Hence, affected assets are
related to contents (→ E4: learning contents) and structural elements concerning learning paths,
and possibly peer reviews (→ E2: course data). Note that reviews again introduce communication
data as further kind of asset (→ E7: communication data).
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D3,2: (self-)assessment
Besides the informal repetition phase as described for D3,1 a more formal process of self-assessment
is sensible. This refers to explicitly integrated questionnaires, multiple choice tests, or assignments
with using interactive animations, e.g., to create structures that can be automatically evaluated
like finite automatons. If such submissions of assignment results can be checked automatically
by the e-learning system, then the system can provide learners with feedback to direct them to
their own mistakes or presumable gaps in understanding (cf. A2,1,2). Furthermore, if results of
self-assessment offerings and interactive animations are collected and stored within the system,
then such data collection can be used to create a profile of each learner (cf. A3,2,4). Obviously, be-
sides questions, also assignments (→ E4: learning contents) and their integration into the course
structure (→ E2: course data), as well as results and connected information about the learning
progress are reasonable assets to be considered (→ E3: learning progress and results). This also
includes learner profiles and histories of former results in comparable self-assessments.
O2,1: evaluation of courses
After a course has been finished, for the sake of quality management, impressions and views of
learners about the organisation and contents of a course should be collected (cf. A3,2,5). This can
easily be achieved using questionnaires. Since honest feedback is desired, such evaluation processes
are meant to be conducted in anonymous way (cf. C2,8, C3,2). Thus, the identity of learners should
be kept hidden to parties evaluating given responses. However, since no learner should be able
to bias results by voting several times, the identity of learners still have to be verified and stored
accordingly (cf. C2,2). This contradiction will have to be solved by appropriate technical means.
To sum up, the secrecy of a learner’s identity provides an asset in certain scenarios like evaluating
courses (→ I1: user identity).
O2,2: de-registration
Analogously to the registration process as described for O1,1, if no further course is wanted by
the learner, or necessary for being issued a certificate, then the learner can de-register from the
system. This process affects all data related to the corresponding user. Data that was created
during the active participation of the user in the system should be deleted from the system
or at least the user’s identity should be scrambled. Note that despite the necessity of keeping
certain data, e.g., results of assessments, these data can still be removed from the actual system
and be kept only on external archive media. Obviously, this includes personal data as required
for administrative processes (→ E1: personal data), but also information about the learning
progress (→ E3: learning progress and results) and the learner’s notes during the actual learning
process (→ E5: personal notes). Although communication and collaboration data might not be
changeable concerning the assigned identity of the de-registering user, the corresponding user’s
data, e.g., as stored in his mailbox (→ E7: communication data) or personal data directory (→
E6: collaboration data), must be removed.
3.3.3 Information Security Services
This second group of criteria and assets considers all relevant data directly connected to the se-
curity concept of an e-learning system, and therefore, a straightforward application of mentioned
security services as structure of this section is sensible. According to Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3
for this subsection the information security services C1 to C5 remain to be discussed. C6 will be
considered in relation to web services in Section 3.3.4.
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C1: Authentication
According to privileges that are depending on specific roles in a system (cf. C2,5), the authentica-
tion process is crucial. Users must be identified accurately to provide them with their legitimate
set of privileges (cf. C2,4). Due to the focus on web-based systems in this thesis, the lack of states
in the HTTP protocol results in further requirements to store relevant data in so-called sessions.
After successful authentication, a session is created on the server comprising the current course
environment and an identifier (ID) of the currently processed course, particular privileges and
duties in the system, as well as current role assignment. Such session data usually are stored
on server-side while a client has to provide the corresponding session ID to identify himself as
owner of this session. Besides authentication credentials, therefore, this session ID is valuable
and worth protecting. In case of software relying only on stored states in sessions, the authenti-
cation process could be bypassed by stealing and abusing this ID. Thus, as assets directly related
to the authentication service, all credentials required for an appropriate and successful identifi-
cation and authentication have to be considered. This includes username, passphrase, function
or cryptographic key for challenge-response mechanisms, or further information involved in this
process (→ I2: authentication data). Furthermore, information identifying and securing online
sessions need to be protected, since otherwise relevant information to exploit currently active
user processes could be disclosed and the system behaviour might be influenced by unauthorised
persons (→ I3: session data). Due to the relevance of the authentication process for further secu-
rity measures, several assets are indirectly affected by this process: for the sake of accountability
successful or failed authentication attempts are logged (→ I4: accountability data), privileges
are assigned to the user after successful log-in (→ I5: privilege settings), and policies related to
the applied user account (cf. C1,2, C2,7) are affected and should be enforced (→ I6: policies and
manuals).
C2: Access Control
As mentioned in Section 3.2, e-learning systems in most cases apply role-based access controls (cf.
C2,5) due to the mostly intuitive assignment of major global tasks to respective roles (cf. C2,6).
In addition, an appropriate set of privileges and management facilities are required (cf. C2,4).
Note that besides privileges to be managed in e-learning systems, the settings of base systems
also have to be considered, i.e., access controls for directories and files on operating system
level, grant rules and an appropriate user management for a database system, and privileges of
additional processes, e.g., auxiliary programs for input filters (cf. C1,1). However, with respect to
learners’ demands for flexibility in choosing different computers to learn wherever they want (cf.
C3,1), possibilities to restrict access to certain services depending on the used physical clients are
limited. On a less technical layer, (in)formal policies can be regarded as a special kind of additional
privilege settings (cf. C1,2). Although users cannot be generally prevented from conducting certain
activities due to the lack of technically manageable kind, executives of an institution can state
policies to demand appropriate user actions in listed situations. In case of formal policies, certain
behaviour besides the actual access to data sets can be restricted (cf. C2,7). Assets primarily
connected to access control, therefore, are the set of privileges and respective settings (→ I5:
privilege settings), as well as information concerning stated policies and descriptions on how to
act in the system (→ I6: policies and manuals).
C3: Data Confidentiality
Although most of the assets as presented in this chapter are affected by data confidentiality or
integrity issues, this paragraph is not meant to summarise those assets again, but to consider
technical processes to ensure data confidentiality, and therefore, identify assets that are directly
connected to the administrative aspect of implementing data confidentiality mechanisms. Obvi-
ously, this mostly is related to access controls and the authentication process. Besides this, as a
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special case of confidentiality the anonymity of users can be considered (cf. C2,8, C3,2). Similar
to user identification and authentication, the confidentiality of a user’s identity, i.e., anonymity,
also can be important in certain scenarios. Learners in anonymous scenarios can be more honest
without any fear of being treated negatively (cf. A3,2,5). Furthermore, anonymity can be applied
to offer more comfort for learners in the sense of not being under surveillance (cf. C2,8), e.g.,
in communication processes. Assets related to this security service are given by access control
mechanisms (→ I5: privilege settings) together with basic functionality like authentication (→
I2: authentication data). For the aspect of anonymity, user identity and related information,
including certain patterns within the system that would allow tracing data back to a physical
person can be considered as asset (→ I1: user identity).
C4: Data Integrity
Unauthorised manipulation of sensitive data may have serious impact on the learning process
and, in case of system files, such manipulation even can break the whole e-learning system.
Consequently, to ensure this crucial security service, again the authentication process and proper
access controls are of relevance (cf. C2,4). But furthermore, this service also has effects on the
accountability and authenticity of transmitted and processed data. For example, to ensure that
activities within the system can be traced back to their originators, certain information concerning
accountability has to be stored and must not be manipulated by any party (see the following
paragraph). Thus, assets directly connected to this service are access control mechanisms (→ I5:
privilege settings) together with a proper authentication process (→ I2: authentication data),
and data concerning accountability and authenticity (→ I4: accountability data), since without
integrity protection those services cannot provide reliable results due to possible changes by third
parties.
C5: Non-repudiation
Besides an administrative necessity to identify users for assigning privileges (cf. C2,4), users are
meant to be accountable for their activities within the system, i.e., there is a demand for ac-
countability and an evident connection between actions within the e-learning system and physical
users actually initiating and processing certain tasks. Such a mechanism is sensible to trace il-
legal activities or consequential mistakes back to their originators. Note that non-repudiation
and accountability explicitly are meant in both directions between all affiliated parties. No sin-
gle party should be in the position to deny conducted actions and to repudiate the receipt of
certain information necessary within the learning process. For example, in case of courses with
limitations concerning the number of participants, learners may be allowed to register for that
course and are issued a receipt of successful enrolment. After this mutual data exchange, none
of these parties may be able to deny a registration, i.e., the learner cannot claim to have never
registered for the course, and, on the other hand, the responsible person for the course may not
repudiate to have accepted this enrolment due to the sent confirmation. Thus, as asset for the
non-repudiation security service all data related to logging activities (cf. A3,2,4) and connected
cryptographic mechanisms (cf. C2,3) have to be considered (→ I4: accountability data). This
kind of data obviously must not be changed by any person within the system, since otherwise
its validity would be broken. Bear in mind that unauthorised access to such information also
could provide exhaustive information about conducted activities. Consequently, for the sake of
confidentiality privilege settings, authentication data, and session data as well can be treated as
assets for this service.
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Figure 3.5: Conceivable architecture for e-learning with distributed components
3.3.4 Web Services
The investigation of e-learning in this thesis is limited to web-based systems, i.e., e-learning as
web service inevitably is based on further technical components like web server or database sys-
tem. Due to the client-server architecture of web-based systems, the infrastructure also includes
the network architecture and respective interfaces of affiliated server systems for working together
appropriately. Thus, besides the concrete implementation of the e-learning system itself, a con-
sideration of the infrastructural basis including hardware, software, and administrative processes
like adequate configuration is necessary to also identify valuable assets on a very low layer close
to technical components, e.g., for protecting against abuse of network protocols. Furthermore,
the continual shift to so-called modern web applications and Web 2.0 that imply the implemen-
tation of more and more functionality on client-side introduces additional attack vectors to be
considered, e.g., client-side protection due to decentralised data processing for better flexibility
and increased performance.
In this subsection a step-by-step attack procedure will be emulated to identify related assets that
might provide likely targets for intruders and could be abused to gather sensitive information
about the technical infrastructure and possible weaknesses.
Network Architecture
With respect to scalability and a separation of single services (cf. B3,2), the network architecture
can differ significantly among various scenarios. Thus, an intruder, who only has a black box
view on the network architecture, will have to do some examination of the topology and service
interconnections prior to starting more specific attacks to single machines or software components.
All services of an e-learning system could be placed on a single physical server or be distributed
over the whole Internet. Since in distributed systems, e.g., as sketched in Figure 3.5, more than one
physical system can be considered as potential target of attacks, the information where affiliated
systems can be found is valuable. Complex network structures usually realise a separation of
internal servers, demilitarised zones (DMZ) providing services for the Internet and intranet, and
finally external services (cf. B2,2) placed on physical systems available over the Internet. Such
networks can be analysed in certain borders and gathered information be used to choose the
weakest target with most prospect of success when conducting an attack. Network topology
aspects, furthermore, also affect flexibility for learners with respect to changing client machines
(cf. C3,1). For the sake of reliability, required components might be available in redundant manner
and possibly be hidden behind additional load balancing systems. In this case, reliability is
understood in a technical sense, i.e., the system should be free of failures and outage including
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resistance against denial of service attacks to a certain extent. Thus, information about the
network architecture and the interconnection of services must be considered valuable to prepare
attacks (→ W1: network topology). Reliability as generic asset is sensible to foster redundant
architectures and an improved resource depletion resistance (→ W2: reliability).
Software Components
In a second step, i.e., after the network topology could at least in parts be uncovered, attackers
most likely aim at discovering software related details. Software most probably is never free of
errors, and therefore, information about specific software details may reveal security issues that
can be exploited. By providing information about the actual software product and its specific
version, this information can be supporting for possible attackers when searching for already
discovered and published software bugs. Hence, kind of software, specific product and vendor in-
formation, currently installed version, or operating system specific information should be treated
as confidential and be protected accordingly. Network ports, protocols, or API specifications
(application programming interface) can possibly be exploited, and therefore, belong to the in-
formation aspired by attackers. Activities in e-learning systems that are related to this second
step of investigation foremost are the management of modules (cf. B3,3, B3,4) to provide further
functionality (cf. B2,1) and the management of connections to external services (cf. B3,2), which
results in ports to be opened for establishing network connections among services. From a soft-
ware engineering perspective, a division into single services is crucial with respect to reusability
and modularisation, but note that here particularly software components as functional modules
are considered. Learning modules, e.g., distributed as SCORM packages, are not considered in
this place, but will be regarded in subsequent chapters in the general form of archiving and
restoring data sets of all kind. However, as concrete assets, several pieces of information about
deployed software (→ W3: software details) and its interfaces like the API or protocol specifi-
cations to be used for exchanging data with this software (→ W4: interface details) need to be
considered.
Data Collection and Exchange
Besides information about the presence of software and its connectivity, actual configuration
details could provide an attacker with (conceptual) security issues, e.g., porous firewall rules.
Related to this, unauthorised manipulations of configuration entries (cf. C1,1) even would pro-
vide possibilities to bypass other security mechanisms and to inject malicious code. In addition to
software, hardware, and network details, information about the way how data are organised, e.g.,
the conceptual distribution of relations in a database including corresponding column names, are
helpful for starting certain attacks. Besides database concepts, positions and names of configu-
ration files, existence of specific software-related files, and files to be included by the main user
interface can be used to re-engineer an application and collect hints about running services on the
server even without full read access to these data. Attackers must be assumed to be quite smart
in collecting and exploiting information that can simplify their work – even if this information
seems irrelevant at first sight. Hence, unauthorised information disclosure should be prevented in
general. Note that in case of improper server configurations, the amount of collectible data can
be immense and the effort for collecting such data can be very low by simply utilising Internet
search engines. Furthermore, a lot of data are produced while users are active in an e-learning
system (cf. A3,2,4). Bear in mind that in case of security incidents attackers might gain access
to these data, and consequently, activities of users including their possibly embarrassing vain
endeavours for certain learning activities are completely revealed. In conclusion, with respect to
the configuration of deployed systems and emerging data sets during productive use, we need to
consider configuration data stored in files or databases as an asset (→ W5: configuration details).
Additionally, information about the way data are stored should be kept secret, such that attack-
ers are prevented from discovering this structure to specifically prepare subsequent attacks (→
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W6: data organisation). Furthermore, all sorts of events and statistically relevant activities have
to be protected from unauthorised disclosure (→ W7: log data and statistics). This latter aspect
mostly is related to privacy issues (cf. C2,8) as emphasised to be of certain relevance to learners’
acceptance (cf. Sec. 2.7).
3.4 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to prepare the threat analysis by identifying relevant assets for e-
learning. For this, first, roles were discussed for a role-based access control mechanism with also
incorporating the concept of subroles for auxiliary tasks to be delegated to additional persons.
Second, sets of roles were brought into relation with types of e-learning systems, i.e., different
types were discussed and considered concerning their amount of roles to assign all tasks without
introducing conflicts. For the actual identification of assets, a division into the research fields
e-learning, software engineering, and information security similar to the one of Chapter 2 was
applied. However, while a thematic distinction into design criteria was chosen for e-learning spe-
cific aspects in Chapter 2, in this chapter a chronological sequence was followed. These different
approaches aimed at a thorough and reliable coverage of e-learning specific activities and assets,
such that the probability of neglecting important aspects could be minimised. For software engi-
neering and information security, an extended set of criteria according to well-accepted standards
was used to cover all relevant areas of the affiliated disciplines.
During the entire examination following sketched procedures, back-references to introduced ac-
tivities of Chapter 2 were applied to ensure specificity for e-learning. Assets were directly deduced
from tasks and activities as extracted from specific literature. A distinction in classes “e-learning”,
“information security services”, and “web services” was applied to emphasise different character-
istics of assets. Data and processes closely related to e-learning obviously differ from more general,
but still relevant security-related assets like privilege settings, or general assets to be considered
for all web services, e.g., reliability of the system. This distinction again will be picked up for
the actual threat analysis to take care of organisational and more technically oriented threats.
The resulting twenty assets are collected and presented in Table 3.4. For references to assets in
subsequent chapters, the placeholder symbol “2” will be replaced by the corresponding number
within table cells.
Table 3.4: Assets assigned to groups
E2: E-Learning
I2: Information
Security Services W2: Web Services
1. personal data
2. course data
3. learning progress and results
4. learning contents
5. personal notes
6. collaboration data
7. communication data
1. user identity
2. authentication data
3. session data
4. accountability data
5. privilege settings
6. policies and manuals
1. network topology
2. reliability
3. software details
4. interface details
5. configuration details
6. data organisation
7. log data and statistics
Each of the mentioned assets will be examined in Chapter 4 with respect to possible threats that
might result in unwanted situations by harming or influencing corresponding data sets or states.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Threats in E-Learning
Systems
4.1 Overview
The aim of this chapter is a systematic threat analysis basing on introduced assets of the former
chapter (cf. Fig. 4.1). Thus, different threat analysis approaches will have to be compared and
be discussed with respect to the stated demand of providing a systematic methodology.
identification mitigation
typical
activities
roles
assets
threats threatmanagement
Figure 4.1: Current position in analysis process – step 3
Since threat analysis approaches usually are very technically oriented and are meant to be applied
to technical systems that allow precise and accurate consideration of single component failures,
we have to assume certain drawbacks when applying one of these approaches (cf. Sec. 4.2).
Limits and possible mitigation of inherent drawbacks will be discussed for adapting the chosen
methodology for analysing e-learning.
Assets will be considered with respective threats according to the group assignment as given in
Chapter 3. Thus, learning specific assets, i.e., assets of group “e-learning” (cf. Tab. 3.4), will
be discussed in Section 4.3. Note that the term “e-learning assets” in the following for the sake
of simplicity will be used to refer to this asset group. This term does not imply that assets of
other groups are not related to e-learning. However, the proximity to learning in this case is
primary for this denomination. Assets of group “information security services” will be considered
in Section 4.4 and assets of group “web services” in Section 4.5. The discussion of threats to
assets will be aligned to different scenarios to provide more concrete examples and connections
to practical e-learning systems. Respective exemplary scenarios for each group of assets will be
presented at the beginning of corresponding sections. Related to this, the discussion of threats
in the following does not cover the entire analysis results. Scenarios are only related to a specific
subset of actually discovered threats within this research project, i.e., only an excerpt of these
threats will be discussed in the following, while the complete set of results is given in the appendix
of this thesis.
After a specific asset discussion, in Section 4.6, general conceptual weaknesses affecting several
assets in the same manner will be discussed. Additionally, Section 4.7 provides technical threats
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with examples to emphasise common threats related to the technical basis. Finally, Section 4.8
will conclude results of this chapter and provide an outlook to subsequent chapters.
4.2 Threat Analysis Approach
Before actually conducting a threat analysis, the best fitting analysis methodology has to be
determined.
“While it is tempting to think that a security scanner or application firewall will either provide
a multitude of defenses or identify a multitude of problems, in reality there are no silver bullets
to the problem of insecure software. Application security assessment software, while useful
as a first pass to find low-hanging fruit, is generally immature and ineffective at in-depth
assessments and at providing adequate test coverage. Remember that security is a process,
not a product.” [MK07, p. 16]
Consequently, to identify threats not belonging to “low-hanging fruits” a formal analysis ap-
proach with structured methodologies is required that ensures better coverage of the considered
object of analysis without increased risk of missing certain aspects. Furthermore, a visual organ-
isation of actually relevant threats is reasonable for subsequent steps of mitigating discovered
threats. Visualisation in this context supports keeping an overview of these threats and checking
recommendations to mitigate problems against still open ones, which are not covered by security
means or organisational frameworks.
4.2.1 Comparison of Approaches
Threat analysis methodologies can be roughly categorised into the following four classes (cf.
[And01, Eck04]), where each of the classes may allow different variants as shown in brackets:
• state-based approaches (Petri nets, Markov analysis),
• table-based approaches (failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), threat matrix [And01]),
• parameter-based approaches (hazards and operability approach (HAZOP)),
• tree-based approaches (fault tree analysis (FTA), attack tree [Sch99], threat tree [And01]).
With respect to stated requirements for the methodology, and specific characteristics of e-learning
systems, all of these classes provide approaches with advantages and disadvantages for the ac-
tually aspired analysis in this thesis. While state-based approaches provide sophisticated models
to construct and visualise mutual dependencies of single components of software, several simul-
taneous processes can hardly be represented. But especially with respect to web-based services
like considered for e-learning (cf. Sec. 1.4.3), concurrent activities within the system can intro-
duce security threats like race conditions, which would be entirely neglected when using such
methodologies. Table-based approaches as second kind cannot be uniformly discussed due to the
various character of respective approaches. While the threat matrix approach of Anderson bases
on (non-systematic) collections of threats and possible mitigation techniques to be assigned to
rows and columns, such that each threat should be met by at least one counter-measure, for the
FMEA approach [DIN06] no concrete methodology for gathering possible threats is mentioned.
Instead, the focus is put into probabilities of detecting and mitigating threats with also men-
tioning possible counter-measures. The HAZOP methodology as parameter-based approach does
not specifically focus on threats that might occur through certain attack patterns or suboptimal
organisational concepts, but instead available and known parameters in the system are consid-
ered with possible effects of misconfiguration or abuse of these parameters. Finally, tree-based
approaches consider a root element as an unwanted event together with possible events leading to
this event in nodes of the next level of the tree, such that each subtree is a recursive application
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of this analysis methodology. Different tree-based approaches are available that differ in their
terminology, e.g., using different symbols to state Boolean dependencies of events in nodes of the
same level. In addition, trees can be used to analyse the existence of threats, but also to analyse
consequences of already appeared threats to uncover possible (side) effects of emerging problems.
All of the mentioned threat analysis approaches are primarily developed for technical systems
with very concrete subelements to be systematically analysed. Thus, none of the approaches can
be directly transferred to an analysis of the area of security in e-learning without any drawbacks.
However, drawbacks can be mitigated to a certain extent as discussed in the following subsec-
tion. With respect to mentioned advantages and disadvantages, most approaches clearly can be
neglected for further discussions. Since web-based systems explicitly have to include concurrent
access to certain pages, state-based approaches are not sensibly applicable and can be excluded.
Table-based approaches lack a clear visualisation for getting an impression of mutual dependen-
cies. In addition, they either are based on brainstorming sessions or focus on probabilities, which
explicitly are neglected for the analysis in this thesis (cf. Sec. 1.4.3). Parameter-based approaches
are reasonable in systems, where all variables are known in advance. Especially when considering
extension modules to be loaded dynamically during the run-time of a system, this is no longer
the case and the pure connection to possible threats depending on the existence of other factors
needs to be in focus of the analysis. Hence, this approach also does not fit to the considered
application field, so that only the tree-based approach is left to be considered in more detail.
Different methodologies using the tree representation are available and used in certain situations
with comparable effort and explanatory power. In the following, the fault tree analysis (FTA)
methodology will be used. This methodology provides an intuitive tree-based approach with ter-
minology similar to electrical engineering and a procedure that is standardised in DIN 25424
[DIN81].
4.2.2 Critical Discussion of FTA Approach
The design of the fault tree analysis is kept very simple, i.e., it only consists of events of different
kind and logic gates to combine events and to include dependencies. Besides this simplicity which
results in improved clarity of presentation, such fault trees convince by their structured approach
for processing the analysis. The actual analysis for this considers the root element to be an
undesired event that has to be prevented. Starting from the root so further subsequent elements
can be integrated into the next level of the tree, where those newly integrated nodes represent
undesired events that directly would lead to the undesired event of the root node. This process
will be continued recursively for every uncovered interim event until basic events as leafs of the
tree could be identified, which allow no further processing.
Bear in mind that the FTA methodology was initially meant for technical systems, where the
termination can be specified easily by identifying an event directly related to a single component
that cannot be considered in more detail, and therefore, a basic event in a leaf of the tree
must have been reached. For e-learning such a termination condition cannot be stated in the
same clarity, since besides technical failures also human failures must be considered. This can
be done to a certain extent, e.g., organisational misconception like a lack of user education, but
obviously it would exceed the scope of this thesis to analyse human errors in all facets including
psychological background and personal situation. Hence, as termination condition for the FTA in
this context reaching an event connected to human errors can be considered as well as reaching
a technical component that allows no further consideration without losing focus on e-learning
systems.
Disadvantageous in the FTA methodology is the inherent contradiction between logically re-
ducible terms and a correct placement of directly dependent events in the tree presentation (cf.
Fig. 4.2). This means, on the one hand, for a correct and supportive presentation, directly related
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(a) redundant events with direct connection to de-
pendent components
(b) logically reduced tree neglecting direct depen-
dencies
Figure 4.2: Comparison of redundant tree and logically reduced representation
events should be placed close to each other and be combined by the appropriate logic gate, e.g.,
a logic AND gate for events that need to happen simultaneously for a superordinate event to
actually happen as well. If some of these events are preliminary for numerous other events to
happen, then such events, of course, have to be placed in redundant manner. On the other hand,
logical reductions could be performed, i.e., the mentioned preliminary set of events also could be
moved upwards in the tree and be reduced to only a single appearance in the (depicted) logical
term with adapted logical structures. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages with
respect to complexity, redundancy, and clarity of dependency relations. Note that redundant
subtree inclusion in parts can be prevented by using so-called transfer symbols as placeholder
(cf. Sec. 4.3.1 and [DIN81]). Consequently, an immediate placement to the position where it acts
as dependency can be ensured while only a single subtree representation would have to be main-
tained, such that error-proneness of redundancy can be reduced. Thus, in this thesis a logical
reduction of the tree will only be conducted implicitly for the recommendations.
Another shortcoming of this standard is the fact that neither an inheritance concept for subtrees
is included in the terminology nor a weighting concept for emerging events and their impact on
the root element. Although this in parts is deliberate, it raises a problem concerning prioritisation
of single events. Threats can significantly differ in their impact on the system as a whole, and
therefore, providing a tree without any weighting of threats is only sensible, if all threats are aimed
to be mitigated, instead of only focusing on most “dangerous” ones. In addition, specific events
that already can be considered as threats to the system as a whole might also be exploited again
by attackers in combination with other events to provoke even more damage. For example, the
disclosure of personal data to unauthorised persons already can be regarded as security incident,
but gathered knowledge again could be gainfully used to start social engineering attacks for even
collecting more sensitive information (cf. [MS03]). Thus, from a logical point of view, in the fault
tree the first mentioned negative event already results in a “true” value of the whole term, such
that the additional exploitation of this event can only be considered as neutral element without
any further effect – despite its practical difference concerning the impact of these events. However,
for the sake of completeness and improved support for administrators, such exploitation subtrees
also will be included in the fault tree, although their presence is irrelevant for the logical structure
of the tree.
With these adaptations and decisions for consistently using the FTA methodology, some of the
introduced shortcomings can be reduced. To avoid the problem of depending on the accuracy of
own brainstorming sessions, and therefore, to increase reliability for a systematic methodology,
catalogues of attack patterns and common weakness listings will be applied and inserted into
the tree. As starting point, available security catalogues and penetration testing manuals will
be used, i.e., [Swa01, SGF02, Gro03, BSI05, SH06, Her06, MK07, MBPC09, MIT10]. Threats
discussed in these catalogues will be filtered, put into relation, and be appropriately extended
to build up the fault tree as resulting from this e-learning specific analysis. Due to the size of
the resulting fault tree, a direct embedding in the text of subsequent sections seems not sensible,
such that only excerpts will be illustrated where appropriate while the entire fault tree is placed
in Appendix A.
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4.3 Analysis of E-Learning Assets
Actual analysis results will be presented and discussed using exemplary e-learning scenarios
to emphasise differences in e-learning types as introduced in Section 3.2. But before going into
details, in the following subsection an excerpt of the entire fault tree will be presented to introduce
the terminology and to draw relations to assets as introduced in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Introduction to Fault Tree Terminology
Besides presenting threats to e-learning assets (cf. Sec. 3.3.2), this section will be used to intro-
duce FTA terminology and related symbols. In Figure 4.3 a fault tree is given representing the
subtree dealing with e-learning specific assets. As example, the asset of personal notes in this
tree illustrates a full path in the tree from the (relative) root, i.e., node representing an undesired
event in the asset group “e-learning”, to basic events in leafs of the tree.
Figure 4.3: Fault tree excerpt for e-learning assets
The upper-most transfer symbol, i.e., triangular symbol named “e-learning assets” represents
a connecting node to the main tree including the global root. Transfer symbols in DIN 25424
[DIN81] are divided in “transfer in” and “transfer out”, where this mentioned upper-most transfer
symbol means “transfer out”, because of the logic flow to go upwards from leafs to the global
root. As “transfer in” in the main tree an equally named transfer symbol has to be placed to
correspond to this instance. The remaining transfer symbols in Figure 4.3, therefore, represent
the “transfer in” type as placeholder for corresponding subtrees providing a set of threats that
influence listed events. Note that transfer symbols not necessarily are meant as 1-to-1 relation,
but rather n-to-1 with several “transfer in” nodes connecting to a single subtree instance linked
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with a “transfer out” symbol respectively. As further components of the tree, rectangular symbols
represent interim events to be further analysed in the subtrees beneath these nodes. Basic events
in leafs are represented by ovals. Logic gates are denominated as commonly used in electrical
engineering, i.e., square symbols with ampersand character “&” for AND gate and “≥ 1” for OR
gate. Note that the symbols for binary logic are not the ones originally contained in DIN 25424,
but follow the revised and standardised version of IEC 60617, part 12 [IEC01].
For the actual procedure of analysing threats to e-learning assets, this means that the upper-most
interim event “e-learning asset harmed” acts as relative root of this subtree, i.e., as unwanted
event that will happen if one of the assets of this group is harmed in any way. Combined by
an OR gate, for each of the asset nodes now the process continues, such that each node in the
next level of the tree is considered as new relative root node for recursively uncovering further
unwanted events. The recursion terminates in case of reaching a basic event (cf. termination
criteria in Sec. 4.2.2).
4.3.2 Scenario: Purchased Advanced Training with Mentoring
For discussing e-learning assets, a scenario of a company will be used as reference, where the
company members are provided with an advanced training to learn relevant matter for better
coping with company related issues and for improving understanding of important aspects of the
company’s value on the market. This e-learning course is purchased from an external provider who
has implemented respective learning contents and offers support for learners within the company
(cf. type 2, Fig. 3.2). Every participant of this course can be awarded with a certificate for
successful participation, such that the provider of this course is obliged to include some assessment
elements. This is realised by an assignment to be processes collaboratively by small groups and
be submitted to the provider. The course has a specific start and end date. Applications for
participation are collected by executives of the company. Issued certificates also will be sent to
executives and be distributed by them to honour respective company members. Affiliated roles
in this scenario are learners as participants of the course, tutors for supporting and moderating
collaborative processes, course creators within the provider’s company, administrators to set
up the e-learning system, and executives of the own company to promote and supervise this
kind of training. Since this training is meant on a voluntary basis and not obligatory for all
company members, the staff council has demanded that the actual learning progress and personal
data have to be protected by the system for the sake of privacy protection and avoidance of
negative consequences for participants. Thus, no unauthorised person may extract such data
from the system. This especially holds for executives of the company who may only know who is
participating, but not how they perform within the learning process. Furthermore, also mentors or
other learners should not be in the position to gather exhaustive information about participants
except for relevant information to work with them on collaborative assignments. Administrators
are meant to be the only ones to access the profile of learners and to manage administrative
elements like master data to a required extent for managing participation.
4.3.3 Threats of E-Learning Assets
Basing on the given scenario, threats to e-learning assets will be investigated in the following.
The assets in their enumeration as given in Table 3.4 will be used as structure of this subsection.
E1: Personal Data
Starting with the first asset of personal data within the system, we have to consider the actual
necessity of collecting such information. However, with respect to administrative processes like
managing participation, contacting learners, or issuing a certificate, master data are required. The
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collection of master data for e-learning can be considered as explicit data collection with users be-
ing informed about it. Such master data usually contain common contact information like e-mail
addresses, postal addresses, phone numbers, personal information like day of birth, nationality,
or native language, and administrative data like internal learner ID, list of purchased modules
and courses, special conditions assigned with this learners, or results of completed courses. A
sharing of specific pieces of data, e.g., contact information, with other users in the system is
sensible. But, obviously, due to the sensitivity of such data, universal access for all users must be
avoided. In the given scenario this means, that administrators, of course, should be able to access
and manage such data, but tutors may only access contact data for directly communicating with
learners, e.g., via their e-mail addresses or similar. Implicit data collection, on the other hand,
mostly consists of log files that store exhaustive information about user activities. This kind
of data usually has no need to be accessed directly by users of the system. Nevertheless, log-
ging mechanisms are reasonable in this scenario to support non-repudiation by recording critical
activities in the system, e.g., the submission of assignment results.
Threats related to explicit data collections are given by erroneous privilege settings or by inatten-
tive publications, i.e., users share contact information with others by mistake. Note that master
data even could be disclosed indirectly. For example, search mechanisms, which internally access
master data, might reveal sensitive information, although the exact content still is kept hidden
in the front-end. Hence, instead of a clear disclosure of sensitive information at least relations to
other data sets can be discovered and the existence of entered strings is confirmed. By a step-
wise refinement of search strings, exact information can be extracted from the database system.
For implicit data collection without appropriate access controls, the fact of having excessive log
entries with missing anonymisation could provide an attacker with valuable information about
personal data of learners, their interrelations, and learning progress. Even with anonymisation,
patterns as given by contemporary events or access to related elements can provide information
about traces of single persons in the system.
General threats are given by low level data manipulation and disclosure as described in Section 4.7
and circumvention of system internal privilege settings by abusing import/export mechanisms as
further discussed in Section 4.6.3. Furthermore, note that not only the discovery of single pieces of
data, but also the reuse of such information to gather even more information can be useful. This
can support identity theft by combining single pieces of information to pretend being someone
else. Bear in mind that especially when aiming at deceiving users, every piece of information
that is inauspiciously distributed by the e-learning system can be exploited to support the act of
deception (cf. [MS03]).
E2: Course Data
Course data include all information directly related to courses, e.g., course settings, list of partic-
ipants, and metadata descriptions. This asset mostly is not directly threatened by asset specific
problems, but rather by general conceptual problems or concept independent low level attacks.
In the given scenario, course settings include important dates, e.g., start and end date of the
course or deadlines for assignment submissions. Thus, manipulations might aim at achieving
more time for preparing solutions to collaborative assignments. Threats related to this are mostly
basing on access control mechanisms that are not tight enough to protect against unauthorised
access. Also general disclosure and manipulation by exploiting low level weaknesses are possible
(cf. Sec. 4.7). Concerning manipulation of participant lists, several system internal mechanisms
might be exploitable related to improper privilege settings and missing separation of duties
(cf. Sec. 4.6.1). This means, if tutors who are only meant to support learners in the sketched
scenario can enrol or delete learners without their confirmation, then newly enrolled learners can
be subordinated to tutors who usually are equipped with more privileges than plain learners.
Thus, even other assets like personal data could be affected by this threat. On the other hand, if
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Figure 4.4: Fault tree excerpt for traffic flow analysis (cf. Fig. A.40)
cancellation of course membership can be realised online without sufficient checks, then learners
could be in the position to fake cancellation for other learners to abort their participation in the
course and related collaborative scenarios.
Another general approach related to this asset is given by import/export functionality, especially
course exchange standards like SCORM or IMS (Instructional Management Systems) Content
Packaging (CP). By using these standards, course settings and course structures can be modified
outside the e-learning system, and therefore, access control mechanisms within the system could
be bypassed (cf. Sec. 4.6.3).
E3: Learning Progress and Results
Mentoring of learners requires information about cognitive barriers and emerged problems. Hence,
learning progress, duration for specific learning steps, or contributions to collaborative work must
be available to tutors in order to assess the situation correctly. For mentoring activities, the more
information about learners and their respective problems in understanding are available, the more
likely and appropriately tutors can support them. This results in demands for increased privileges
to evaluate learner’s activities and to get insight in personal notes. But note that mentoring can
take place in different ways: either perpetually or only as demanded by learners. This corresponds
to different self-concepts of learners (cf. Chap. 2, [KHS05]). While “mentoring on demand”, i.e.,
learners by themselves ask for support in case of emerging problems, in general is accepted and
desired by learners, a perpetual observation by tutors could lead to rejection (cf. Sec. 4.6.2).
Common threats to progress data can be found in general access control shortcomings to provide
read or write access to persons who are not meant to access these data. This also includes tutors in
case of autonomous learners who want to work on their own and only accept mentoring when ask-
ing for support on their own discretion in case of problems. Furthermore, attacks against storage
media, e.g., by exploiting SQL (structured query language) injection vulnerabilities, can be used
to gather progress information. Thus, data can be uncovered or even manipulated with bypass-
ing access controls (cf. Sec. 4.7). With respect to the client-server-architecture, user interaction
might also be revealed by evaluating network traffic. This means, traffic flow analysis approaches
can be used to reconstruct learner activities by matching requested pages and responses to the
corresponding user (cf. Fig. 4.4).
E4: Learning Contents
Learning content is threatened by two general concepts: either it contains unreliable information,
e.g., because of unauthorised manipulations, or the content is made available to unauthorised
persons.
The first case of providing unreliable information can be further divided into inattentive changes
by authorised persons or fraudulent changes by unauthorised ones. While unauthorised manipula-
tions, again, can be related to improper access controls and low level attacks to base components
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like storage media, inattentive changes usually are related to human fallibility, e.g., entering
wrong contents or including spelling mistakes. Note that especially in formulae typing errors
can change the meaning significantly. Furthermore, missing support by the content management
system or chaotic data structures also can provoke inattentive content changes. Missing mutual
controls of authors or missing quality checks by designated quality controllers even might increase
this problem.
Second, with respect to unauthorised disclosure we additionally have to distinguish the case of
some external person who (actively) gains access to protected contents and the case of unau-
thorised distribution by a person who for that moment was authorised to access these data, i.e.,
copyright infringement. In case of active persons who try to gain access for themselves, threats
like porous configurations and privilege settings on the server can be mentioned. This means, in
case of a web server that is configured using a blacklist of file types to be prohibited for publi-
cation, further types, e.g., backup files still stored on the server, can be accessed by an attacker.
Although this does not necessarily affect the most current version of protected contents, close
similarities are probable, such that the attacker succeeded at least in parts. Similar to this, some
web administrators seem to believe that files not linked on the web page will not be accessible to
external persons. In fact, by using “fuzzing” mechanisms (cf. [MK07]), deriving hidden filenames
from linked ones, or by using arbitrarily changed URLs (uniform resource locator), these files
can be directly requested and accessed. With respect to unauthorised distribution, information
and data that are not meant to be distributed and accessed by third parties must be protected
accordingly and authorised persons should not pass these pieces of data to anyone else. This
primarily concerns data with reserved copyrights as implicitly given by the sketched scenario
with respect to the purchasing of created contents.
E5: Personal Notes
Learners with respect to constructivist learning theories should be able to create their own
contents during actively processing learning matter, i.e., annotations, notes, personal remarks,
messages in communication facilities, submissions in exercises or self-assessments, and contribu-
tions to collaborative work (cf. Chap. 2). Especially in case of personal notes and annotations this
is related to privacy and should be treated as confidential. Again, general threats by attacking
the base system (cf. Sec. 4.7) and porous access control mechanisms can be the root of a set
of threats related to unauthorised read or write access to foreign notes. However, besides this
strict confidentiality view, also a less restrictive view on personal notes can be given with re-
spect to sharing notes and annotations among a group of learners working collaboratively. Such
special scenarios with sharing annotations and notes, therefore, have to be considered in the
access control schemes. Note that threats especially will occur with respect to sharing sensitive
information, if access privileges are not fine-grained enough to only provide read or even write
access to a certain subset of users. An all-or-nothing approach only making contents available to
anybody or no one threatens confidentiality and integrity of such data. In addition to possible
technical shortcomings by too coarse privilege settings, this aspect also is related to improper
default settings and missing user support.
E6: Collaboration Data
Collaboration in the sketched scenario primarily is affected by three areas: data exchange and
storage for the collaboration process, cheating attempts with respect to achieving the certifi-
cate with less efforts, and accountability for the assignment submission (cf. Fig. A.12). First, for
the data exchange during collaboration, in principle two cases must be distinguished: working
synchronously or asynchronously. Working concurrently on the same data, i.e., synchronous col-
laboration, results in problems concerning handling of conflicts. From a technical perspective, of
course, only local copies of these data are used with synchronisation afterwards. But especially
this synchronisation process leads to the questions of prioritisation of changes by all affiliated
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Figure 4.5: Fault tree excerpt for race conditions in concurrent scenarios (cf. Fig. A.13)
users and threats related to concurrent access, e.g., by actively exploiting competing access with
so-called “race conditions” (cf. Fig. 4.5). Race conditions are comparably difficult to conduct,
since timing is crucial, but they can be used to overwrite or render data of others useless by
provoking temporal conflicts. In case of a missing conflict management, e.g., temporary blocking
mechanisms, these threats are most likely to happen, although their existence might be difficult
to prove due to a non-deterministic occurrence of this problem. The second case of asynchronous
collaboration introduces threats to completely overwriting former solutions and provoking large
data loss problems in case of missing history functions, e.g., by a versioning system. Since con-
sensus among group members cannot be expected at all times, data loss by overwriting the work
of others most probably will occur – either by mistake or on purpose.
Second, threats related to cheating attempts will have to be considered. In the given scenario,
certificates should be issued to participants after certain collaborative results are submitted.
Contents and results of other groups, therefore, might be a likely target for participants to reduce
own efforts for the collaborative assignment. Weaknesses and threats related to this are given by
improper access controls to current results of other groups, but also to previous (interim) results,
e.g., as stored by a versioning system on the server. In addition, eavesdropping transferred data
(cf. Fig. A.58) or conducting manipulations by man-in-the-middle attacks (cf. Fig. A.61) are
reasonable approaches to read or alter foreign solutions. Besides this, also denial of service has
to be considered as serious threat, since collaboration and submission of assignment results are
not possible in case of not available services (cf. Sec. 4.7).
Finally, accountability concepts have to be assured for providing proof of having fulfilled stated
conditions (cf. Fig. A.57). A major requirement of electronic submission systems is to ensure
incontestable results. Thus, accountability has to be ensured in both directions, i.e., the group
of learners must receive a non-deniable confirmation for successful submission – preferably with
assurance that the solution was not changed during the upload process. From the viewpoint
of tutors or certificate issuers a confirmation for unchanged content is essential, since otherwise
learners could deny that the submitted version is the one this group has handed-in. Consequently,
without appropriate accountability mechanisms issuing certificates is not possible in a sensible
manner, since manipulations cannot be excluded, and therefore, legitimacy of certificates cannot
be guaranteed.
E7: Communication Data
Communication with other learners is an appropriate means to enable mutual motivation and
to exchange thoughts about current cognitive barriers. This also should not exclude private
communication (cf. Chap. 2). Communication channels intended for message exchange without
tutors or superiors listening, therefore, need to be protected by the system. But this asset is
threatened by two general aspects: restraints in the used protocol, i.e., technical limits, and
direct attacks against messages.
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Figure 4.6: Fault tree excerpt for protocol limits in communication (cf. Fig. A.14)
A main problem with the concept of (purely) web-based e-learning systems is the aim of providing
all activities and communication facilities on ground of a common technology that cannot equally
satisfy requirements for all system parts. In case of web-based systems this common ground
is the usage of HTTP for the entire data exchange (cf. [FGM+99]). Disadvantages of HTTP
(cf. Fig. 4.6), e.g., stateless operation and missing push functionality, reason a certain degree
of rigidity and unreliability of the data transfer. News intended to be sent to whole groups of
receivers cannot be directly transferred because of the missing push functionality and restrictions
to client-server-communication. Instead, data have to be cached on the server until all intended
receivers have actively requested these data from this interim node. Obviously, such caches imply
the suboptimal case of spreading copies of possibly confidential messages over several systems.
This threat of confidential message disclosure even gets increased in case of unlimited storage
of such data, i.e., long-time data retention. Since HTTP, additionally, does not implement any
sort of error detection and correction mechanisms, a secure and reliable transmission cannot be
guaranteed per se. This allows several disturbances to be conducted by malicious parties, e.g.,
network related denial of service attacks.
4.4 Analysis of Information Security Service Assets
Information security services, as a second group of assets, are concerned with security relevant
configurations and properties affecting other assets like confidentiality of sensitive data. Similar
to the e-learning asset discussion, we will start with an exemplary scenario. Afterwards, threats to
considered assets will be brought into relation with this scenario to emphasise practical relevance.
4.4.1 Scenario: Distant University with Various Study Courses
For the following discussion, we assume a distant university that provides various study courses
to be purchased by students. The university employs teaching staff to conceptualise courses,
technically experienced authors to realise these concepts within the e-learning system, mentoring
personnel to support students, administrators for tasks like managing users within the system,
and executives for quality controls and public relations. In this scenario a huge amount of students
is considered to work simultaneously with the system in their respective courses. Collaboration
and communication are essential parts of this system. Each of the courses similarly to a lecture
is assigned to a single professor. In addition, roles are distinguished in global and local ones
to manage groups with system-wide scope, but also to provide support for flexible role assign-
ments and special privilege settings within a course. Thus, according to Figure 3.2, this scenario
corresponds to a type 4 e-learning system.
With respect to personal expectations of not being perpetually under surveillance of tutors or
professors, an appropriate level of privacy is demanded. This includes possibilities for learners
to decide on their own when they want to share information about their learning progress and
whether they currently want to receive support by mentoring persons within the system. However,
executives particularly demand meaningful statistics for public relations to advertise provided
study courses. Furthermore, evaluation phases for courses are required for quality assurance.
60 4. Analysis of Threats in E-Learning Systems
Evaluation surveys, of course, need to be integrated into the study process in a way that all
learners may only participate once per course and stay anonymous for persons responsible for
respective courses. Hence, a user’s identity has to be protected for certain activities within the
system with simultaneously demanding user authentication.
4.4.2 Threats of Information Security Service Assets
This subsection considers threats to assets of the information security services group (cf. Tab. 3.4).
Note that these assets usually have strong connections to other assets in the system, i.e., if the
assets as described in the following with related threats can be harmed, then other assets also
might no longer be protected. For example, in case of stolen authentication data, an intruder
can gain full access to the system, and therefore, other assets can be manipulated by abusing a
foreign identity with all related privileges.
I1: User Identity
Hiding the user identity can be sensible for various applications in the sketched scenario, e.g., for
receiving more honest feedback on evaluation surveys, to enable learners to give more accurate
statements without being anxious of saying something wrong, or simply to do activities with-
out possibilities to let tutors trace unprofessional habits back to the corresponding learner (cf.
Fig. A.16). Anonymity in this context can be realised in different ways, and as such, different
threats can emerge to aim at disclosing the identity. Obviously, the most trivial way of ensuring
user anonymity is to ignore all personal data and to not store anything that might be brought
into relation with a specific physical person. But since log files and records of user activities
(including personal data) are valuable for the sake of security, for statistical evaluation, and for
empirical studies, anonymisation of all output can be a sensible way of hiding user identities.
However, sensitive information still is contained in logs, and therefore, it could be uncovered by
circumventing security means, e.g., in case of porous access control schemes, or by targeting base
system components to directly access storage media (cf. Sec. 4.7). Furthermore, anonymisation
cannot be considered to be completely sufficient for hiding a user’s identity. Certain activities
and combinations of activities can lead to patterns that can be traced back to a specific learner
who should be protected by anonymisation mechanisms. Hence, loss of such data and disclosure
of certain pieces of information could lead to an identification even without immediately seeing
personal information. Traffic flow analysis and observing base system components together with
their log files can be sufficient to extract meaningful information (cf. Fig. 4.4). Also, in case of
evaluations in a small course with only a few participants, inconspicuous details like gender, age,
former experience, or course of studies can be exploited to gather information about possible
identities behind corresponding answering parties. Thus, anonymisation could be invalidated by
specific patterns in such a situation. In addition, a special case is given by anonymous activities,
where learners may only participate once. Learners obviously have to authenticate with revealing
their identity while still staying anonymous. This “contradiction” can be implemented by using
trusted third parties that overtake the authentication process and do not reveal the identity of
an authenticated user. However, missing trusted third parties in such a scenario represent a sig-
nificant threat to stated demands, since data sets, even if stored separately, could be combined
as far as access control mechanisms are not implemented reliably and with proper configurations.
“Trusted” in this context explicitly demands physically separated and distributed server systems
with different administrators. Otherwise, administrators still could combine data sets.
I2: Authentication Data
The authentication process is one of the most crucial processes for an e-learning system, since
all subsequent security mechanisms usually depend on the reliability of this service. Thus, com-
mon threats to authentication data are bypassing of the authentication process or disclosing
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foreign credentials to authenticate with stolen data. Bypassing authentication mechanisms can
be realised by exploiting weak protocols that allow, for example, so-called replay or reflection at-
tacks. The former kind can be realised by eavesdropping the authentication process and sending
recorded packets again to replay this process later. In the latter kind, erroneous implementations
of challenge-response authentication mechanisms working in both directions will be abused, such
that an attacker can send the received challenge from the server on the first opened connec-
tion back to the server (“reflect”) on a second connection. The server answers this challenge
with the appropriate response needed by the attacker for the first connection, such that the first
connection can be established successfully. Another approach especially relevant for web-based
scenarios is given by all kinds of session hijacking for bypassing the authentication process (cf.
I3 for details). Besides this, foreign credentials can be stolen or reconstructed in different ways.
Credentials might be disclosed, e.g., by using so-called “phishing” approaches with providing
fake log-in pages, by exploiting weak domain name system (DNS) mechanisms (“pharming”) to
redirect traffic, or by intercepting exchanged messages with the correct authentication server.
Attackers also may be able to collect usernames if they are displayed without any restrictions
within a system. Thus, only passphrases are left to be gathered as remaining part of the secret.
Although the passphrase is usually better protected, it still is threatened by inadequate organ-
isational policies, e.g., if the length of passphrases can be predicted, if patterns are used, or if
no dictionary or simplicity checks are performed by the system to prevent users from choosing
too weak passphrases. Even if these threats are not existent or exploitable by an attacker, brute
force attacks with testing all possible combinations of usernames and passwords can be used
to reveal credentials. Missing temporary blocking mechanisms, so-called “captchas”, i.e., images
with randomly chosen human readable information to be entered in an additional input field, or
delays after wrong authentication attempts allow an attacker to apply a huge amount of combi-
nations per second, such that successfully cracking the authentication process only is a matter
of (relatively short) time.
I3: Session Data
As introduced for authentication data, log-in status is usually managed using sessions stored on
the server and accessed by clients using their session ID. Without further protection, a valid
session ID stolen by an attacker is sufficient to get logged in as the corresponding user (cf.
Fig. A.22). Possibilities for hijacking sessions are given by approaches like cross-site scripting
(XSS), cross-site tracing (XST), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), or session fixation attacks
(cf. [Tra01, MK07]). Since with Web 2.0 more and more e-learning offerings include possibilities
for users to edit and comment contents, this significantly increases the amount of pages where
malformed code can be injected to trick other visitors. Thus, threats related to script injections
gain in importance. Besides this, in case of low entropy for the ID creation, session IDs might even
be predictable for attackers. This particularly holds, if patterns can be extracted from different
session IDs. But also flaws in applied pseudo random number generators used for the creation of
IDs could be exploitable. Another aspect related to sessions is given by providing a store for user-
related states. If an attacker is able to access these sessions, e.g., by low level attacks (cf. Sec. 4.7),
then the behaviour of the e-learning system for this user could be influenced. If the system also
relies on state information to be transmitted by the client, then further threats become obvious by
actively manipulating corresponding information on client-side, e.g., manipulate cookie contents,
hidden tags within web forms, or by injecting malware like Trojan horses. Generic manipulations
during data transfer are possible by man-in-the-middle attacks like malicious web proxies, or by
intercepting and altering AJAX-based requests.
I4: Accountability Data
Accountability aims at providing non-repudiation assurance for all affiliated parties in critical
activities. Consequently, appropriate mechanisms have to be present and protected (cf. Fig. 4.7).
Besides generic aspects like weak authentication or session management, an error-prone privilege
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Figure 4.7: Fault tree excerpt for accountability (cf. Fig. A.57)
management can be the root of improper accountability means. This means, the more users with
equal privileges have access to some function, the more difficult it will be to find the actual
user behind a certain activity – at least if no further non-repudiation means are implemented.
With respect to mutual non-repudiation assurance and possibly mutual distrust, an additional
trusted third party can be integrated, such that critical data transfer takes place in encrypted
way over the trusted third party. Hence, this mediator can request and provide this information
several times until corresponding partners confirm successful transmission. However, common
threats to accountability, in general, are given by spoofed messages for weak protocols, network
traffic redirection, or unnoticeable manipulations. Even in case of digital signatures for providing
integrity and authenticity of messages, wrong public keys could be injected. Also, their validity
for a specific physical person might be unsure without further identification mechanisms like
provided by a PKI (public key infrastructure). In addition, low level attacks aiming at base
system components or data transfer threaten accountability data, since such attacks easily can
invalidate authenticity and integrity of stored or transferred data sets without being noticed at
once by affected users (cf. Sec. 4.7).
I5: Privilege Settings
As a whole, threats to privilege settings for the given scenario can be seen from two perspec-
tives: either the privilege management is inappropriate, such that real life requirements cannot
be mapped to the privilege system, or privilege settings are erroneous, such that unauthorised
persons can gain direct access to desired functionality or data (cf. Fig. 4.8). Starting with im-
proper privilege management, the set of available and manageable privileges can be too coarse to
fit the actual e-learning scenario. For example, in the scenario as given in Section 4.4.1 privileges
should be fine-grained enough to provide specific adaptability for integrating tutors into courses
with moderator privileges. This means, although the corresponding professors or rather authors
as course creators have full privileges within their courses, further personnel with limited privi-
leges might be sensible to support learners in certain activities. If the privilege concept does not
take care of such helper roles, then it might be necessary as kind of workaround to also provide
auxiliary personnel with full privileges for a course. Obviously, this threatens the course integrity
and confidentiality of specific settings or learning contents. Related to this conceptual threat are
so-called “horizontal attacks” where users of the same role or with the same privileges influence
each other and access or manipulate foreign data.
On the other hand, misconfiguration can be considered in more detail. This is mostly related to
fallibility and laziness of users, such that usability and support in setting privileges appropriately
are reasonable. Threats in this case are given by confusing interfaces and the lack of overview
pages, such that in the example of role-based access controls no comparison of roles is supported,
although this comparison would simplify the adjustment of different roles to each other. Fur-
thermore, a lack of consistency checking mechanisms and insecure default settings increase the
amount of threats related to human errors. Besides this, erroneous treatment of local role hier-
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Figure 4.8: Fault tree excerpt for privilege setting threats (cf. Fig. A.24, A.25, A.26)
archies may threaten the system, i.e., access controls on a global scope possibly can be bypassed
by course teachers in their local scope (cf. Sec. 4.6.1), such that local privileges can be exploited
to harm other assets.
I6: Policies and Manuals
Policies and manuals are meant to support authorised users of a system. Hence, this information
should be accessible and correct; policies should be enforced to mitigate laziness or fallibility
of users. Threats to these assets, consequently, are given by the lack of available information,
e.g., by not created product or procedure information, by denied access as given by external
denial of service attacks, or by insufficient information within provided manuals. With respect to
more formal policies, clearly stated rules are desired, such that this policy can even be managed
and controlled by the system itself. A problematic situation, therefore, primarily is given by a
lack of formalisation, such that rules and demands cannot automatically be enforced by the e-
learning system. Changes to provided manuals and policies, obviously, should only be reserved to
administrators or superior personnel to prevent abuse. Especially since such documents should
provide guidelines for acting correctly within the system, fraudulent manipulation, e.g., by cir-
cumventing erroneous access controls or attacking base system components, can have far-reaching
consequences.
4.5 Analysis of Web Service Assets
In this section, threats to assets common for all web services will be investigated. A scenario will
be introduced in Section 4.5.1 that explicitly emphasises a distributed architecture, and therefore,
provides several starting points for discussing network based threats as well as base component
specific attack vectors.
4.5.1 Scenario: Various Training Providers with Single Authentication
We assume an association of various software developing companies that will provide specific
e-learning courses for their software. These software companies work on individual projects, but
also share certain libraries to reduce their overall effort for providing high quality software. Thus,
besides mutual access to work with common libraries for the convenience of customers, this as-
sociation also provides a central management of account data for their e-learning courses. This
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includes the organisation of the authentication process as well as the administration of purchased
software specific trainings. As a consequence, each customer only has to register once at this cen-
tral server and at once is provided with a list of all software products for which he has purchased
an educational course. These courses still are managed at the respective software company, since
the decentralised content management is considered to provide better accuracy and to support
keeping them up-to-date with less efforts. Courses can be purchased by arbitrary customers with-
out any restriction. Support is not considered during the courses. Thus, this scenario describes
an e-learning system of type 1 (cf. Fig. 3.2). Affiliated roles include learners, i.e., customers of
this service, software companies as authors of their software specific courses, administrators for
each company network to provide their own courses, and common administrative staff manag-
ing the central authentication server. Since this network in general provides distributed services,
network security and reliability are of major value. The authentication process in this scenario
is outsourced to a separate server for providing single sign-on for the sake of improved usability
for customers. Interfaces have to be implemented appropriately to let this association of several
companies work well together.
4.5.2 Threats of Web Service Assets
This subsection considers threats to assets of the information security services group (cf. Tab. 3.4).
Many of the threats to be mentioned in the following will be closely related to actual attacks as
discussed in more detail in Section 4.7. Hence, explanations in this place will be reduced to a
minimum.
W1: Network Topology
Distributed architectures as sketched in the scenario per se exhibit an increased amount of net-
work traffic in comparison to single server architectures, since all affiliated services have to ex-
change data accordingly among each other. As a consequence, distributed architectures provide
attackers with more targets and may simplify attacks. But, first, an attacker will have to uncover
the actual network topology to get an impression what server systems are available and how
important they may be for the architecture as a whole. Possibilities for investigating a network
usually are protocol-based. Thus, the Internet protocol (IP) and related routing mechanisms can
be abused to identify demilitarised zones (DMZ) or routing nodes with network address trans-
lation (NAT) (cf. Sec. 4.7). Since network communication usually depends on the domain name
system (DNS) to resolve hostnames to IP addresses, an attack to this protocol, and therefore,
spoofing a desired server in the network can easily be applied for preparing man-in-the-middle
attacks (cf. Fig. A.61, A.67). Besides the disclosure and manipulation of the network topology
with its primary servers, a recent trend to shift more and more computational processes to the
clients for increased flexibility and an improved presentation by dynamic web pages, e.g., basing
on Web 2.0 technologies and AJAX, results in additional targets. Although server-side systems
might be protected best possible, immoderate reliance on client-side security could break the sys-
tem. Considering fallibility of users, e.g., at user assisted code execution or injudicious activating
of links, this also can lead to an injection of manipulated data and far-reaching consequences
for user data. Increased complexity in distributing computational processes on server and clients
even besides human errors can be very error-prone. Hence, critical implementation errors are
very probable.
W2: Reliability
Reliability besides the pure availability also demands efficiency, such that significant slowing-
down can already be considered a problem with respect to a usable e-learning system. Thus,
reliability can be seen from three perspectives: unstable software components, inappropriate
maintenance including denial of service prevention, and mutual influences of deployed software.
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Figure 4.9: Fault tree excerpt for improper infrastructure maintenance (cf. Fig. A.31)
First, due to the demand of reliability in productive environments, software has to be tested
sufficiently prior to actual deployment (cf. Fig. 4.9). A flexible but due to security issues not
reachable system cannot be used in any way. Hence, productive systems particularly must prefer
availability and security over possible flexibility improvements by quickly applying new software
releases. Nevertheless, software tests can be very time-consuming and require an experienced
administrator to actively challenge the software stability and reliability of functionality. The
fact of missing supervisory bodies for administrative staff – at least with comparable technical
knowledge – even increases the technical problem of neglecting tests, and therefore, this can
result in actually threatening the e-learning environment as a whole. Second, from a maintenance
perspective, not only software patches have to be applied for closing discovered security flaws,
but also adaptations to changing situations have to be considered. Delays and disadvantages
by (partly) incompatible software components significantly negatively influence the performance
and reliability at least of parts of the e-learning systems. Also, denial of service protection can
be mentioned. Such protection consists of mechanisms being placed in the network architecture,
e.g., load balancers, and respective configurations, e.g., SYN flood protection [Eri03]. Note that
maintenance also includes the assurance of business continuity even in case of non-preventable
incidents. Since customers paid for corresponding courses, in the sketched scenario every lack of
availability could lead to indemnity claims. Threats concerning this requirement, therefore, are
given by missing or permanently not available computer emergency response teams (CERT) and
emergency policies in case of security incidents. Third, mutual influences usually are reasoned by
exhaustive privileges assigned to processes or persons in the system, but also missing sandboxes
are conducive for such threats. Similar to quarantine areas, it is advisable to run software in a
restricted area not threatening any other system outside this scope. Besides the scope of software,
a missing separation of storage media, e.g., by storing data of all e-learning components in the
same database, introduces threats concerning the exploitation of weaknesses in one component
to access data of all other components as well.
W3: Software Details
Increasing complexity implies an increased risk of security holes to exist and to be overseen.
Nevertheless, many developers tend to include more complex and general functionality. This
most probably can be reasoned by the software engineering goal of reusability. If modules are
implemented as general as possible, they can be applied in more scenarios than simple modules
only providing very specific functionality. Thus, the inclusion of general concepts into already
existing base components and the extension by additional functionality are considered to be easier
than an alternative (re-)implementation of exactly those functions missing. Reusability goals and
simplicity of inclusion here affect software complexity and related vulnerabilities (cf. Fig. A.43).
With respect to the high probability of software containing security holes, exact information
about the specific product in use and its current version is valuable for an attacker to prepare
attacks with increased accuracy. Thus, threats are given by mechanisms to uncover the presence
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of a specific kind of software, e.g., by using port scanners, “banner grabbing” mechanisms, or by
evaluating version strings as given in protocol headers when connecting to a specific service (cf.
Sec. 4.7).
W4: Interface Details
Similar to the discovery of provided software details, respective interfaces have to be protected,
such that attackers must not be able to connect to these services in an unauthorised manner.
Besides the pure existence of web services, specific details of provided functionality and respective
protocols to access them can be considered as secret. However, transferred data can be eaves-
dropped if not encrypted appropriately. Open source code of services can be reviewed to extract
related protocols, and closed-source products can be reverse engineered if their program files are
made available to attackers. This threat especially applies for dynamic extension modules in com-
bination with insufficient access controls. Concepts and inner implementation details of modules
cannot be considered entirely in advance by administrators of the core e-learning system. Hence,
an extension by modules will likely introduce security issues to be examined and exploited by
attackers having knowledge about corresponding interface details for such modules. But despite
the value of interface details, security by obscurity cannot be considered as reasonable security
measure. Thus, gaining knowledge concerning API specifications is not considered a security
breach per se, but the exploitation of interfaces as enabled by improper access controls will.
W5: Configuration Details
This asset can be threatened in the sense of being uncovered. For example, an attacker might
gather valuable information concerning weak configurations. Also, configuration files could be
manipulated to inject own configurations. Since some sort of configurations are necessary for all
deployed software components, several configuration files and data stores can be considered a
likely target for attacks, e.g., dedicated configuration files, environment variables, or loaded and
active firewall rules. Note that configuration data also could be uncovered in case of misconfig-
ured access controls, such that remaining backup files could be requested and their contents be
exploited to guess and deduce current configurations (cf. Fig. A.35). In addition, configuration
details can be considered as known to an attacker if the default settings are not changed after
deployment. This especially can introduce further security holes by limiting the search space for
certain string values in configuration data. With respect to manipulations of configuration data,
we have to consider reconfiguration, e.g., by redirecting links to libraries that get included in
the e-learning core system. A possible threat for actually manipulating configuration data or at
least provoke unpredictable behaviour is given by parameter injection with either changing ex-
isting values or injecting contradictory configuration entries, such that former settings might be
overridden. Thus, configuration data might be exploited to clear the way for subsequent attacks.
W6: Data Organisation
This asset has to be considered in two steps: first, the data organisation and inherent data struc-
tures will be investigated by possible intruders, and second, this information will be exploited
to conduct more precise attacks. For revealing data organisation, several more or less technical
threats exist. On the one hand, of course, again low level attacks and bypassing of authentication
mechanisms or access controls can be applied to uncover information. On the other hand, more
active attacks like the so-called “fuzzing” can be conducted to provoke errors that may contain
further information about internal data organisation, e.g., database concept and names of corre-
sponding relations or tables. Threats like enabled directory listings even enable spidering of the
server file system (in respective scope) and the exploitation of search engines to find specific files.
Concerning extension modules and related data storage solutions, we have to distinguish new
functionality and replacement functions. Real extensions, e.g., new interaction forms and tools
for collaborative learning like whiteboard integration for simultaneously working on identical rep-
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resentations of data, will result in new data sets that need to be protected against unauthorised
access and that need to be stored reliably. Access to already existing data sets is not necessary in
this case. Contrary to this, modules like the integration of a sophisticated mail system replacing
a less powerful message exchange system, of course, need to access existing master data to not
store such data redundantly. In addition, with direct access to such existing data sets this module
can be used immediately without the need of additional time-consuming configuration. However,
direct access without further configuration implies increased security issues by more probable
security relevant configuration flaws. Note that this aspect concerns all assets of an e-learning
system, since the actually concerned data sets depend on the corresponding module, which can
provide functionality of all kind, and therefore, is not restricted to specific data sets. Actual
threats related to this conceptual problem of integrating modules without strict data separation
are usually of very technical kind. This mostly includes implementation errors in the module code
allowing various types of code injection, e.g., by buffer overflows (cf. Fig. A.44) or SQL injection
attacks (cf. Fig. A.65). Further details will be given in Section 4.7.
W7: Log Data and Statistics
As discussed in Section 2.7, activities in the system are sensible to be logged and such information
be combined to statistics for providing feedback for learners and for being able to reconstruct
misbehaviour in critical activities. However, this requires the integrity of log files and is in contrast
to user demands with respect to being under surveillance. Log data and statistics represent an
asset affecting privacy and person related data. Log data, if combined appropriately, could even
allow tracing a user account back to the physical person behind this account. Therefore, this
asset has to be treated appropriately, such that data sets, as far as only relevant for statistics,
should be stored in anonymised way. If critical activities have to be stored including personal
information, then access to these data must be protected accordingly (cf. Fig. A.38). Threats
related to this are given by improper access controls, excessive data logs at least increasing the
impact of a successful attack, and low level attacks to base system components (cf. Sec. 4.7).
Note that the primary aim of using log files to recognise fraudulent activities results in necessities
to evaluate these logs and prevent misinterpretation. Thus, automated tools are needed to cope
with the amounts of emerging protocol entries and support administrators in interpreting entries
correctly to not harm learners by false accusations and related consequences.
4.6 Perpetual Concept Related Issues
As emphasised in the former section, certain concept related threats affect several assets in
comparable manner, such that they cannot clearly be assigned to a single asset only. In the
following section, three of such concepts will be investigated and discussed independently of
sketched scenarios.
4.6.1 Enrolment and Role Hierarchy
Role-based access controls, despite their clear advantage for managing privileges for many users
in few steps, are dangerous if applied in different scopes. In e-learning systems, mostly a dis-
tinction is realised between global scope, i.e., outside of courses, and local scopes, i.e., inside of
courses. Obviously, roles and assigned privileges to roles on a global scope are superior to locally
restricted privileges within a course. But with respect to these separated scopes, all roles in cor-
responding scopes are handled independently and describe their own role hierarchy. As long as
these scopes actually are separated and each role is assigned only with privileges that do not
interfere with duties and privileges of other roles, then this usually is not a problem. Note that
this particularly demands an appropriate separation of duties, although in smaller institutions
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conceptually different roles and related tasks might be gathered in single physical persons. For
example, administrative tasks may have been assigned to tutors in certain scenarios, and there-
fore, these tutors need to be equipped with appropriate privileges. In case of larger institutions
with a vast amount of users, smaller groups with very specific duties and privileges are sensible
to reduce temptations for abusing such privileges. Bear in mind that for the sake of security we
always have to assume mischievous persons among users, such that privileges steadily have to be
kept as restrictive as possible.
The problem of roles in different scopes becomes obvious when considering the enrolment of a
user of a high global role in a course with its own role hierarchy as user of a low local role. In
case of an improper separation of duties, this could introduce threats concerning unauthorised
manipulation or disclosure of personal data in this local scope. For example, course creators
as local administrators may access all data of this newly enrolled user – including data only
relevant on a global scope, e.g., the corresponding master data. Thus, circumvention of global
privilege settings could be possible by incorrectly implemented scopes. This situation even gets
worse, if global administrators can be treated by such course creators or tutors just like every
other user in the system, i.e., subordination by (possibly unconfirmed) course enrolment also is
possible. Similar to changes of learner’s profile data and personal information, changes to the
data of administrators might be possible, e.g., changes to security critical parts like the degree
of notifications to be sent. If only little information is available for this administrator, he cannot
react in adequate time to intervene appropriately at malicious activities.
Hence, besides the basic threat inherent in several scopes for role hierarchies, missing handshake
protocols for such scope changes promote mentioned threats, i.e., direct enrolment in courses
must not be finished without confirmation by affiliated parties (cf. Fig. A.63). Furthermore, if
manipulations and changes to the status of learners are not made obvious, traceable, and for
the final steps require agreement of affected parties, then this even might occur without learners
being informed in any way. Consequently, the threat of invisible and unrecognised alterations
endangers users within this concept.
4.6.2 Supervision and Observation
Depending on learners’ autonomy and self-concept, supervision and a complete disclosure of
learning progress and former successes or failures as given by their profile might not be acceptable
to learners (cf. Sec. 2.7). Hence, to know that some tutors can perpetually access these data might
lead to rejection and increased distance, although the presence of moderators especially is sensible
for the initiation of working processes in groups consisting of participants who did not know each
other up to this moment. However, reservation and artificial behaviour could be the consequence,
such that collaboration, for example, could be negatively influenced and probability of successful
learning might be reduced significantly. Knowles et al. [KHS05] describe experiences with groups
whose participants fall back to passivity in case of active participation and mentoring by superiors
like teachers, since they completely rely on these moderators instead of taking the initiative and
actively aim for achieving results.
Besides perpetual supervision, evaluation of data concerning the learning progress and possibly
emerging problems also enable teachers to trace learners and disclose cognitive barriers. This
means, for supervision and mentoring of learners, as much information as possible is required
by tutors to support and mentor appropriately. However, conversely, this kind of data is very
sensitive and might not be wanted to be shared by learners. Thus, unauthorised disclosure can
be considered a security threat – even revelation to teachers, tutors, superiors, project leader, or
other executives. This kind of disclosure is considered to be a threat independent of a further
distribution, at least if it is not communicated in advance and related to specific supportive
tasks. Note that this general threat mostly concerns the contradictory expectations of teaching
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Figure 4.10: Fault tree excerpt for import and export functionality (cf. Fig. A.48)
staff and learners. While learners usually do not want to be invisibly observed, teaching staff
demands exhaustive information about learners and their learning progress do be able to support
adequately. Related to this is the abuse of privileges by tutors within a course to listen to
communication during collaboration. To mitigate this threat, allowing learners to hide and offer
their data piecewise on their own discretion to teachers can be helpful. Privacy and acceptance
of learners have to be considered to be of higher priority than supervision urges of teachers.
4.6.3 Import and Export Functionality
This general concept can be implemented in different ways, e.g., as global backup/restore mecha-
nism, import/export of entire courses, or import/export of single components like learner profiles,
list of participants, configurations, or prepared tests. Every mentioned way of using some func-
tionality for exporting data and importing them into another system or the same system at a
later point in time introduces threats concerning bypassing of access controls and the injection
of malicious data. In principle, these mechanisms may provide possibilities to export data, apply
changes to the archive which would not be allowed in the original system, and re-import these
altered data again. Hence, by exporting information, the data are out of the scope of access con-
trols in the e-learning system, and therefore, security mechanisms could be successfully bypassed
(cf. Fig. 4.10). Affected import/export standards implemented in many e-learning systems be-
sides a general global backup/restore functionality are given by IMS Content Packaging (CP)
[IMS06a] as also integrated in SCORM [Adv09] for exchanging learning contents, IMS Learner
Information Package (LIP) for exchanging learner profiles [IMS01], and IMS Question and Test
Interoperability (QTI) for exchanging tests [IMS06b]. Note that especially import and export
functionality including a list of participants and their learning profile can raise problems con-
cerning privacy of learners. Consequently, the special case of complete course backup and restore
functionality is not sensible for common tutors in courses with respect to privacy of learners in-
cluding all information about learning progress, communication contents, and results within the
learning process. For not provoking moral conflicts for teaching staff to decide between privacy
of learners and better insight in learning problems, the task of managing entire course or system
backups must only be assigned to administrators. Nevertheless, specific learning content backup
and restore mechanisms can be integrated for teaching staff that already is equipped with privi-
leges to legally access every single piece of exported data also within the e-learning system. But
bear in mind that exporting mechanisms besides information security also affect other security
areas like physical security for backup media. No unauthorised person may have physical access
to corresponding backup media to prevent theft or manipulation.
Besides this, import mechanisms also could be exploited by usually authorised personnel to inject
malicious code (cf. Fig. A.52). E-learning systems like all other web services have to implement
proper input validation mechanisms to sanitise malformed user input and to prevent security in-
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cidents by accepting input strings without further checks. Thus, import/export mechanisms also
can be abused by tutors to gain increased access to the system than usually intended by these
means. For example, scripts can be injected in learning contents to realise cross-site scripting
attacks or even entirely redirect users to another server under the control of the attacker. Conse-
quently, data to be imported using such import mechanisms besides the actual authorisation of
users still have to consider these data as not trustworthy. Input validation and similar protective
measures need to be applied just like for every other user input.
4.7 Low Level Event Based Threats
This section investigates general threats to assets that result from (intentional or unintentional)
low level events on base system components. Since events, e.g., attacks against an informatics
system, are very technically oriented, many of the threats introduced in this section can be
considered to be far from being specific to e-learning. They rather address web services in general.
Nevertheless, e-learning systems depend on a variety of base systems like web server, database
system, or operating system, and therefore, attacks to these systems affect the proper functioning
of the e-learning system as well (cf. Fig. A.42). Note that many of the threats and concrete
attacks to be discussed in this section were mentioned before with closer relation to the discussed
assets. However, the discussion in the following will go more into detail and present actual attack
procedures and possible consequences for e-learning, such that this recurring discussion aims at
a more in-depth consideration.
Possible threats to mentioned assets consist of very different kinds and intentions. Numerous
physical factors might threaten reliability of hardware and software components, but even more
important are threats originating from human beings. Note that unintentional threats need to
be considered in the same manner as the more obvious threats of an intentional kind. However,
intentional attacks are much more difficult to protect against, since attackers can continually
adapt to emerging security mechanisms, and therefore, perpetual analysis of the current security
situation and adaptations to newly uncovered security issues are crucial.
For the following discussion, we will focus on intentional attacks while referring to the fault tree
in Appendix A for respective unintentional threats. Intentional attacks can be roughly divided
into three steps an intruder most probably will conduct:
1. preparation by an extensive investigation of the target system,
2. actual performance of an attack possibly including the insertion of backdoor systems to
simplify later reuse and repeated penetration, and
3. “anti-forensics” by covering own tracks and make backtracking more complicated.
Especially the first step seems mostly underestimated by administrators. Skilled attackers are
very patient in gaining information about a target system in order to increase the probability of
penetrating successfully and of not being caught in the act:
“A skilled intruder appreciates principles of strategy and will not rush into a system without
careful preparation and planning.” [Tra01, p. 172]
“When preparing to mount any attack, it is always advisable to know the terrain. In this, a
skilled intruder is far from negligent.” [Tra01, p. 179]
Every piece of information that is provided by deployed systems can support intruders, and
therefore, attacks to discover such information should be turned to be in vain by hiding as
much information as possible or – for the sake of counterstrike – flooding the intruder with huge
amounts of false information (cf. proactive defence against port scans in [Eri03]). The second step
will usually take place by already prepared software tools that take care of formerly gathered
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knowledge about a target. In this case, in particular, it is relevant to know the operating system
and hardware architecture of the target system. Adaptations to an already running attack are
very difficult and mostly doomed to failure, since computers are quite fast in making decisions
according to their ruleset and program logic while humans need much more time to realise their
current thought and type respective commands:
“The Hollywood-fashioned hacker that continually assaults a system login would not last an
hour in the midst of contemporary firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Today’s
intruder is armed with an arsenal of far more sophisticated tools, which enable him to carry
out more automated and intelligently planned attacks.” [Tra01, p. 170]
By intelligently prepared attacks, the probability of failing in an early stage can be reduced,
although an administrator of the target system, of course, will try to impede such preparation by
hiding relevant information. As sort of a transition to the third step, certain software elements
like rootkits can be used to keep up backdoors in the system and to cover tracks by hiding
relevant information induced by activities of the intruder. Furthermore, already logged data that
are related to current activities have to be deleted accordingly. Hence, from an administrator’s
point of view, of course, such log files have to be protected and the inclusion of malicious software
be prevented.
4.7.1 Investigative Process
According to the distinction in three separate steps as introduced above, threats to e-learning
scenarios can at least be divided into, first, an investigation of used software and network details
and, second, the actual exploitation of the discovered situation. The third step of “anti-forensics”
will be considered where appropriate in the exploitation subsection. However, as first step, an
attacker most probably starts with the investigation of the target system and target network. In
the following, we will give a brief overview over this general theme.
When starting an investigation of target systems and networks, besides the most obvious software
interface, i.e., the provided web-based application, the base technology is of interest. This base
technology promises bigger gains after successful penetration than filtered front-ends will. Hence,
first, we focus on the infrastructural basis with considering threats against assets like network
topology, software details, data organisation, and others (cf. Fig. A.28, A.29). A simple and useful
source for information is given by the “whois” service. This service can be used to gain information
about reserved IP ranges for a specific company or institution. With this information, a network
scan (broadcast ping, NetBIOS name table requests, port scans, and so on) can be limited to the
discovered addresses and be conducted for identifying systems online and available for external
requests. In addition, a so-called DNS zone transfer, if not filtered for external requests, provides
a list of all registered machines within the network. This, of course, is more precise than an
anonymous set of reserved IP addresses. To further uncover connectivity and topology details of
the network, protocol details like time-to-life (TTL) fields in IP headers or different appearances
and compositions of received packets depending on specific implementation variants on physical
systems can be exploited. With abusing TTL entries, network address translation (NAT) and load
balancers can be identified, but the computers within the network are still hidden. A scientific
approach that can help identifying and distinguishing such computers behind protective gateway
systems is given by clock skew [KBC05, Mur06]. This approach exploits specific and individually
different temperature dependent behaviour that can be analysed remotely and be used to uniquely
fingerprint a system.
To gain information about the actual relevance of certain systems, and to identify services pro-
vided by physical systems, there are primarily two approaches. First, traffic flow analysis as shown
in Figure 4.4 can be used to get a picture of time dependent and perpetual data exchanges among
interconnected systems. This approach works best, i.e., least conspicuous, in local networks, since
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Figure 4.11: Fault tree excerpt for provoking and abusing error messages (cf. Fig. A.34)
otherwise packets will not be visible to a passive attacker. With active approaches like ARP (ad-
dress resolution protocol) spoofing/poisoning in switched networks [Eri03] or exploiting BGP
(border gateway protocol) for even sniffing large parts of the Internet [PK08], of course, this
restriction can be lifted. By successfully observing network traffic – even in encrypted transmis-
sions – attackers can extract information, e.g., about affiliated parties. Computers with a lot of
traffic can be assumed to be of more central relevance than machines only rarely starting requests.
A second possibility to uncover relevance of systems is given by sophisticated port scanners in
order to identify provided services (cf. Fig. A.33). Port scans show up which ports are open,
filtered by firewalls, or closed if no service is listening on that port. In addition, port scans can
be used for so-called “banner-grabbing”, i.e., the scanner connects to an open port and evaluates
provided information as given by the listening service, e.g., type of service and version infor-
mation. Similar to banner-grabbing, significant support can be found in software advertisement
strings telling almost all necessary details about the actually used software together with dy-
namically loaded modules and extensions, as well as specific configuration details (cf. Fig. A.35).
Note that such signature strings with embedded version information are not necessarily printed
on each page, but can be provoked by attackers when requesting elements that will result in
error pages that usually contain this information for supporting error detection and correction
(cf. Fig. 4.11). In addition to explicitly given version and software information, implicit hints can
be found in specific processing behaviour, e.g., the order of header entries in HTTP responses.
Furthermore, most scripting languages like PHP (PHP hypertext processor) provide information
collection functions to enable developers to get an overview of what functionality and libraries
are available. Due to laziness and fallibility of human developers, such information request pages
often are still available in productive environments. Hence, attackers might be rewarded for
guessing corresponding URLs by receiving a complete dump of configuration details and linked
libraries. In case of PHP, especially option settings like “register globals” or “magic quotes gpc”
can be useful for attackers, since this provides information about security settings concerning pa-
rameter handling and whether “threatening” special characters in parameters are automatically
“disarmed” by the interpreter.
For preparing code insertion and execution of arbitrary code, data organisation details on the
server are valuable information (cf. Fig. A.37). Similar to configuration and programming errors
as already described above for gaining version information of used software, error pages can also
be used for collecting information about database concepts and used programming language.
Concrete examples for exploiting talkative error messages related to a specific database are given
by Anley [Anl02] for preparing and fine-tuning SQL injection attacks.
This list of events, of course, can be significantly extended by considering all possibilities for
using software against its determined ways and misusing protocol specifications to see how the
system behaves with broken requests. The introduced events, therefore, are only meant to provide
a brief overview that will be picked up again in the exploitation section. Further information on
technical and concept independent events can be found in [Eri03, MK07, MBPC09].
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4.7.2 Exploitation
Many aspects of software and network technologies can be exploited by using them in unintended
ways and by aiming at programming errors that allow malicious code insertion. Implementation
mistakes provide significant potential for being exploited. Although, only a small subset of im-
plementation mistakes can be mentioned and discussed in this section, an elaborated list of most
common programming errors can be found in [MBPC09] and also in the fault tree as presented
in Appendix A. As an example for a very common programming error in web-based applications,
improper input validation can be mentioned (cf. Fig. A.50). This weakness, in general, refers to
the processing of user input, e.g., via web forms, without having sufficiently checked input strings
by the program logic including filtering or disarming of dangerous elements. As a more concrete
subcategory, SQL injection attacks can be added. For this type of attack specially crafted SQL
statements are entered in input fields, such that own SQL statements can be smuggled to the
database and be executed afterwards (cf. Fig. A.64). This can result in unauthorised read and
write access for stored data, as well as deleting entire databases or reconfiguration of database
and user settings. Note that even arbitrary code might be injectable into the file system by this
vulnerability and be executed on the server by exploiting extended stored procedures (ESP)
[Gui09]. The relevance for e-learning systems directly results from the usual connections to a
database system for storage purposes and the increasing need for enabling users to enter their
own comments or similar, such that input fields are required. Related to this requirement for
user input are deliberations resulting in automated corrections of user input. Fuzzy input sys-
tems are applied in certain cases to support users, e.g., to state commands in natural language,
or simply for the sake of usability by not enforcing users to recall exact syntax statements (cf.
[Shn92, Nie94, Dah06]). A common example for fuzzy search is given by Internet search engines
providing support by also searching for similar strings not directly provided by users. However,
back-end software usually needs input of parameters and commands in a very restricted syntax
to be able to process this input appropriately. Assuming statements that are processed to access
data in the system, e.g., input forms used for SQL statements, then a correction of wrong user
input can lead to unpredictable behaviour and data disclosure, or even to data loss and fraudu-
lent alteration as possibly desirable by attackers. Automated correction of parameters containing
critical data, consequently, is not sensible and should be avoided to not threaten back-end data
(cf. Fig. A.42). Note that the better the error correction is implemented, the more imprecise
attackers are allowed to work with still being successful.
Famous attacks to software vulnerabilities by implementation errors are stack or heap-based
overflows [One96, Eri03], format string vulnerabilities [Eri03], and exploitation of null pointer
dereferences [Spr06]. All of these programming vulnerabilities are well-known to attackers and are
frequently exploited. With respect to scenarios with several concurrent processes that influence
each other, e.g., in collaborative work, race conditions can become problematic (cf. Fig. 4.5).
This kind of vulnerability is very difficult to detect, since errors only rarely appear – at least
if not initiated by attackers. Race conditions, for example, can emerge, if two or more learners
simultaneously write on the same file for preparing their solutions. This can result in dropping
individual solutions and only storing the last writer’s data. Furthermore, temporary file manage-
ment is related to race conditions, i.e., if a process needs to store interim results in a temporary
file, an attacker could wait for this file to appear and change contents in this file while the main
process is working on different tasks before getting back to this file again. With this approach
malicious information can be inserted into the actual process.
Weaknesses related to the network layer are primarily related to insecure protocols or insecure im-
plementations for handling protocols, i.e., protocol entries can be spoofed to influence behaviour
of other technical components or even redirect traffic. For example, a spoofing approach con-
cerning DNS in combination with cache poisoning, i.e., filling up caches with useless or malicious
information, can be used to redirect requests to one’s own machine and process these requests
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instead of the meant target. What significant impact such approaches for DNS can have, is illus-
trated by Dan Kaminsky [Kam08] who discovered a very critical vulnerability in the DNS protocol
in 2008. Furthermore, TCP headers (transmission control protocol) and handshake mechanisms
can be exploited. By guessing sequence numbers or by attentively observing transmissions with
payload length and changes in sequence numbers, entire TCP connections can be hijacked and
single receivers be completely replaced. Affiliated parties in such connections can be reset to not
try to send any packets again to the other party. Also, TCP desynchronise can be used, such that
packets are inserted with correct sequence numbers. However, due to a missing packet reception,
the party to be excluded could not process and increase its own sequence number, which results
in invalid packets to be sent from now on within this pending connection. In addition, software
implementations that accept erroneous protocol data can perforate firewalls and be abused to
smuggle malicious data into protected network areas. Protocols are very strictly specified and all
states and statements that are not explicitly considered in this specification have to be treated
as undefined and should be dropped or rejected. But negative examples for implementations can
be found in many proxy or web servers. A common reason for system failure is given by an
incomplete consideration of protocol contents, i.e., although only a limited set of commands is
defined in protocols, some systems ignore or process additional statements instead of throwing
errors. Mostly for the sake of performance, protocol-based evaluations are neglected. But a sys-
tem in this case supports intrusion attempts by adapting wrong inputs to something that can
be used within the system. For example, some header fields are only allowed once in a packet
according to the specifications. But if such a field is used several times with different entries,
then some implementations might also process all of them. This leads to conflicting states, since
it cannot be decided by the software which entry is more reliable (first, second, . . ., or last one),
and therefore, this must raise errors due to specification conflicts instead of processing it in an
insecure manner. Contradictory entries for the actual payload size might not be detected and
treated accordingly, such that malicious data could be injected. Most famous realisations of such
attacks are the so-called “teardrop attacks” using wrong offset entries in IP headers that lead to
overlapping areas when re-assembling packet fragments (cf. [Eri03]). Also several HTTP exploits
using an analogous technique of providing contradictory header entries for HTTP packets are
commonly applied, e.g., HTTP request smuggling [Kle06] (cf. Fig. A.42). Hence, as long as error
correction and fault-tolerance are implemented in this layer, this can only lead to ambiguous
situations and increase the security risk significantly. For the prevention of respective threats, an
abortion due to specification conflicts is sensible and necessary.
Concerning availability of services and secure connections to these services, different threats are
conceivable. Besides mentioned protocol-based approaches like redirecting traffic, man-in-the-
middle attacks, TCP hijacking, and DNS cache poisoning, other denial of service approaches like
an increased net load, software related resource depletion, or the exploitation of programming
errors to crash the corresponding software can be applied. Increasing network traffic, for example,
can be realised by distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) with a huge amount of so-called
“zombie” machines simultaneously sending many requests to the target. This usually results in
(legitimate) packets getting lost or not being processed due to an overload of the network or
the server itself (cf. Fig. 4.12). Denial of service (DoS) attacks related to software implementa-
tion errors mostly are reasoned by other attacks that simply were not successful and instead of
arbitrary code execution only led to a system crash and lack of availability.
Getting closer to e-learning systems again, concept independent events on the application layer
can be considered. Here especially identity theft by stealing or intercepting authentication data
should be regarded in more detail. Although several approaches exist for user authentication, e.g.,
challenge-response mechanisms, smart card integration, or biometrics, most of today’s authenti-
cation mechanisms still base on passwords and similar credentials. Thus, all necessary pieces of
information for an authentication must be protected. In case of username/password pairs, this
obviously also includes the actual username, i.e., no obvious pattern should be used for username
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Figure 4.12: Fault tree excerpt for network related denial of service (DoS) (cf. Fig. A.56)
creation, no default usernames like “administrator”, and no publicly known information as (part
of) username, e.g., e-mail address. A famous attack for gaining existing usernames in a system
is given by the so-called “enumeration attack”. This approach exploits functions for users, e.g.,
account creation by themselves, password reset functionality, or the actual log-in form, to gain
information about the existence of entered usernames (cf. Fig. A.20). If error messages provide
information about the existence of an entered username, then the attacker has already gained
one part of the whole secret and can reduce further effort to the missing elements. Since such
an attack can be conducted automatically to evaluate different feedback messages, this can re-
veal many usernames in short time. Hence, only general error messages should be offered, i.e.,
“something” did not work. Note that due to mostly missing security means for ensuring a specific
strength level of passwords, even simplest passwords could be chosen by users which simplifies
password recovery attempts. Mechanisms for this are probing passwords by using brute force
approaches or dictionary attacks. Further simplification to guessing correct passwords is given
by assuming (simple) patterns in default password creation in cases where corresponding users
were too lazy to change initial passwords.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the actual theoretical discovery and analysis of threats to e-learning
systems. To conduct this analysis in a systematic way, the fault tree analysis approach was
introduced and presented as the best fitting approach in comparison to other commonly used
ones. However, the FTA also has several shortcomings that had to be taken care of during the
analysis process, e.g., redundancy by recurring generic threats. For drawing relations to former
chapters of this thesis, the analysis process was started by considering specific threats to assets as
introduced in Chapter 3. Thus, specific aspects for e-learning could be discussed with discovered
threats. But since e-learning systems as a collection of several activities and single services, or, as
a web-based service with dependencies on different base system components cannot be covered
as a whole by asset specific threats, more general and comprehensive conceptual and technical
threats affecting numerous assets at once have been considered accordingly.
Threats in this analysis phase emphasised the necessity for a thoroughly elaborated security
concept. Several valuable suggestions for implementing security with an appropriate level of
flexibility in e-learning can easily become harmful to the system, if not considered together
with related threats. As an example, role-based access controls were given with a distinction of
global (system-wide) and local (course-internal) scopes. Although separated scopes with relative
hierarchies provide several advantages concerning privilege management, an improper separation
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of duties can reverse this security concept into its opposite and even provide the circumvention
of access controls by abusing these scopes.
The resulting fault tree encompassing all threats as discovered during this research project is
presented in all its details in Appendix A. It consists of
• 7410 events in a fully expanded version,
• 1050 of these events are unique, and
• 597 unique events are basic events (in leafs of the tree).
These events sum up all threats as described in this chapter and provide additional threats and
dependencies, which did not fit to the scenarios as used for the discussion in this chapter, but
still are actually relevant for covering e-learning as a whole. Note that the difference in numbers
of events in a fully expanded tree and the unique events is reasoned by the comprehensive
conceptual and technical threats as mentioned in the former paragraph. Those threats can be
applied to several assets in equal manner, such that they have to be integrated redundantly into
the fault tree – at least by using transfer symbols to refer to those sets of threats.
Results of this chapter will be verified and extended by the subsequent Chapter 5. Given results,
therefore, build a starting point for a practical examination of existing e-learning systems to
complete the theoretically created tree with practical experiences and results. Afterwards, Chap-
ter 6 will provide recommendations to mitigate or even prevent discovered threats. As outlined
in Section 2.7, security mechanisms cannot be implemented by all means with respect to still
enabling undisturbed learning with the system. Consequently, not all threats will be solvable
entirely for e-learning, although there might exist mechanisms to protect against them and to
attenuate their possible impact. Regarding technical threats, most of these events can be pre-
vented by technical means. But what is less solvable are conceptual issues that are in touch with
human users, i.e., users must be informed about security concepts and possible consequences
of ignoring policies or circumventing security means. Hence, this aspect needs to be considered
appropriately to find comfortable solutions in form of a compromise between users’ demands and
security deliberations.
Chapter 5
Case Studies
5.1 Overview
While in Chapter 4 threats were introduced and discussed in theoretical manner, this chapter
aims at a practical application and verification of results. Thus, introduced aspects will be brought
into relation with outlined assets for e-learning and productively used e-learning systems. In this
special case, a practical analysis of threats in widely used learning management systems (LMS)
will be conducted. For this, first, the term “learning management system” will be introduced
in Section 5.2 together with common functional elements. Afterwards, the selection of two LMS
to be considered for the further investigation in this chapter will be discussed. These LMS, i.e.,
MOODLE and ILIAS, follow rather different approaches concerning security, and therefore, enable
the comparison of even contradictory conceptual deliberations. For the actual analysis in Sec-
tion 5.3, a structure as given by the information security services will be followed (cf. Sec. 3.3,
Tab. 3.1). Thus, mentioned LMS will be compared with respect to their different security con-
cepts and approaches to manage corresponding security services. Conceptual shortcomings as
discovered during this general analysis will be explicitly presented in Section 5.4. Also, possi-
bilities to exploit these weaknesses will be discussed and consequences will be illustrated with
their impact on respective assets. Finally, this chapter will be concluded in Section 5.5 with a
discussion of results and implications for the subsequent chapter.
5.2 Learning Management System
5.2.1 Term Definition and Functionality
E-learning and learning management systems are not consistently defined, i.e., no common and
widely accepted definition is available. However, the term of learning management systems (LMS)
is well-spread in literature, but not used in the same meaning and not always considered to be
combined with a content management component. Maier-Ha¨fele and Ha¨fele [MH05] introduced
four different types of management systems to be distinguished: learning management system
(LMS), learning content management system (LCMS), content management system (CMS), and
community content collaborative management system (C3MS). This means, content manage-
ment and learning management components as well as collaborative community-driven systems
are considered to be different system types. Weippl seconds this view on learning management
systems by his definition:
“A Learning Management System (LMS) is software that is used for the administration of
teaching and training programs. Main activities include the registration of users, tracking
their progress and generating reports.” [Wei05, p. 45]
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Again, only the resource management facilities of an LMS are mentioned. Weippl neither con-
siders architectural demands nor content management components, since in his opinion content
management only belongs to the task sets of CMS and LCMS.
However, since in this thesis not a system-related investigation is conducted where differences of
system types might be relevant, in the following, a more generous definition will be used basing
on Schulmeister [Sch03b]. Learning management systems will be considered as web-based appli-
cations, i.e., digital learning environments, implementing an e-learning system in a monolithic
way with functionality for administering all relevant resources for e-learning. This means, the
system provides all relevant elements to support the learning process including content manage-
ment. Also, organisational tasks covering all administrative, communicative, and organisational
duties are considered (cf. [Sch03b, p. 10]). Due to its monolithic architecture, single elements
cannot easily be exchanged, but instead they are strongly interconnected and well-adjusted to
each other. An approach, alternative to combining different independent tools for building the
e-learning system as a whole, is implemented in many learning management systems in form of
a core system with interfaces to enable dynamic extensibility by including additional modules.
Thus, this corresponds to a combined approach of a monolithic base implementing most common
functionality with sufficient harmonisation and, in addition, the provision of increased flexibility
by incorporating further components or by exchanging less valuable ones.
With respect to the aim of analysing practical e-learning systems for evaluating and refining
theoretical results of Chapter 4, comparing different LMS is reasonable. LMS in opposition to
general e-learning systems, possibly created as compounds of single functionality modules, provide
a whole set of required functionality by a single instance to be installed. No further software
is required; no complex dependencies to other functional software components are given. This
means, loosely coupled components as different option for providing an e-learning system are
quite more difficult to compare and to analyse due to missing interrelations of components and
the increased flexibility for including alternative parts. In addition, numerous commercial and
free LMS can be found on the Internet with connections to significant user communities. Hence,
their practical value can be easily verified.
5.2.2 Selection of Learning Management Systems
In the following, LMS to be used for the further investigation will be presented. As criteria for
choosing appropriate LMS as objects of comparison we use
1. availability of source code, i.e., open-source software is preferred,
2. publicity of LMS, i.e., size of community and reputation, and
3. diversity, i.e., considered LMS are not too similar.
Besides the fact of mostly being available for free, open-source learning management systems
offer the advantage of allowing the source code to be analysed. This property is supported by
demands of the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [ITS91] and the
Common Criteria (CC) [ISO05] for security evaluation, since the source code as an important
subject matter for the evaluation must be available for an appropriate examination of the actual
strength of software. Furthermore, the openness of the source code is important for understanding
extendability and implementation quality. Closed-source and commercial systems can only be
regarded in a very restrictive way, since their source is not available, and therefore, cannot be
included in the comparison process. The second criterion of publicity and application in numerous
institutions aims at ensuring practical relevance of the comparison in the following. While the
theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 can be generally applied to arbitrary e-learning systems, this
chapter should emphasise security issues in existing e-learning systems with letting the reader
relate mentioned threats to a system known to him/her. Obviously, this can only be achieved in
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case of well-spread and deployed systems with a considerable size of the user community. For the
third criterion, despite the common definition of being an LMS, a reasonable degree of differences
in these systems is demanded, such that different tasks and activities will most probably be solved
in different manner, and as such, different conceptual deliberations can be found and discussed
with respect to information security.
For the actual decision process, studies comparing several commercial and open-source LMS
were applied to only consider LMS more in detail that already suffice stated requirements. These
studies even showed that open-source does not give an indication for worse quality – the opposite
is true. MOODLE, for example, has competed with several other systems and turned out to be
the best one according to stated requirements (cf. [BHM05], [MD05]). Hence, for the following
comparison MOODLE will be considered. As a second system, ILIAS will be regarded, since this
LMS also is open-source and has a significant user community. Furthermore, original ideas and
concepts differ significantly from MOODLE in several areas, such that the third criterion also can
be fulfilled. Note that the focus on these two systems and a discussion of respective shortcomings
do not mean that these systems are more insecure than others or are somewhat special in this
field. The decision was made solely according to stated criteria including their publicity, and
therefore, negative discussions and discovered problems are not meant to despise these systems.
In fact, both systems tested very well and disclosed problems that most likely can be found in
other systems as well. However, before actually comparing security concepts of these LMS, first,
both systems will be introduced concerning initial aims and implemented concepts.
5.2.2.1 MOODLE
MOODLE1 (“Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment”) is a well-spread and
deployed LMS that was originally initiated in 1999 by Martin Dougiamas in Australia. Dougiamas
worked as system administrator at Curtin University of Technology and was not satisfied by the
used commercial LMS because of problems concerning usability and support for learning. After
some studies of education and early test versions, MOODLE was released in version 1.0 in 2002.
By now it has won a huge community of open-source programmers and users all over the world,
among them the University of Siegen.
Although initially aiming at university education, MOODLE is now also used in schools of different
levels, non-profit organisations, and companies. MOODLE enables course and user management
as well as the creation of learning contents, exercises, and assessments. Besides the ease of use,
the main focus of MOODLE is on activity of learners, i.e., it follows a constructivist approach
with emphasising social relations. It provides many possibilities for getting in contact with other
learners and for interacting with the system, e.g., chats, forums, wikis, assignments, or polls
to ask for learners’ opinions, e.g., evaluation of course sections. MOODLE does not provide the
possibility of individual notes and private spaces. The often regarded metaphor of a personal
desk to appear after log-in in MOODLE is restricted to only showing a list of courses in which the
logged in person is enrolled (independent of his role). Additional so-called blocks are available
for showing small frames with information, e.g., a calendar of relevant events in courses, other
persons currently online, or the most recent messages sent to a forum. Courses can consist of
texts allowing HTML formatting, external pages presented in a frame, directory listings to work
with files, or a collection of links to other documents. Although forums can be arbitrarily included
as activity in courses, at least one forum is part of each new course for general discussions and
news. Teaching staff is provided with a protected forum only accessible to them for enabling the
exchange of information not meant to be visible to learners. Files can be shared and uploaded
as part of a forum post to present solutions and let others discuss it.
1http://moodle.org [06-10-2009]
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MOODLE is realised as a web-based application programmed in PHP and using a database back-
end like MySQL or PostgreSQL. External programs for file compression in ZIP format or spell-
checkers can be integrated. MOODLE organises itself in two directories, such that one directory
contains all scripts necessary for running MOODLE, while the other directory holds all course
data that are not directly stored in the database. For security reasons the data directory should
be outside the scope of the web server to not allow upload and execution of malicious scripts.
Furthermore, MOODLE is separated into a core component with scripts to manage the core func-
tionality like administrative tasks, and modules that allow a flexible extension with additional
functionality. Extension modules and plug-ins are collected by MOODLE developers and provided
via the official web page2. MOODLE distinguishes different categories of extension modules with
different ways of processing access controls. These module categories are activity modules that
can be directly integrated into courses and be used as new sort of teaching method, blocks show-
ing some information on the user interface, and filters processing entered texts. By using such
filters, instead of the original input, processed representations appear in their designated places.
With respect to reusability of created courses, standards like IMS QTI [IMS06b] for tests, as well
as SCORM and IMS CP for the exchange of courses with other LMS are supported.
Comparing different versions of MOODLE, it becomes obvious, that not only bug fixes and minor
functional extensions are implemented, but also core concepts like user and roles management as
well as privilege administration are adapted significantly. During the author’s research project,
several major releases of MOODLE were regarded and investigated: version 1.6 (June 2006), 1.7
(November 2006), 1.8 (March 2007), and 1.9 (March 2008). As most recent version for this an-
alysis, version 1.9.5 (October 2009) was considered. Starting with version 1.5.4 as released in
May 2006, MOODLE did not implement a fine-grained access control scheme, but only fixed roles
were available with their respective privileges. No further adaptations to privileges were possible.
Since version 1.6 filters come with adjustable settings to adapt them more accurately to current
needs and to integrate security preferences. Such settings also allow alternative back-end im-
plementations for the expected functionality by changing configurations accordingly. In version
1.7 the privilege concept was completely re-implemented to allow fine-grained adjustments to
role preferences and to overload role privileges in the scope of local courses. Although version
1.6 already introduced facilities to change the appearance of own courses to the one of learners
with less privileges, in version 1.7 arbitrary roles (from an adjustable set of roles) can be chosen,
i.e., different roles with different privileges and properties are available to check the course ap-
pearance from different points of view. In version 1.8 no significant changes were considered for
the implementation of security aspects, but many privilege settings were tightened, e.g., while
import/export of courses and backup/restore functionality was allowed for course creators in
version 1.7, this now is set to the neutral “inherit” position in version 1.8, and as such, it is only
available if allowed in a higher scope (not set by default). In addition, version 1.8 introduced a
separation of system and site context, such that better adaptability for course internal settings is
possible without affecting global preferences. In version 1.9 or more precisely version 1.9.5, again,
no significant security changes were introduced, rather mainly bug fixes and new functionality.
Concerning roles and their implementation, the performance was changed significantly due to
a more efficient implementation of this concept. With respect to better adaptability, blocks as
shown on the users’ welcome screen for providing information about certain course elements and
activities can be hidden from certain roles and be shown for others. Before this version, only a
general publication for all roles was possible.
All these changes with respect to security and adaptability from a security point of view show
that the development of MOODLE is not yet completed and the necessity for larger adaptations
is still given. This aspect will be discussed again later for reasons concerning security.
2Modules and plug-ins for MOODLE, URL: http://moodle.org/mod/data/view.php?id=6009 [08-09-2009]
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5.2.2.2 ILIAS
ILIAS3 (“Integriertes Lern-, Informations- und Arbeitskooperations-System”) was initially devel-
oped in the VIRTUS4 project at the University of Cologne, Germany, and released in 1998. The
primary aim was to enable and support communication and cooperation, as well as to provide
a platform for sharing information, especially to support the mentioned project. Due to positive
experiences in practical use, ILIAS was released from VIRTUS and developed independently as an
open-source project. Currently, ILIAS is used in productive environments of educational institutes
all over the world – and still the University of Cologne coordinates the community of developers.
In opposition to MOODLE, ILIAS does not put its primary focus into activities but rather into
complex course structures with many possibilities to improve course material with external links,
web feeds, or a collection of easily accessible media objects. Complex course relations can be set
by creating associations in form of dependencies, i.e., some courses can only be entered by learners
who already have successfully passed certain preliminary courses. The session concept inside of
courses provides additional structuring capabilities: files, information, or communication facilities
either can be made available in a pervasive, general course element or in particular timely limited
sessions. Like in MOODLE, several possibilities are given for assessments and polls. Noteworthy is
the integrated mail system that enables message exchanges within the system and without the
necessity of making e-mail addresses available to all possible addressees. In addition, the metaphor
of a personal desktop that allows the administration of courses enables an overview of current
news and appointments using a calendar view. It also provides the creation and administration
of personal notes to store ideas on the central server, and bookmarks to simplify access to often
used elements.
ILIAS is realised as a web-based application programmed in PHP. Primarily, ILIAS aims at sup-
porting MySQL as database back-end, but in more recent releases a generic database abstraction
layer was introduced to also connect to other database systems like Oracle. Third party software
like an image converter script, compression tools, or tools for rendering TEX formulae to images
can be included. In addition, an integration of Google’s map service for locating users or social
bookmarking sites is possible. Similar to MOODLE, ILIAS for the sake of security also is organised
with two separate folders, where one of them within the scope of the web server contains program
scripts and configuration data, and the second folder outside the web server scope stores user
data uploaded in respective activity modules. In versions 4.0.0 and newer, ILIAS also provides
support for an easier inclusion of additional modules, such that ILIAS also can be considered as
basic core component as offered by the official developers and extension modules to be installed
in the directory structures of ILIAS for integrating additional functionality. Another main goal of
ILIAS is standard conformity. Among other standards, ILIAS supports SCORM [Adv09] for the
import and export of learning objects, and IMS QTI [IMS06b] for assessments. Note that the
conformance to SCORM even was certified by ADL5 (Advanced Distributed Learning), i.e., con-
formance was verified and not only claimed as in many other LMS, although only rudimentary
support can actually be found.
Comparing different versions of ILIAS as released during the run-time of this research project, the
security relevant improvements are less significant than those of MOODLE. Starting from version
3.6.3 (May 2006) as relative object of comparison, major releases during this project are ILIAS 3.7
(Aug. 2006), 3.8 (June 2007), 3.9 (Nov. 2007), 3.10 (Sep. 2008), and 4.0 (Sep. 2009). Considering
the differences between these releases, since ILIAS 3.7 CAS (central authentication server) and
SOAP were supported for the authentication, revisions and enhancement of user registration
3http://www.ilias.de [15-01-2010]
4http://www.virtus.uni-koeln.de/virtus/ [12-12-2009]
5certification of compliance: http://webapps.adlnet.gov/CertifiedProducts/Certification.aspx?ID=241
[02-10-2009]
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were implemented, and a PayPal6 module was integrated for the corresponding payment method
in commercially driven offerings. For version 3.8, the LDAP (lightweight directory access proto-
col) authentication method was extended by an automated generation of users and an import of
user profiles for simplified user management. The latter task additionally is supported by auto-
mated scripts run, e.g., via the cron daemon on Unix-like systems. Version 3.9 introduced further
extensions to the LDAP authentication by assigning new users to roles according to group mem-
berships or LDAP user attributes. ILIAS in version 3.10 did not implement new security-related
aspects. Finally, in version 4.0 disk quotas were introduced to limit the space on the storage
media for each user, LDAP and Shibboleth authentication were extended by automated assign-
ments of local roles according to respective attributes, and a new payment method via bills was
implemented together with a corresponding payment administration like storing billing address
or bank data.
Comparing these changes to the amount of changes in MOODLE, ILIAS seems to have been much
more focused on security concepts than can be found in the development of MOODLE. While
MOODLE needed several adjustments for sufficing security demands over time, ILIAS showed no
significant adaptations and still provides proper security means, i.e., ILIAS already had imple-
mented required security concepts in an early version.
5.3 Information Security Services
In this thesis, the main focus when considering learning management systems will be on MOODLE.
This primarily is reasoned by the use of MOODLE at the author’s university, and therefore, by
better availability of experience reports as gained due to a productive application. ILIAS, on
the other hand, acts as object of comparison that shows significant differences in its concept
and implementation. This is mostly reasoned by a different context of creation, i.e., national
legislation, planned application field, and management of further development. For the following
comparison, most current releases of MOODLE and ILIAS as given in October 2009 are used,
i.e., MOODLE in version 1.9.5 and ILIAS in version 4.0.0. However, former versions will also be
considered where appropriate.
5.3.1 Authentication
For a proper assignment of privileges and roles to users, an authentication process is necessary.
With respect to a modular architecture, local network properties, or demands for particular
authentication approaches, different authentication mechanisms should be implemented in learn-
ing management systems to suit actual requirements in existing infrastructures. Nevertheless,
for simplicity, in both introduced LMS a password-based authentication is used as default with
storing authentication data in a database on the same server. This approach can be easily used
by all learners independently of their location or the computer they are using, i.e., no further
hardware requirements like chip card readers for the application of smart card authentication
or fingerprint scanners for biometric authentication are stated. Furthermore, with this simple
approach, no deeper knowledge about underlying technologies or complicated processes for being
authenticated is required.
However, constraints given by this approach are the lack of centralised data storage and align-
ment, such that redundancy is necessary in case of multiple LMS, and therefore, inconsistencies
will appear with considerable probability. Due to the limited length of usernames and password
(for keeping it usable in practice) these data can be reconstructed in a certain period of time by
an attacker. Especially in case of guessable or extractable usernames by exploring the system,
6http://www.paypal.com [17-10-2009]
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mechanisms for breaking into the system can concentrate on passwords only. Both considered
LMS do not implement proper functionality for protecting against brute force password attacks.
ILIAS does not block log-in attempts in any way, while MOODLE at least restricts the number of at-
tempts to fail before a client gets blocked. This means, after ten failed log-in attempts no further
tryouts are allowed, and therefore, all subsequent requests will fail despite correct credentials.
But since the corresponding counter is stored in a user’s session without additional consideration
of client specific properties, like IP address or user agent, this only will hinder inexperienced
attackers. The more common case of automated scripts to try all possible combinations of user-
names and passwords can easily be adapted to renew the session cookie after a certain amount
of unsuccessful requests.
Despite the simple password-based authentication approach with local storage as default setting,
both considered LMS support further, more sophisticated approaches, e.g., central authentication
services like Kerberos, directory services like LDAP, or Shibboleth. However, these approaches
also require passwords for connecting to the central services. Alternative approaches like biomet-
rics and challenge-response mechanisms, e.g., using public key cryptography, are not available
yet in these LMS.
5.3.2 Access Control
Concerning role-based access controls (RBAC) in LMS, we are confronted with different role
managements. In older MOODLE versions (before 1.7), a fixed set of roles was used that enabled a
quick start using the system, but lacked further adaptability. The different roles could be assigned
to users in a global scope, while still local re-assignments were possible, so that (global) students
could be teachers locally. Roles were strictly hierarchically organised. In recent versions, new
roles can be created and equipped with corresponding privileges, thus single roles for specific
tasks are possible. Global and local roles as well as role assignments are handled differently.
MOODLE has a global set of roles that can be only administered by the system administrator.
Here no local roles for specific courses can be created. Instead, local assignments to roles are
possible. Although the role is globally defined, certain users can be assigned to another role
for the scope of single courses. In this context, functionality for overriding privileges of locally
assigned roles is implemented to achieve more fine-grained access controls – if permitted by the
global administrator, which is not the default setting. Hence, the general hierarchical structure
of roles vanishes due to varying privilege settings. Furthermore, MOODLE enables inheritance of
privileges from roles in higher contexts like the top level site or course area. ILIAS, on the other
hand, gets installed with a minimal set of global roles, but automatically adds standard local
roles when creating courses, e.g., course administrator or course members. Users then can easily
be assigned to such new local roles. In opposition to MOODLE, ILIAS allows teachers to create
new local roles on their own discretion to adjust the role setting to practical course requirements.
Since ILIAS only has minimal predefined roles, like global administrator and global user, this must
usually be extended prior to start working productively.
Both LMS support fine-grained privilege settings in their current versions, i.e., MOODLE has over
150 permission items to be adjusted in the main permission administration page and ILIAS about
490. Note that these numbers are strongly related to the amount of activities available in the
system by default, i.e., permissions in forums are not correlated to permissions in chats or similar
facilities. Hence, the set of activity facilities has direct influence on this number of permission
items. Concerning the role concept itself and related privileges, ILIAS and MOODLE implement
different approaches. In MOODLE roles in general are managed in a global scope by a corresponding
administrator. Consequently, existing roles have relevance in all single scopes, i.e., categories and
courses as well as a system-wide scope. With this concept, MOODLE implements a hierarchical
system that enables overriding of privileges in higher scopes by local adaptations and, in addition,
allows further settings besides explicit grant or denial of permissions (cf. Fig. 5.1). MOODLE also
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Figure 5.1: Administration of permissions in MOODLE, version 1.9.5
Figure 5.2: Administration of permissions in ILIAS, version 4.0.0
supports inheritance of permissions assigned to a role in a higher context. In fact, this acts
as a neutral setting in the current scope, since only higher scope settings influence the actual
privilege assignment. As a fourth option, permissions can be prohibited, i.e., even if the role would
be granted the corresponding permission in a lower context, this assignment is without any effect,
since the higher context already prohibits this activity in all layers below. Consequently, with this
option, the administrators can prohibit certain actions system-wide for specific persons without
influencing local settings or other roles. ILIAS, on the other hand, only supports Boolean values,
i.e., either permission is granted or not. No further options are available to influence other scopes
or to inherit privilege settings (cf. Fig. 5.2). But due to the strict separation of roles, this concept
as presented for MOODLE would not make any sense here. In ILIAS roles are not only administered
globally, but local roles are automatically created together with a new course. These local roles
are not available on the next higher scope, such that role conflicts and interferences of permission
settings are effectively prevented. Note that by the global modification of the role template of
course administrators, the privilege of creating local roles can also be removed if necessary.
With respect to security usability concerns, user support in managing permissions and roles will
be compared. In principle, the systems seem to focus on different types of users. While MOODLE
makes it very simple to find privilege settings and to get an overview which user is assigned
to some role, in ILIAS such settings are quite more distributed over the system. ILIAS enables
a more technical view on the security settings, such that identifiers for courses are applied to
assign users to local roles of corresponding courses. In addition, MOODLE only considers one role
per time (cf. Fig. 5.1), while ILIAS shows relevant roles for certain objects simultaneously (cf.
Fig. 5.2). Consequently, privileges can easily be compared. An overview of existing roles and
assigned privileges may increase security significantly, since it enables a thorough comparison
and alignment of roles and permission settings. Therefore, it becomes obvious which roles can
still execute certain activities – although the administrator, for example, wants to prevent all
users from conducting them. For ILIAS, this means that the administrator only has to search
for the corresponding privilege and then remove all relevant checks. In MOODLE, such pervasive
changes would lead to the necessity of opening each role’s permission table and adjusting it
as necessary. This increases failure probability by obliviousness or inaccuracy. Advantageous in
MOODLE, on the other hand, is the fact that it marks permission items and gives hints about
possible consequences of wrong permission settings. In the right-most column in Figure 5.1 there
are four different icons that indicate impending threats like “users could change site configuration
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and behaviour” (green), “users could add files and texts that allow cross-site scripting” (red),
“users could gain access to private information of other users” (blue), and “users could send spam
to site users or others” (yellow). Note that not all permission items are yet marked with such
threat indications, i.e., warnings are not completely available and users, therefore, are partially
left on their own.
5.3.3 Data Confidentiality
Besides the common recommendation of both systems to apply encryption for transmitting data,
i.e., using HTTPS, they handle data related to confidentiality quite differently. Considering de-
fault privilege settings of both systems, ILIAS seems to be focusing more on privacy and individual
decisions. This means that teaching staff is not in the position to administer learner accounts
and to access all of their data. In general, users can adjust on their own, which data of their
profile should be visible to others. Thus, although all necessary data are given in the system, they
cannot be extracted by unauthorised persons. MOODLE, on the other hand, has some flaws in
this context, since teachers are considered superior to learners, such that – even in case of global
denial of access to some learner’s profile for a teacher – such a teacher as course administrator
can easily enrol the learner in one of his courses and afterwards will have read and/or write access
to the learner’s profile (cf. Sec. 4.6.1 and 5.4.1).
In addition to explicitly collected data, e.g., user data stored in a profile, we have to consider
implicit data logs. Schulmeister considers such access logs and activity recordings as extraordi-
narily important, since in his opinion teachers, by using such mechanisms, can gain performance
information of course participants, and therefore recognise whether problems occurred [Sch03b,
p. 8]. Activity logs, in the sense of empirical data, in certain degrees support in evaluating courses
concerning their popularity and utilisation. Furthermore, activity recordings provide information
about access to certain files, such that teachers can be notified whether all learners have already
accessed corresponding contents. Both, MOODLE and ILIAS, provide logging capabilities. While
MOODLE considers statistics as optional and allows them to be turned off, activity logs are always
written – only visual evaluations in the form of a statistical representation are not available in
that case. Anonymisation is not considered in MOODLE. ILIAS, on the other hand, provides sep-
arate settings for activating user tracking by log files and evaluation by statistic capabilities. In
case of activated tracking functions, ILIAS furthermore provides an option for only storing data
in anonymised way to reduce privacy concerns. Note that all such tracking functions are turned
off in ILIAS by default. Besides general logging mechanisms, both systems provide functions for
keeping track of last user access to the system. This function is needed for maintaining a list
of currently active users in the system, i.e., a list of who has conducted an activity within a
certain period of time before the corresponding request. Thus, this list presents potential part-
ners for synchronous communication, since they are possibly still logged in and available using
the e-learning system. If data about the last access of users to certain contents are available to
teachers, then this can also be abused to gain information about the learner’s utilisation of the
system. With regard to the mentioned LMS, despite the fact that both systems maintain such
access logs, their publication of respective data is different. MOODLE shows the date and time
of the last access to the system in activity logs as well as in corresponding user profiles. ILIAS
provides this information to administrators only.
With reference to E7, Section 4.3.3, MOODLE and ILIAS as web-based monolithic systems suffer
from the inappropriateness of HTTP as a basic protocol to be used for data transfer of all
kinds, including communication data. Communication data in this case have to be cached on
the e-learning server, e.g., by storing them in the central database. These data then can be
requested several times from authorised users until they get deleted. Since databases are likely
targets of attacks, e.g., by SQL injection, storing data over long time could possibly lead to
the disclosure of private contents, and therefore, to confidentiality breaches. To restrict data
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retention, MOODLE and ILIAS use scripts that can be run frequently by the operating system to
delete messages that are older than a specified number of days. This number of days in MOODLE,
for example, can be chosen from a drop-down menu when creating a new communication activity,
i.e., no arbitrary, but only predefined durations are possible. The default setting is to never delete
these messages. Consequently, at least the administrator (and successful attackers) can read all
transmitted messages directly from the database (cf. database table “mdl chat messages” for
MOODLE). Besides communication data, this problem exists for almost all modules and activities
of HTTP-based learning management systems.
5.3.4 Data Integrity
Eibl, von Solms, and Schubert in [ESS06] presented an evaluation catalogue to roughly audit the
security of existing e-learning systems by simply checking the presence of protective measures for
each information security service. Having applied this catalogue to MOODLE and ILIAS it turned
out that in both systems, besides counting on an encrypted data transmission and sufficiently
secure authentication mechanisms, no further integrity protection like an application of digital
signatures is implemented. Consequences were discussed by the same authors in [ESS07] and
respective results will be presented in Section 6.6. However, a conceptual deliberation actually
threatening integrity in MOODLE is given by the possibility to log-in as different (subordinate)
user. MOODLE allows persons with higher global roles to log-in under the account of a participant
of one’s own course. This option was probably meant to support learners with technical problems,
so a teacher can get the same view on the system as the learner, and therefore, can give more
accurate advice. Furthermore, this provides the ability for teachers to see their courses in the
same way as learners. This has the advantage of getting better insight, as to whether a course is
designed appropriately or whether certain elements are confusing, or even missing. Schulmeister
demands this “debug functionality” even with a value of 5, which is the highest possible rating
in his catalogue for necessary criteria [Sch03b, p. 59, tab. 15]. The problem related to a complete
log-in change is a much simplified identity theft, which can be considered to be very critical.
Teachers can read all private notes, profile entries, or act under the name of that learner and
write messages to others. Although the MOODLE developers did mitigate this problem, and in
current versions only provide this option for administrators and not teachers, this option is still
part of the system. A better solution for changing views was introduced in version 1.6 with
changing roles in the system, i.e., in MOODLE 1.6.x rather than the teacher’s view, a student’s
view can be chosen. And, in versions larger than 1.7, all subordinate roles can be chosen for
changing views. This means that teachers can drop privileges and view their courses with the
privileges as given to learners. ILIAS has also implemented a change of view for its courses with
the approach of dropping privileges.
5.3.5 Non-Repudiation
Similar to data integrity, none of the considered LMS implements appropriate mechanisms for
proving authenticity and guaranteeing non-repudiation of origin or receiver. Only logging of all
activities and data transfers including request and response details like source and destination are
implemented in MOODLE and ILIAS. Note that for web-based e-learning systems, the dependencies
on other systems like web servers, database systems, or the operating system result in connected
logs of these base components, i.e., each of the components will record activities targeting the
respective system. Thus, a combination of log files can give extensive information about activities
within an e-learning system. With this, activities can be reconstructed and originators can be
identified – at least if the integrity of these data can be assumed. But note that data entries, as
given by such logging mechanisms, only contain information being received by the base system
components, i.e., manipulations on their way to the server or client like those given by man-
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in-the-middle attacks, will not be recognised by server-side non-repudiation mechanisms only.
Hence, non-repudiation is not incontestable in mentioned systems due to the lack of client-side
mechanisms such as applying digital signatures.
5.3.6 Availability
The service of availability is primarily related to the technical basis and base system components.
Nevertheless, certain functionality in the e-learning system is supportive, e.g., backup/restore
mechanisms for being able to restore relevant data quickly in case of security incidents or hardware
failures. MOODLE and also ILIAS provide appropriate functionality to take backups of courses. This
means that teachers and course creators can backup learning contents of their own courses, while
administrators are provided with the functionality for taking backups of the entire system. This
would include user accounts with related data, configuration settings, and uploaded files. Further
functionality implemented in both regarded systems concerning availability is given by multiple
confirmation dialogues in the case of critical activities, such that users are getting warned to
avoid unintentional changes of critical settings and the conduct of critical activities.
5.4 Conceptual Shortcomings
The investigation of MOODLE and ILIAS revealed several conceptual weaknesses. These weaknesses
already were sketched in Chapter 4 in a theoretical manner and will be discussed concretely in
the following. Note that presented weaknesses are by design, such that it is much more difficult to
solve these problems compared to simple implementation errors where patches could be quickly
applied. Instead, whole implementation concepts need to be changed and a thorough code review
might be necessary.
5.4.1 Deactivation of Foreign Mail Addresses
Roles in learning management systems usually have an inherent hierarchical order. For example,
if assuming distant universities, then administrators have more privileges than teaching staff and
all members of teaching staff have more privileges than learners or even guests. Roles cannot
only be considered in connection with physical persons, but also with respect to dependencies
on course settings. This implies that teachers could enrol other users in the system into their
own courses and subordinate them locally as learners (cf. Sec. 4.6.1). As far as the LMS does
not consider this scenario and even rewards such activities by teachers with actually allowing
them to access confidential data of enrolled users, confidentiality and integrity with respect to
unauthorised administration of personal data are affected. ILIAS is prepared for such a scenario
and only allows course specific changes to data, i.e., different scopes are logically separated.
MOODLE in older versions (before 1.7) allowed the disclosure and alteration of profile entries
of (local) learners. In recent versions this is disabled by default, but MOODLE still allows the
deactivation of e-mail addresses of “subordinate persons” (cf. Fig. 5.3). This probably was meant
to prevent bounce mails in case of obviously no longer existing mail addresses. However, this
feature also can be abused to exclude affected persons from receiving informative messages of
all kind. Note that this change has system-wide effect and is not bound to a specific course. So,
if the administrator can also be enrolled in one’s own course just like every other user in the
system, then this has significant impact on the security of the system as a whole. Administrators
need to be available and be informed by the system in case of incidents or system failures of all
kind to react as soon as possible and to be supported by as much information as necessary to act
appropriately. The basic problem behind this conceptual weakness is the mixture of local scope
role hierarchies and global scope settings. Furthermore, a missing handshake for course enrolment
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Figure 5.3: Deactivation of administrator’s mail address by teacher
and transparency at least for enrolled users about their changed status and assignment to another
course even makes this problem worse.
5.4.2 Personal (Contact) Data in Search for Users
For contacting users because of administrative reasons, contact data must be available and be
stored in the system. But these data are not relevant for all parties in the same manner, and
therefore, access has to be limited to authorised persons only (cf. E1, Sec. 4.3.3). Concerning
usability and user interface design, according to Shneiderman [Shn92] users always should get
the feeling of having influence on the system and being able to control the data flow. ILIAS, for
example, provides fine-grained sharing possibilities for personal data in user profiles, such that a
user can explicitly hide or show certain information. Further data sets can still be stored in the
profile without being visible to the majority of other users. However, a conceptual shortcoming
in MOODLE also results in a leak providing users with a vast set of user-related data – in this case
name and e-mail address. Bear in mind that confidentiality leaks providing e-mail addresses to
third parties primarily can have negative consequences with respect to unsolicited bulk mail. With
holes in the system, a huge amount of e-mail addresses of registered users can easily be gathered.
Connected to this, another threat is given by the application of these addresses for sending faked
messages from the LMS to conduct “phishing” attacks to collect further user specific data. In
MOODLE, for example, the search for users can be considered vulnerable with respect to such
data loss. Users for course enrolment are identified by a combination of their real names and
their e-mail addresses. Therefore, entered search strings are applied to this concatenated string.
Thus, all combinations matching the search string are presented as results – including the entire
e-mail address without being scrambled. This mechanism, of course, can be abused for collecting
a huge set of addresses, e.g., by searching for common e-mail providers or character combinations
including the @-character. This problem gets even worse when considering the fact of learners
also using their private e-mail addresses instead of being forced to use, for example, addresses
provided by the actual educational institution or company maintaining this LMS installation.
Addresses of the latter kind usually are temporarily limited and could be created especially for
being used in this online scenario. Consequently, other addresses would not be affected in case of
unauthorised disclosure and abuse. In addition, by using corporate addresses the corresponding
institution is in the position to support their users by sophisticated protection mechanisms –
such as the most up-to-date filter technologies or malware protection.
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5.4.3 Generalisation and Module Inclusion
In this subsection the so-called “TEX filter” of MOODLE will be considered as an example for vul-
nerabilities related to module inclusion and design decisions towards more general functionality.
This input filter is meant for rendering text describing a formula in TEX notation (surrounded
by double dollar signs). As an example, the binomial theorem entered in MOODLE as
$$ (a + b)^n = \sum {k=0}^{n} {n \choose k} a^{n-k} \cdot b^{k} $$
will be rendered automatically by this filter to an image showing the semantically equal formula:
(a + b)n =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
an−k · bk
Images created by this filter get integrated into the HTML pages of a course instead of their
original textual representation as entered by the author of the learning content. This enables
the usage of mathematical formulae in courses, which is especially necessary in topics of natural
sciences or engineering. However, note that the filter is available to all users of the system after
being activated by the system administrator. No further privilege settings for fine-grained access
control are possible in MOODLE.
Interestingly, within only a few months in the mentioned filter three critical security holes were
discovered and published:
1. remote code execution in file “texed.php” (Oct. 2008),
2. sensitive file disclosure using LATEX back-end (Mar. 2009), and
3. buffer overflow in mimeTeX back-end (May 2009).
The first vulnerability was found in October 2008 and published in December 2008 using the
BugTraq mailing list (provided by Security Focus [POP08]). This security issue concerned a
parameter for describing a path in the file “texed.php”. This file has no essential meaning for the
filter and its proper processing of entered text. It is meant only for authors to test their syntax
of a formula to check it prior to the actual integration into learning contents. The security issue
requires the option “register globals” to be turned on for the PHP processing module, although
this option is already off by default since PHP version 4.2 (April 2002) for the sake of security.
The other two vulnerabilities target the back-end system for actually rendering LATEX formulae.
MOODLE is shipped with a version of the “mimeTeX”7 application, which implements a very
limited set of LATEX commands for processing formula notations. Thus, vulnerability three is
given by implementation errors in this application (cf. [Bar09]), such that long input strings
could lead to a buffer overflow possibly enabling the execution of arbitrary commands on the
server. In the following, the second vulnerability will be considered in more detail. This security
hole was discovered by the author of this thesis in March 2009 and was promptly reported to
the MOODLE developers (cf. MOODLE bug MDL-18552, MSA-09-00098, and the BugTraq report
[Eib09b]). This vulnerability is reasoned by an improper input validation, and in addition, by a
decision towards increased functionality. Since MOODLE version 1.6 (June 2006) a complete LATEX
environment on the server is preferred over the supplied mimeTeX. Although the command set
of mimeTeX for formula descriptions should be sufficient in most cases, the more powerful LATEX
environment is preferred, probably due to possibilities for including further symbols, redefining
terms for providing shortcuts, and even processing complex structures for the resulting output.
But this generalisation leads to a significant increase in complexity. LATEX as back-end system for
the use in the input filter represents a Turing complete language that even supports file system
7http://www.forkosh.com/mimetex.html [08-06-2009]
8http://moodle.org/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=121039 [04-10-2009]
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operations in certain borders. As consequence, besides possibilities to read confidential data,
an attacker might even be able to inject arbitrary code under certain circumstances. However,
the latter case of code injection will not be further investigated due to the restrictive default
configuration of TEX for file output (cf. option “openout any”).
The generalisation and the urge for more flexible and universally applicable modules in this case
led to an ignorance of security considerations. On the web page of mimeTeX, explicit warnings
concerning security risks related to certain LATEX commands can be found. This also indicates
an implementation of mimeTeX with certain restrictions:
“\input{filename} behaves just like the corresponding LaTeX command [. . .] Moreover, for
security, absolute paths with leading /’s or \’s, and paths with ../’s or ..\’s, are not permitted.”
(http://www.forkosh.com/mimetexmanual.html; 19-03-2009)
LATEX as indicated in this quotation supports the function “\input” for including external files.
However, the security mechanisms as mentioned for mimeTeX by default are not active in the
LATEX environment due to a typically different application field in comparison to mimeTeX. An
attacker, therefore, can access confidential data with sufficient knowledge about path structure
and LATEX syntax. This means, an input string like
$$ \input{../../../htdocs/lms/moodle/config.php} $$
can result in an image with sensitive information like illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Example: disclosure of MOODLE configuration file
This configuration file, as uncovered by abusing the TEX filter, clearly shows on which server
the database used by MOODLE can be found together with all relevant authentication creden-
tials (blacked in the figure) and the database name. Thus, if database access over the network
is supported by the corresponding network architecture, then the attacker can directly access
and manipulate the entire database including the creation of a new user account with admin-
istrative privileges or the disclosure of confidential communication contents. Note that besides
the local configuration file of the LMS, all other files on the server can also be read as far as
they are accessible with the privileges of the web server. This includes operating system files like
“/etc/passwd” for investigating existing user accounts on the server and all files uploaded by
using MOODLE routines, e.g., files attached to forum posts.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we compared the open-source learning management systems MOODLE and ILIAS.
Besides an initial discussion of the term “learning management system” and introductions to
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MOODLE and ILIAS, including historical development of security concepts and general functional-
ity, the comparison was structured according to the six information security services as introduced
in Chapter 3. Although both systems showed similarities due to their common property of being
LMS, they showed also significant differences concerning their aims and security concepts, which
provide disadvantages and advantages with respect to accordingly considered situations.
MOODLE and ILIAS show significant deficiencies concerning protection against brute force attacks
for authentication data. Neither delays nor temporary blocks of user accounts are implemented.
Furthermore, the security services of data integrity and non-repudiation are not considered suf-
ficiently in their security concepts, since these services almost entirely rely on the authentication
process and on logging mechanisms to reconstruct user activities. Digital signatures or simi-
lar encryption-based mechanisms are not implemented. In addition to these security services,
more general conceptual shortcomings were presented as primarily found in MOODLE. Among
these shortcomings, the circumvention of access restrictions by poorly conceived role and priv-
ilege management facilities was discussed. The basic principle of generalisation of functionality
in combination with dynamic extensions by modules was considered in detail with an example
introducing several vulnerabilities. Since conceptual shortcomings are by design, this obviously
emphasises a significant need for a thoroughly deliberated security concept.
Nevertheless, both regarded LMS, despite the mostly insufficiently secure default settings, pro-
vide more sophisticated and adequate security settings, which can be adjusted accordingly for
productive environments. In general, ILIAS seems to focus more on adult learners with an ad-
vanced demand for self-direction in learning. On the one hand, this is supported by anonymous
communication channels and possibilities to prevent exhaustive logs. On the other hand, several
user controlled settings for sharing individual data like personal notes and for providing specific
contact information like instant messenger ID are provided. Such publication is left to the in-
dividual user’s discretion and is not set in a mandatory way by superior administrative staff.
Concerning usability and support in administrative tasks, MOODLE offers helpful information in
the form of coloured symbols and textual hints for items in the privilege management page. This
can be helpful to mitigate inattentive changes by less experienced administrators, since possible
consequences of misconfiguration get illustrated and described prior to actually confirming such
threatening settings.
In the following chapter, recommendations will be presented to cope with mentioned theoretical
threats as introduced in Chapter 4, but also for conceptual shortcomings and technical weaknesses
as presented in this chapter for regarded LMS.
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Chapter 6
Recommendations
6.1 Overview
For managing risks, first of all, it is necessary to know about their existence and possible im-
pact [Sei06]. This includes the identification of threats as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, and
implies deliberations for conducting appropriate management steps. Hence, this chapter deals
with recommendations to mitigate discovered threats (cf. Fig. 6.1).
identification mitigation
typical
activities
roles
assets
threats threatmanagement
Figure 6.1: Current position in analysis process – step 4
For this, risk management strategies will first be discussed in order to distinguish different ways
of treating threats (cf. Sec. 6.2). Note that in general not all threats will be solvable in equal
manner – some will even have to be accepted to a certain extent due to missing reliable solutions,
e.g., human fallibility.
“Often, the term security solution suggests the security risk has been eliminated. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Not one single security solution has ever proven to be perfectly
secure. And, for a variety of reasons, none ever will. All solutions are relative.” [MC01, p. 32]
Nevertheless, even if no satisfactory solution is available for some threats, at least the conscious-
ness of still existing threats can be regarded valuable, since administrators can be prepared to
detect attacks and initiate counter-measures. However, for actually solvable threats recommen-
dations will be presented with numerous references to the fault tree as depicted in Appendix A
to draw relations of recommendations to respective threats. The remainder of this chapter is
organised following the “layer” dimension of Figure 1.1 on page 4, i.e., (1) technical basis repre-
senting essential system components like the infrastructure and functional elements (cf. Sec. 6.3),
(2) formal policies including conceptual aspects and regimentation (cf. Sec. 6.4), and (3) the users
of the system (cf. Sec. 6.5). Each of these sections is constructed like a set of simple rules and
recommendations with brief explanations. In addition to those sets of recommendations, in Sec-
tion 6.6 a proxy server realisation as security agent for overtaking security tasks and for relieving
users from doing them will be presented in detail. This agent, of course, will take care of design
criteria (cf. Sec. 2.5) and limits for security mechanisms (cf. Sec. 2.7), such that it can easily
be integrated into existing e-learning infrastructures. Finally, this chapter will be concluded by
summarising and discussing presented concepts and implementation aspects.
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6.2 Management Strategies
Different management strategies are conceivable for mitigating risks (cf. [SGF02, Sei06]): avoid
or at least limit risks by implementing appropriate security means, “transfer the risk by using
other options to compensate for the loss, such as purchasing insurance” [SGF02, p. 27], or simply
accept a risk that cannot be handled otherwise in reasonable manner. Note that although in this
thesis probabilities of threat occurrences for estimating risks will not be examined (cf. Sec. 1.4.3),
threats as base conditions for the existence of actual risks can be considered with comparable
management strategies. Realistically, not all threats can be avoided and not all problems be
eliminated, although this would be desirable for the sake of security. Especially comparisons of
costs in case of security incidents, and costs for mitigating risks reasoned by concrete threats
should be considered to accurately decide between different alternative strategies. In many cases,
security mechanisms are introduced in practice without even considering their negative impact
on the actual task of the system. But, as stated by West [Wes08], security in best case is of
secondary interest. The primary task, i.e., the task a user actually plans to do with the system,
should have priority. However, security mechanisms should assist and protect this task. In case
of very restrictive security mechanisms, obviously, the primary task cannot be conducted in all
situations with the needed flexibility and functionality. Hertz and Thomas claim that with respect
to economic systems, too strong security mechanisms and systems for eliminating risks “result
in the greatest risk of all: rigidity” [HT83, p. xii]. Anderson seconds this claim and encourages
to think of more appropriate alternatives to cope with identified threats:
“The point is, don’t fall into the trap of believing that the only possible response to a vul-
nerability is to fix it; and distrust the sort of consultant who can talk only about ‘tightening
security.’ Often, it’s too tight already.” [And01, p. 490]
However, with respect to the sketched e-learning types (cf. Fig. 3.2, p. 33), no general solution
and set of recommendations can be given fitting to all e-learning systems in the same manner.
Introduced types of e-learning systems, obviously, are different with respect to the complexity of
the system, interconnection of physically separated components, emphasis on security or usability
and user acceptance, and possible side-effects influencing other system components or users,
e.g., concurrent work on the same data sets. Hence, it is sensible for different management
strategies to be applied for the actual type and related characteristics and priorities concerning
system functionality and emphasis. Bear in mind that the threat analysis as presented in this
thesis considered characteristics of all e-learning types, such that the resulting fault tree covers
particular requirements and conceivable threats of all these types. Analogously, in the following,
recommendations will be presented that are based on the fault tree, and as such, also are in touch
with characteristics of different types of e-learning systems. This means, threats as revealed in
this thesis were examined with conceivable counter-measures, such that reasonable means in
form of recommendations could be deduced for further discussion in this chapter. For the actual
practical application of findings within the analysis or introduced recommendations, therefore,
conceptual deliberations, as well as adjustments according to the effective lists of services of the
considered e-learning system, must be taken into account. Since not all services and investigated
functionality components are available (and needed) for all types of e-learning systems, only a
subset of these recommendations might be directly applicable to a reader’s infrastructure or e-
learning system. Others will have to be (considerably) adapted, and some of them will not be
applicable at all due to services not being implemented. Obviously, recommendations to absent
services can be ignored. However, in this chapter we assume all introduced services to be of
importance, such that recommendations can be introduced and discussed accordingly.
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Table 6.1: Technical aspects and requirements for secure e-learning systems
base system protection and implementation authentication
• network surveillance and software tests
• proactive defence and information hiding
• encrypted data transmission only
• proper interface specifications
• restricted run-time environment
• privilege separation
• server-side processing of sensitive data
• strict (whitelist) configuration
• sophisticated authentication mechanisms
• prefer HTTP post over get
• no persistent credentials
availability
• suitable infrastructure
• regular backups
• distributed architecture
• fall-back systems
• load balancing
6.3 Implementation Concepts and Technical Remarks
In the bottom-most layer of Figure 1.1, technical aspects of base system security are in focus. This
especially includes an appropriate infrastructure that does not provide a potential attacker with
exhaustive information about internal processes and connections. Furthermore, implementation
concepts, i.e., security deliberations realised during the programming process of base applications,
need to be considered. As further subdivision of this layer and as structure for the following
discussion, three areas will be distinguished: (1) base system protection and implementation for
the very basic concepts of a reliable infrastructure, (2) the authentication process related to
certain protocols, and (3) availability recommendations for ensuring business continuity even in
case of smaller failures. As an overview, Table 6.1 collects all recommendations as discussed in
the following subsections. Note that all recommendations are considered to be of almost equal
value, such that no further statement will be expressed by the applied order.
6.3.1 Base System Protection and Implementation
This subsection primarily is focusing on recommendations related to protection on a very low
layer. This is not usually specific for e-learning systems, but needs to be considered in practice for
not allowing the circumvention of security mechanisms of an e-learning system by low level weak-
nesses. Recommendations deduced from the dependency of e-learning systems on base systems
and infrastructural components are given as follows:
• Network surveillance and software tests
In complex networks and system environments a lot of traffic is present and many different
data packets are exchanged between components. To be able to detect fraudulent activities
within the huge set of legal transactions, an evaluation of transmitted packets is necessary.
Obviously, due to the vast amount of emerging events, recorded log entries, and packets
transmitted over the network, a manual examination of such data for filtering legal from
illegal activities or warnings is not efficient in practice (cf. Fig. A.39, A.67). Consequently,
automated analysers for log files and packet analysers for current network activities are
reasonable to detect fraudulent activities and to be able to intervene as soon as possible,
e.g., with the help of automated intrusion detection and prevention systems. In particular,
in case of successful attacks, data loss must be reduced and business continuity must be
ensured to continue the provision of e-learning. Thus, appropriate reactions to attacks have
to be deduced from logs. This includes respective modifications and adaptations to the
security hole exploited for the attack, such that newly set up systems will not be susceptible
again to the same issues. Besides this, deployed software needs to be examined concerning
reliability, stability, and suitability for corresponding tasks. Also, exhaustive software tests
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prior to a deployment in a productive environment are reasonable (cf. Fig. A.31, A.45), as
well as an examination of the implementation and possible shortcomings.
• Proactive defence and information hiding
In the fault tree as presented in Appendix A several possibilities for attackers are mentioned
in order to gather information about possible target machines, e.g., network port scans (cf.
Fig. A.28), detailed version information of server software (cf. Fig. A.33), exhaustive error
messages with sensitive data (cf. Fig. A.34, A.37), or configuration data (cf. Fig. A.35).
Such information can be very useful for preparing an actual attack, and therefore, access
to these data should be prevented. In case of version information provided by software, this
usually can be solved by reconfiguring corresponding software elements. Hiding network
information is more difficult, since the fact of some port being open for connections cannot
be hidden effectively without disturbing other services that need to connect to that machine.
For this reason, Erickson [Eri03] proposes a proactive defence approach that does not try
to hide information but rather render the given information useless. His approach gives a
lot of fake information to an attacker, such that the real information vanishes within that
vast amount of data. Hence, the gain of additional information is kept small.
• Encrypted data transmission only
Concerning confidentiality and reliability of transmitted data, cryptography provides a sen-
sible means by using encrypted data transmission only. A weak protection of the data trans-
fer enables several attacks from simple eavesdropping to sophisticated data manipulation
on-the-fly, i.e., by man-in-the-middle attacks (cf. Fig. A.58, A.61). With using standards
like SSL (secure socket layer) or TLS (transport layer security) a server has to identify
itself to the client, such that man-in-the-middle attacks can be prevented so far as users
thoroughly check the received server certificate and deny connections in case of fake certifi-
cates. Despite the significant potential of (strong) encryption for increasing the security of
data transmission, note that human fallibility can negatively influence this security gain.
In case of web sites that are available over an encrypted HTTPS transmission, as well as
over a plain text HTTP connection, users might only request the plain text version, since
this usually is the default behaviour in today’s web browsers. To take care of this problem,
e-learning systems should only be available over an HTTPS connection and – for the sake
of usability – redirect HTTP connections to the corresponding HTTPS version.
Bear in mind that HTTPS stands for an HTTP connection on top of an additional en-
cryption layer realising SSL/TLS, i.e., in case of only mentioning HTTP connections, e.g.,
for discussing protocol shortcomings, this does not affect the validity of this recommenda-
tion. Thus, respective discussions are not in contradiction to this demand for only using
encrypted data transmissions.
• Proper interface specifications
Functionality cannot arbitrarily be included by extension modules without increasing the
risk of becoming vulnerable due to errors in such modules. But by accordingly crafted in-
terface definitions taking care of data exchange controls, and a suitable implementation
of security concepts within each module, this can be used for integrating additional func-
tionality with still keeping a reasonable degree of security. Each module on its own can
be made responsible for security critical activities and the base system can be informed in
case of required or failed authentication. Furthermore, arbitrarily created roles in the base
system cannot be entirely matched automatically with roles of different privilege levels as
prepared in included modules (cf. Fig. A.25). But by providing a set of all available privi-
leges to the base system, such privileges can dynamically be integrated into the central role
configuration interface. Thus, administrators can still be provided with a single interface to
assign privileges to corresponding roles. In addition, if interface specifications even include
the definition of standard roles, module developers can be expected to prepare privilege
settings for these roles.
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• Restricted run-time environment
The high probability of software to contain implementation errors, which could possibly lead
to security holes, can significantly be mitigated by restricting the run-time environment.
Approaches for doing so are described by terms like “sandbox”, “jail”, or “virtualisation”.
“Sandbox” here is used as general term for a secure separation of base system components,
e.g., the operating system or a database system, and data directly related to the actual
application. This means, in case of software flaws, errors can only be abused to access data
within the sandbox (cf. Fig. A.37, A.48). Other external components are not threatened.
Note that this concept only holds as far as the sandbox software is not vulnerable as
well, and as far as the software does not result in a privilege escalation, with the result
that an attacker may break out of the sandbox by abusing superuser privileges. Practical
realisations of this concept are given by the “chroot” tool on Unix-like systems, where a
virtual root directory gets created and software that is running in this “chroot jail” at
most can go up to the virtual root represented by a subdirectory on the physical disk. A
different approach for creating a sandbox is given by “virtualisation”. This term refers to
an abstract set of possible solutions describing the use of virtual machines as guests on a
real server system, such that no process within the virtual machine can access elements
outside this scope. Here even hardware access can be restricted to only take place over
mediating systems.
• Privilege separation
The term “privilege separation” usually refers to a dropping of superuser privileges if they
are no longer needed by some process. This mostly can be found in network tools that
provide a service listening to a so-called “well-known port”, i.e., ports 0-1023. These ports
may only be occupied by administrators, and therefore, software needs to be started with
administrative privileges. Since after start-up special privileges are no longer required, they
have to be dropped accordingly. Similar to these network services, the concept of privilege
separation can also be transferred and applied to roles within an e-learning system. Thus,
administrative privileges should only be available for corresponding persons in case they
need them. For example, teachers in distant university scenarios might have assigned du-
ties like entering results of assessments into user profiles, but their usual task within the
system is mostly concerned with courses and learning material. Consequently, the rare but
sensitive process of administering users can be protected by additional steps to temporarily
increase privileges and by dropping these privileges after successfully finishing correspond-
ing activities. Such a virtual change of roles with additional confirmations for respective
tasks should be enforced to assure involuntary exploitation of privileges, and therefore, to
mitigate human errors.
• Server-side processing of sensitive data
With respect to Web 2.0 technologies and AJAX (asynchronous Javascript and XML)
as modern concept for web applications, we have to consider locations of data storage
and processing. By using AJAX, a lot of computational tasks can be transferred to the
client machines, such that flexibility and performance of web applications can be improved.
However, since trusted data storage and processing can only be ensured on server-side, this
introduces additional security issues due to the increased complexity of distributed code.
No process on client-side, although necessary for certain features, can be considered as
trustworthy, and therefore, thorough validations of transmitted results need to take place.
Otherwise, data could be altered and processes be manipulated (cf. Fig. A.23).
• Strict (whitelist) configuration
Independent of the type of configuration that has to be set in a server system, whitelisting
is usually preferable over a blacklisting approach. For example, in case of a web server that
provides specific files for clients, a whitelisting approach has to ensure that only legitimate
files will be delivered, e.g., files with suffixes like “.htm”, “.php”, or “.jsp”. A typical
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problem related to this recommendation is given by backup files made available on the
server by mistake, e.g., files with a suffix like “.bak”. Since backup files in case of only little
changes are very similar to the corresponding protected files, this could result in a privacy
and confidentiality leak (cf. Fig. A.10, A.37). Thus, all files not explicitly allowed to be
delivered by the server have to be protected against unauthorised disclosure.
6.3.2 Authentication
One of the crucial processes in e-learning systems is given by authentication, since all subsequent
security mechanisms base on a reliable identification of users. To allocate roles and privileges,
users need to log-in using their personally assigned account data. For attackers, consequently,
these data are valuable. In the following, the authentication basis will be considered, i.e., not the
account data themselves, but technical aspects building a reliable base for the actual authenti-
cation process:
• Sophisticated authentication mechanisms
Authentication processes that base on the exchange of specific data can be vulnerable to
so-called replay attacks (cf. Fig. A.18). This means, an attacker can reconstruct and replay
exchanged packets between client and server, and therefore, reproduces a successful authen-
tication process even without knowing the exact authentication credentials. To mitigate this
problem, authentication processes must include some sort of timestamps or unique (ran-
dom) data only valid for the current session in order to render replay attacks useless. An
approach basing on this concept is given by challenge-response mechanisms, such that users
are confronted with a (randomly chosen) task as a challenge to be solved and then answer
with the corresponding response to the challenge. This mechanism utilises the process for
creating the answer to be the necessary secret, and therefore, the data exchanged between
client and server could be eavesdropped without directly gaining useful information. Such
mechanisms additionally can be realised by using smart cards processing challenge data on
the integrated chip. Thus, this secret process for generating answers even can be protected
against local attacks. However, the application of additional physical tokens or biometric
authentication mechanisms might introduce requirements for hardware components like
smart card or fingerprint readers leading to inconveniences with respect to limited mobility
and flexibility (cf. Sec. 2.7). In case of distributed authentication mechanisms, such that
an e-learning server does not manage the authentication process on its own, but relies on
a distinct authentication service, the corresponding authentication protocol needs to be
cryptographically secure and be elaborated for not providing attackers with possibilities to
circumvent or disturb crucial data exchanges (cf. Fig. A.17).
• Prefer HTTP post over get
During the learning process and organisational activities, perpetually data have to be ex-
changed between e-learning server and clients. For web-based systems, therefore, such data
including request information must be transmitted using the protocol HTTP – preferably
with additional encryption by an SSL/TLS layer. HTTP, in principle, offers two differ-
ent possibilities for including and transmitting parameters: HTTP get and HTTP post.
In the former case, all relevant data are integrated into the URL used for connecting to
the server, while the latter case embeds parameter information in the message body and
keeps the URL untouched. Concerning session hijacking or session fixation attacks (cf. I3,
Sec. 4.4.2 and Fig. A.18, A.22), the implementation should take care of these approaches
and prefer the post method over get. Otherwise, attackers could inject URLs to users of
the system, who by mistake or fallibility might activate such links, and parameters included
in this URL are processed with the privileges of that client. Hence, to mitigate the risk of
fraudulent parameter injection and involuntary execution by users, post can be made the
only acceptable way of receiving parameters.
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• No persistent credentials
Some vendors integrate so-called master passwords or default authentication data in their
products to be able to reset this product in case of any mistake by a customer that harmed
proper operability. But such credentials usually will be found by attackers (cf. Fig. A.19)
either in case of (open) source code investigation or by cracking the password, e.g., by brute
force. Note that since passwords usually never have to be accessed in plaintext, the storage
in form of a cryptic string as result of a hash function, in general, is reasonable. Similar to
the conceptual weakness of hard-coded master passwords are user passwords that are in use
for a very long period of time. Such negligence significantly simplifies password cracking
attempts. In case of frequently changed passwords, an attacker might have cracked a former
password after some time, but due to already changed settings, this gain in information is
no longer valuable and the attacker’s effort was in vain. Thus, the integration of password
lifetimes, i.e., enforcement for regularly changing passwords, is sensible to improve security.
6.3.3 Availability
In the following, the term “availability” will generally be used incorporating terms like “depend-
ability” and “reliability” (cf. [And01]). This means, besides simply being available, corresponding
systems also should provide sufficient resources and ensure reliable processing of data. Thus, in
addition to trivial technical failures, this aspect of availability is strongly connected to denial of
service attacks that might result in a lack of usable connections due to fraudulent manipulations
or resource depletion (cf. Fig. A.54, A.56). Obviously, for successful e-learning, learners should
be able to rely on the system, such that the probability of errors to occur is minimised, and that
in case of an occurrence they can be fixed quickly. The following criteria should be considered for
a practical implementation to ensure a high degree of availability, reduced probability of failure,
and a fast return to a working system in case of emerging problems:
• Suitable infrastructure
E-learning as a web-based application is confronted with the demand for a high level of
interactivity to suffice modern learning theories (cf. Chap. 2). Thus, for promptly providing
reactions to user input, the very basic requirements for successful e-learning are an assurance
of sufficient bandwidth for the backbone network connection and suitable server systems
capable of managing all requests of learners – even in times of peaks. E-learning systems
most probably have to cope with increased amounts of requests near some deadlines, e.g.,
for assignments to be submitted, and therefore, bandwidth reserves need to be considered
appropriately. Furthermore, since collaborative processes in certain scenarios are planned
to be supported by the e-learning system in a way that all learners of the group can
access data simultaneously, infrastructural components must be sufficient to enable efficient
collaboration without increased delays or even data loss due to connection failures.
• Regular backups
Besides technical availability of services, the business continuity in case of incidents or
loss of data must be ensured. For this, relevant data need to be backed up regularly in
such manner that this data storage and backup process is tested frequently to guarantee
reliability. To not burden learners or teachers with this process, a central backup service is
reasonable as duty for administrators. Note that personal data protected by access control
mechanisms within the e-learning system could be backed up and afterwards be extracted
from archives, such that this implies that only administrative staff should be allowed to
backup the entire system’s data. Similar to this, with respect to (concurrent) read and write
access of several group participants in collaborative work, version management, history of
changes, and locking mechanisms for critical activities are sensible for providing better
reliability and for being able to undo unwanted alterations or to restore previous versions.
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• Distributed architecture
In order to minimise the impact of system failures, involved services like web server,
database system, or authentication service can be placed on different physical systems
to create a distributed architecture. In case of physical failures of one of these systems, the
other ones are still available and do not need to be restored as well. Hence, for business con-
tinuity, only single services would need to be set up anew instead of the entire architecture,
i.e., a so-called “single point of failure” could be avoided.
• Fall-back systems
Similar to a distributed architecture is the demand for fall-back systems. In case of system
failure in one of the services, or, more general, in a single position of the whole infrastructure,
alternative systems can be provided to overtake the missing infrastructure element. This
leads to a redundant set of components, where each service is provided by at least two
physical systems. Short periods of time for switching between identical services guarantee
a high degree of availability despite physical outage. Note that such redundancy also is
necessary to solve the contradiction of keeping the system up-to-date with possibly requiring
reboots and, on the other hand, being available almost all the time without outages reasoned
by such update and reboot processes.
• Load balancing
Regarding demands for a suitable infrastructure and fall-back systems, load balancing is
desirable for actual infrastructure realisations. With this technology, the redundant, dis-
tributed architecture can be used more efficiently and less straining for single system parts,
since incoming requests will be forwarded to the system currently least busy. Hence, huge
amounts of simultaneous requests can be split in smaller amounts for each system provid-
ing the requested service, and therefore, probability of failure due to overload gets reduced.
Thus, attacks like distributed denial of service (DDoS) can be easily mitigated to a certain
extent by this additional concept.
6.4 Organisational Concept and Policies
Technical security as discussed above usually is considered as the most intuitive and primary
field for implementing security means. This also is indicated by (official) security evaluation
catalogues and methodologies like the Common Criteria (CC) that describe “administrative
security measures” to be “somewhat peripheral to IT security” and “to be outside the scope of
the CC” [ISO05, part I, p. 8]. Nevertheless, despite this decision, the relevance of administrative
and organisational aspects is acknowledged:
“However, it is recognised that a significant part of the security of a [target of evaluation
(TOE)] can often be achieved through administrative measures such as organisational, per-
sonnel, physical, and procedural controls.” [ISO05, part I, p. 8]
Threats as discussed in Chapter 4 and presented in Appendix A result in requirements for an
appropriate security concept – of course, including organisational aspects.
For a transfer of tasks found in presence teaching processes, the following questions need to
be considered and answered for a specific situation to fulfil requirements and find compromises
between affiliated persons, such as teaching staff and learners:
• What data are necessary for supporting the learning process?
• Who is allowed to access these data? Can access to specific data result in negative conse-
quences for learners?
• What activities should be supervised and are there any private areas without observation?
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Table 6.2: Conceptual requirements concerning security services
data confidentiality non-repudiation
• proper user management and
authentication
• roles and separation of duties
• reduce data collection
• front-end interfaces for hiding back-end
information
• pseudonymisation and anonymisation
• transparency
• limit amount of authorised persons
• record critical activities
• public key infrastructure and digital
signatures
• trusted third party
• digital watermarking
access control data integrity
• default deny policy
• proper transfer of roles to privileges
• minimise functionality
• correctness assurance by digital signatures
• concurrency control
• consistency assurance
• multiple confirmations for critical activities
In the following subsections, recommendations and requirements according to (not already in
Section 6.3 regarded) security services are presented and discussed for a security concept with
respect to limits as implied by educational and psychological aspects (cf. Chap. 2). As a collection
of results, Table 6.2 provides an overview of recommendations as presented in the following. Note
that the order of items has no further meaning due to almost comparable relevance.
6.4.1 Data Confidentiality
The collection of personal data for better personalisation and socialisation among learners is
problematic. In informatics systems, it is quite easy to record activities of users and to create a set
of data for each access or event. Nevertheless, an excessive data collection has to be seen critically
due to the dual use character of logged events and supervision mechanisms (cf. Sec. 4.6.2).
The fact of teachers taking notes in presence teaching, e.g., which pupil was missing and who
participated in which manner during a course, is entirely different to informatics systems that
objectively record all activities of users and do not miss any event only because of large amounts
of participants. Subjectivity, fallibility, and obliviousness of teachers mitigate privacy concerns
in presence teaching significantly. Hence, a simple and unchanged transfer of presence teaching
approaches to e-learning scenarios most probably will not be accepted by (self-directed) learners.
Thus, learning outcomes might be negatively influenced or learners will even refuse to use the
system at all. In the following, recommendations will be discussed that take care of these contrary
views on data collection and aim at a compromise that is acceptable for all parties:
• Proper user management and authentication
Confidentiality in the sense of protecting against unauthorised disclosure of information
is closely related to the authentication process and an appropriate user management. In
case of stolen authentication credentials, attackers can easily pretend to be someone else
and exploit gathered privileges. Therefore, prevention of account data disclosure is crucial
for this service. First, revealing usernames by system messages should be prevented, i.e.,
protection against enumeration attacks (cf. Fig. A.20). This mostly results in demands for
not giving more information than necessary in system messages concerning username cre-
ation, password reset, or failed log-in attempts. These messages must not give information
about the existence of tested usernames. Second, entropy in generated usernames, (default)
passwords, or session IDs must be kept as high as possible by sophisticated pseudo random
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number generators. Low entropy could be exploited with respect to guessing such data (cf.
Fig. A.19, A.20). Also, patterns in authentication credentials could be exploited to signifi-
cantly reduce the search space for possible representation. Note that gathered information
about some found accounts can possibly be transferred to other ones. Third, automated
password cracking attempts must be hindered by demanding additional information not
widely known, e.g., personal information like day of birth, or by demanding randomly cho-
sen information to be shown as image, i.e., so-called “captchas”. Furthermore, in case of
failed log-in attempts, the system should include time delays to decrease the amount of
passwords that can be tested by an attacker in a given period of time (cf. Fig. A.21).
Restrictions on client-side, e.g., attempt counters using cookies, are not sufficient.
• Roles and separation of duties
Role-based access control is commonly used and sensible in educational environments. To
take care of adaptability demands concerning responsibilities and task sharing in certain
courses, besides a global role assignment, the extension by local roles inside of courses
gives much more flexibility. Global roles can be administered by the administrator for a
global scope, while local roles could be made manageable for responsible course teachers to
introduce further helper roles. However, as discussed in Section 4.6.1, roles with different
scopes and inherent hierarchies within separated scopes can introduce several threats to be
mitigated by an appropriate role management. Privileges and mutual influencing factors
have to be considered appropriately to not allow this scope construct to be exploited to
harm “subordinate” learners (cf. Fig. A.24, A.25, A.63). This means, while global roles may
affect globally relevant data of learners and the system as a whole, local roles only may
access locally relevant data, i.e., course specific progress and data connected to respective
activities. Thus, a strict separation of duties is necessary. Although this requirement for
small institutions can be regarded as less relevant, the concept of the system should consider
this aspect for the sake of scalability to institutions of different sizes. Note that a separation
of duties also affects data backups of the entire system and import/export functionality
with e-learning standards (cf. Sec. 4.6.3 and Fig. A.48).
• Reduce data collection
With respect to privacy protection, the national legislation of several countries demands
to be as modest as possible concerning the collection and storage of personal data and
related events. The less data are collected by the system, the less data need to be protected
accordingly, and the less data are at risk to be uncovered by unauthorised persons. But,
obviously, despite this basic principle of collecting as few data as possible, some sorts of data
still are required to be stored. Thus, as a second protection level, the timely limit for data
storage should be considered. For example, numbers concerning course properties like the
amount of users online at a specific point in time or similar can lose their relevance if certain
events have happened, e.g., when a course has been finished. Consequently, such data has
no necessity of being stored any longer and can be deleted. In web-based e-learning systems,
this also affects communication data. By using HTTP as transfer protocol, messages need
to be stored on the server until all participants have requested these messages (cf. E7,
Sec. 4.3.3). Hence, for reducing the risk of data disclosure for these pieces of information,
a regular clean-up process is desired. This process should sign out users that have never
accessed a course or were inactive over certain periods of time. In addition, it should
delete old log files and take care of module specific clean-up processes. For communication
facilities, old messages should be deleted or archived according to the configuration.
• Front-end interfaces for hiding back-end information
Besides input filters to sanitise received data, the output of internal data can also be filtered
or processed to prevent disclosure of sensitive contents. Thus, users can be provided with
front-end interfaces to manage certain processes, while the actual processing takes place in
the back-end with keeping relevant data hidden from users. Such front-end services and in-
6.4. Organisational Concept and Policies 103
terfaces, for example, could be given by internal message systems that use e-mail addresses
without the need for revealing them to respective e-mail senders (cf. Fig. A.8). Conse-
quently, messages can be typed in the e-learning system and be sent by this application
even without showing actual contact information. Clearly, this approach can be transferred
to other e-learning components in similar manner. For example, automated statistical re-
ports can be given with assuring anonymous output and still hiding detailed log data from
users.
• Pseudonymisation and anonymisation
A lot of data do not lose explanatory power if not related to a specific person, e.g., quan-
titative access statistics. Hence, if possible, such data should be stored anonymised or at
least pseudonymised, such that these data cannot be exploited to spy on users in the system
(cf. Fig. A.8, A.16). If anonymisation of data could become counter-productive in certain
scenarios, then delivery and presentation of (non-anonymised) data after certain correlation
processes should be in an anonymised way as far as possible for the respective situation. For
example, this affects the logging of critical activities, where user identification is necessary,
and the collection of empirical data requiring further details about related users to estimate
reliability of data entries. With this double-sided concept, personal data is available in the
back-end system, while only non-critical data are delivered to the front-end for a certain
set of persons.
• Transparency
With respect to user acceptance, the transparency aspect is crucial. Users mostly will ac-
cept exhaustive surveillance, if they at least are informed about it, and if this surveillance
can be reasoned in any way. But in case of accidentally detecting surveillance without being
informed in advance, resistance will be the consequence (cf. Sec. 4.6.2). Hence, transparency
in this case means information about the degree of recording activities in the system and
about general conditions like durations of storage or application of anonymisation. With
respect to users’ influence on the usage of their data, some national data protection legisla-
tion demand a confirmation to data collection and an agreement to the usage of explicitly
collected data. This has to take place in a way that cannot be overseen and accepted by
default, e.g., using a checkbox that is checked by default in an online form. To simplify
data processing, a form can be stated in a general way for letting the user accept all re-
lated data collections and processes affecting these data in advance. Thus, only a single
form prior to connecting to some services is sufficient instead of several confirmations dur-
ing the activities. In addition to system related data collections, handshake protocols are
sensible for requiring mutual confirmations concerning state changes, and therefore, data
publication for certain users. This especially concerns course enrolments of users initiated
by course teachers in corresponding scenarios (cf. Sec. 4.6.1 and Fig. A.63). Additionally,
the confirmation demand supports the protection of data for not being collectible without
informing affected users.
6.4.2 Data Integrity
Integrity, correctness, and consistency of data are of value, but quite difficult to guarantee. In
presence teaching with human teachers and only paper-based notes, unintentional modifications
of notes can almost completely be excluded. Even unauthorised modification of own notepad
entries are less likely or at least can be detected in most cases due to a different handwriting. In
case of e-learning with centralised data storage and digital notes only, this must be considered in
a different way. Besides access control mechanisms based on roles as introduced in Section 3.2,
this primarily can be summarised to the following recommendations:
• Correctness assurance by digital signatures
For spending time on learning certain content, learners should be in the position to rely on
its correctness. Reliability in this case can be assured by letting these contents be checked
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by experts who finally digitally sign all related data elements. With this, manipulations
and transfer errors can be detected in an early stage due to falsified digital signatures.
Correctness besides learning contents also affects communication and cooperation messages
(cf. Fig. A.14), such that the use of digital signatures should be considered in a system-wide
manner to not neglect any important data set. Note that contents can even be signed by
several experts to signalise common agreement.
• Concurrency control
Collaboration together with communication and joint work on solutions are crucial com-
ponents of e-learning systems. But they also introduce problems in case of concurrently
working on the same documents over the network (cf. Fig. A.12). If related functionality
is implemented regardless of possible conflicts, then race conditions are likely to happen or
even can be provoked by attackers (cf. Fig. A.13). Although race conditions are restrained
to very small periods of time, and as such, often are considered to be very improbable, an
e-learning system has to take care that no learner intentionally or unintentionally can delete
the work of others due to concurrent access to the same files. Thus, since race conditions
actually can occur and can be of great impact due to underestimating their risk, block-
ing mechanisms like semaphores are sensible and should be implemented for this reason.
In addition, mechanisms taking care of latencies and timestamps for almost simultaneous
modifications of same elements are reasonable to inform all learners when someone else is
currently modifying the same pieces of data.
• Consistency assurance
Data consistency is essential for productive work. In case of slightest inconsistencies, this
will perpetually get more and more problematic, since other processes might rely on wrong
data, which again leads to wrong results and new wrong data. Hence, consistency control
is an important part of ensuring data integrity in the sense of correct data processing.
Principles as known from database management systems like transactions with their all-or-
nothing approach are sensible, as well as file access locks can help to prevent race conditions
in case of critical activities (cf. Fig. A.13).
• Multiple confirmations for critical activities
In web-based scenarios, states like a successful authentication are usually managed in ses-
sions. These sessions are stored on the server, while the client receives a unique and ran-
domly chosen session ID to identify himself and to let the server find the corresponding data
sets again. Thus, if an attacker is able to reproduce or steal this session ID, he can act with
the same states as the legitimate user could do, i.e., he also is authenticated to the system
and gets full access with the privileges of the user. Since several attacks aim at stealing
such session IDs (cf. Fig. A.22), security is aspired by demanding additional authentication
steps and confirmations. Thus, even if an attacker could hijack a session without knowing
the authentication credentials, critical activities are not possible. Also, sensitive data may
not be changed, as far as the system again requires the user to be authenticated.
6.4.3 Non-repudiation
Certain activities in e-learning systems require accountability and non-repudiation to be imple-
mented. This especially holds for activities that are influencing grading processes or obligatory
tasks for being issued a certificate, e.g., submission of assignments and collaborative work. In
these scenarios, no affiliated party should be in the position to deny successful submission or to
accuse the other party for having altered original submissions. Hence, integrity protection for the
submission is one part that needs to be implemented, but also authenticity, i.e., who actually
was involved in some activity. The following recommendations support these aims:
• Limit amount of authorised persons
The most trivial solution to the problem of who may have changed certain configurations
or data entries is given by reducing the amount of users having access to these data (cf.
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Fig. A.57). If only few persons have access, then these persons can be controlled more easily
than a vast amount of users with the same privileges, i.e., horizontal attacks are less likely
(cf. Fig. A.26).
• Record critical activities
The easiest approach, and in most e-learning systems an already integrated functionality,
is a logging of all relevant activities. Every critical action in the system triggers an event
that can be recorded in log files and afterwards be evaluated by administrators in case of
emerging problems. Note that for the sake of security, log files should not (only) be placed
on the same system as the corresponding program logic receiving and recording respective
events. Ideally, event details securely get transmitted to an external append-only system
where no manipulation is possible by only using the provided interfaces (cf. Fig. A.38).
• Public key infrastructure and digital signatures
For assuring authenticity of actions, mechanisms beyond authentication and access con-
trols are necessary. For critical actions and submissions, therefore, digital signatures can
be demanded to ensure integrity of submission and authenticity of the signing party. Thus,
transmitted data – at least for critical processes – can be signed by corresponding authors,
such that unauthorised changes can easily be recognised by receivers due to wrong signa-
tures. Note that in case of unsigned contents, these data would have to be discarded for
not circumventing this additional security means. To equip every learner with a required
public-private-key pair and for taking care of identities of learners, a public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) can be built up at corresponding institutions, such that administrative staff
or executives act as registration and certification authorities in this PKI. This results in
keys that are checked to belong to the pretended user as far as this key did not get lost
or was shared among a group of learners. However, liability in case of sharing keys can be
transferred to the users illegally distributing their secret keys.
• Trusted third party
For mutual accountability, where the submitting and receiving parties must not be able to
deny certain activities or reception of data, trusted third parties can be used (cf. [GRV05]).
Such third parties can act as interim receiver of data, or only be used as cryptographic
mediator that checks signatures and hash values to guarantee authenticity and integrity
of submissions. With a trusted third party as interim receiver, the actually meant receiver
can several times request the data from this party, such that he cannot claim to never
have received respective data from the designated sender. In the other direction, the actual
sender has to provide the data until the trusted party finally confirms successful reception.
As a special case for accountability, private authentication can be considered [Aba03], i.e.,
authentication while still acting anonymous within the e-learning system (cf. Fig. A.16).
Certain activities like the evaluation of courses may only be conducted once, and therefore,
access has to be logged. Here, trusted third parties are sensible to overtake an authentication
process without delivering identity information to the main e-learning system. This means,
authentication and the actual working process within an activity are not on the same
physical system, but strictly separated. These servers do not influence each other and
enable such scenarios by an appropriate exchange of (cryptographically secure) messages.
• Digital watermarking
Concerning copyright and reservations related to unauthorised distribution, mechanisms are
desired to protect against such illegal activities (cf. Fig. A.10). Especially with respect to the
effort for creating good learning material, an appropriate protection gains in importance
for authors and teachers. Thus, policy enforcers and embedded viewers without directly
making material available for learners, as well as digital rights management or other copy
protection mechanisms are conceivable. Note that all these mechanisms rely on the used
software and possibly can be bypassed by accessing those contents with other applications.
A solution basing on cryptographic mechanisms storing all data in encrypted way even
106 6. Recommendations
on the client machines is presented in [Gra03, pp. 123-126] under the term “encryption
enforcement”. Since this mechanism demands to be online for retrieving session keys to
decrypt contents for every single access, it is not handy enough for providing flexible and fast
e-learning solutions. Another approach not focusing on preventing copying and distribution,
but tracing illegal copies back to the last authorised accessing person, is given by digital
watermarking. Media can be marked in a way that learners only get copies that invisibly
contain their personal identification code in an encrypted way [Dit00]. These watermarks are
robust enough to even endure transcoding to different file types. Hence, although prevention
is not possible with this approach, liable persons can be identified and punished accordingly.
6.4.4 Access Control
Security basically relies on an appropriate access control mechanism and corresponding privilege
settings (cf. Fig. A.24). To support such configurations, conceptual deliberations are reasonable
for reducing probability of wrong settings. In the following, recommendations that aim at simpli-
fying privilege management and at reducing error-proneness due to weak default configurations
will be introduced and discussed:
• Default deny policy
Similar to a whitelisting approach for file access, privileges should follow a default deny
policy. This means, only activities that are explicitly allowed by corresponding configuration
settings may be conducted by users. Other activities have to be denied. Thus, even in case of
improper administration (cf. Fig. A.27), where several possible activities in the system have
not been assigned privilege settings and rules, this will not result in security breaches. Note
that such a policy especially is of relevance when considering dynamic module inclusion
with own privileges and activities that are not known to the core system prior to an actual
inclusion. Consequently, a general consideration of these particular privileges is not possible.
Without an appropriate configuration, this also could lead to a significant impact on security
if preferring a default accept policy.
• Proper transfer of roles to privileges
The actual personnel structure within an educational institution should be easily transfer-
able to the access control mechanisms to support users in configuring the system accordingly
(cf. Fig. A.25). If these two concepts, i.e., access control scheme and personnel structure,
are too different, then no sufficient security can be achieved without the necessity of using
several compromises either against security or single persons. Furthermore, due to the fact
of persons acting individually in certain situations and not following general group duties
or habits, possibilities for adjusting privileges on a per user base can be helpful.
• Minimise functionality
A common problem of privilege settings is given by implemented functionality that has to
be aligned to available privilege options. If only a single privilege option is connected to
functionality that consists of several sub-functions and activities, i.e., the privilege system is
too coarse, then users possibly get assigned privileges for sub-functions that are not meant
to be used by those persons (cf. Fig. A.25). Thus, functionality behind single permissions
should be minimised and the privilege management be as fine-grained as possible to enable
a configuration that actually fits the required personnel structure.
6.5 User Support and Human Factor
Besides the general research for software ergonomics and user interface design (cf. [Shn92]), the
connection of security and usability became a focus of research. Yee stated for the relevance of
usability that
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Table 6.3: Recommendations concerning user support and human factor
guidance and (security) usability security education and user involvement
• reduce secondary interaction
• plausibility checks and fall-back settings
• no error correction in sensitive areas
• provide guidance
• confirmations
• adapt complexity
• security education
• provide documentation and manuals
• policies and enforcement
• concept audit
“[. . .] correct use of software is just as important as correctness of the software itself” [Yee02,
p. 278].
Therefore, activities and mistakes due to user fallibility need to be considered in more detail. In
particular, user education, in relation to intentional and unintentional activities, will be in focus.
Findings from a psychological perspective are presented by West [Wes08] who investigated user
behaviour concerning security within informatics systems. He points out aspects that describe the
basic problem very well, e.g., “Users aren’t stupid, they’re unmotivated”, “Safety is an abstract
concept”, or “Security as a secondary task”. Especially the latter claim indicates contrary views
on informatics systems. On the one hand, users want to follow their primary tasks, i.e., use the
computer as tool for finishing some work. On the other hand, security people try to make com-
puters more secure and prevent data loss or manipulation, such that these security mechanisms
might interfere and even hinder the primary task. Tim Mullen stated this conflict as follows:
“We spend money, increase administration, and take away functionality. Is it any wonder that
security people are so misunderstood?” [Mul03]
Thus, to bring security deliberations together with expectations and needs of users, some require-
ments as presented in the following have to be fulfilled. Table 6.3 summarises recommendations
to be presented in the following subsections. Note that the order of recommendations does not
correlate to their specific relevance and impact. All are considered to be of comparable relevance.
6.5.1 Guidance and (Security) Usability
As stated before, users are mainly focusing on their primary task within the system and usually do
not want to be involved in administrative tasks related to security. But since computers on their
own cannot make decisions with sufficient accuracy in certain critical situations, it is sometimes
not avoidable to inform users about critical events and to ask for interaction. However, the
research field of security usability examines ways of making security relevant decisions as easy and
understandable as possible for inexperienced users (cf. [HS07]). In the following, recommendations
will be given that take care of the primary task of users to avoid unnecessary user interaction.
Nevertheless, users should be involved in decisions with proper guidance and support for not
discouraging and overstraining them:
• Reduce secondary interaction
In fact, security mostly is not in the focus of users – it is at most of secondary interest.
Hence, in case of security breaches and warnings popping up, the user tends to make
quick decisions to continue with the primary task. This means to shift the decision making
process as far as possible to automated routines following a reasonable set of rules not
threatening the system more than tolerable. A possible realisation, for example, is given by
an automated security agent as presented in Section 6.6.
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• Plausibility checks and fall-back settings
Complex informatics systems usually provide many configuration options to enable users
to adapt the system to very specific situations and needs. For the sake of usability and
user support, an e-learning system should implement plausibility checks for configurations.
Thus, in case of contradictory entries or critical adjustments, warnings will be displayed
and confirmations will be necessary. This can prevent loss of availability of a system because
of incorrect and damaging configuration activities. Furthermore, a possible solution for not
overstraining less experienced users and for simultaneously providing sufficient adaptability
for expert users is given by a level-based structure of configuration options. This means, a
base set of simple options can be presented to beginners, while an expert level can be chosen
by experienced users to make other options available. However, in case of contradictory or
wrong configurations by users (cf. Fig. A.26), the system can fall back to secure default
settings. But note that this must not be implemented for security critical options, since
otherwise this might be exploitable similar to error corrections.
• No error correction in sensitive areas
Since the term “hacking” usually is defined exactly in the way of using some service against
its specifications (cf. [Eri03]), automated corrections of input can enormously simplify at-
tack attempts. Error correction especially in security critical areas could help intruders in
conducting attacks, since they are allowed to work less precisely (cf. Fig. A.42). Hence,
usability and security are sort of contradictory in this context. Mentioned security critical
areas, therefore, clearly have to be defined to enable error correction and fault tolerance in
remaining uncritical areas for the sake of usability.
• Provide guidance
Not every situation emerging in practice can be anticipated, and therefore, user interaction
cannot be prevented in all cases. For supporting users in making sensible decisions where
asked by the system, they need to get an impression of what is going on inside and what the
consequences in terms of gains and losses will be for each possible decision. Inexperienced
users get overstrained very quickly, if too many technical details are mentioned in messages
and the language is chosen for experts. Therefore, users usually do not read system messages
reliably, even if contents are of importance. A possible guidance for required user interaction
is the use of colours to indicate importance and possible impact on the system. In addition,
text messages should be kept short to allow users to see all contents within a few seconds.
Further information for the decision making process can be offered by buttons that redirect
users to respective information.
• Confirmations
Integrity of data is mostly endangered by unauthorised and unintentional alteration of con-
tents. Both cases can be solved with including agreement and confirmation demands as far
as possible, such that in case of critical actions on personal data, e.g., course enrolment
or changes in booked services, the corresponding person needs to agree or at least confirm
reception of notifications (cf. Fig. A.63). In case of unintentional activity, e.g., publishing
of private data (cf. Fig. A.8), confirmation dialogues can be used to safely abort unwanted
actions. Furthermore, additional dialogues to be confirmed may even emphasise the critical-
ity of certain activities, such that users might think again, whether this activity is actually
wanted.
• Adapt complexity
Due to human habits of choosing the way of least resistance, systems should be programmed
in a way, that the most secure path is the easiest while relaxing security policies should
require increased efforts to be finalised. Especially due to the fact that “users do not think
they are at risk” [Wes08, p. 37], it is necessary to not make it too simple to work with exces-
sive privileges and to change security relevant preferences in the system. Thus, findings of
(security) usability can be applied to simplify understanding of security relevant activities.
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On the other hand, security critical activities can be made even more difficult. To change
critical things, a user really should need to know what he is doing there and what the
consequences could be. This aims at preventing users from choosing bad security adjust-
ments. Note that this also is related to privilege separation, i.e., only temporarily increase
privileges and drop administrative privileges again if no longer needed (cf. Sec. 6.3.1).
6.5.2 Security Education and User Involvement
The primary goal of this thesis is the investigation of security mechanisms for e-learning systems
while maintaining user acceptance. With focus on users of the system, this can be managed by
an adequate security education and by user involvement. First, security education for users is
desirable (cf. [GI00]) to foster awareness of implemented security mechanisms and their respec-
tive goals. Users of the system can only do the right thing and act correctly if they get informed
appropriately of what the right thing is. Although security education introduces further require-
ments and demands for additional staff and appropriate course materials, a lack of education
may result in considerably more disadvantages. If security education would be neglected, users
might be willing to circumvent security measures as far as possible, since the meaning of re-
spective measures is unknown in the same way as possible negative consequences of bypassing
mechanisms. Second, user involvement is an important aspect of creating an appropriate and
widely acceptable concept. In Section 2.7 limits for security mechanisms were stated with respect
to privacy concerns and surveillance within e-learning systems. This aspect is one of the most
critical and specific parts of e-learning. Depending on the target group, teaching staff should be
enabled to access more or less detailed information about the learning progress of learners and
emerging problems while concentrating on learning contents. Thus, all groups of users (including
learners) should have possibilities to take part in the decision making process, or at least in
the evaluation of underlying concepts to avoid later problems concerning unwanted situations
protected by corresponding concepts.
In the following, recommendations concerning user involvement and their education for better
understanding security concepts are presented:
• Security education
The concept of security is hard to understand for non-technical persons, since an exploita-
tion of basic systems and protocols seems very abstract and users do not feel to be at risk
[Wes08]. Security is a concept that usually only gets visible in case of its absence, such
that incidents can occur. Consequently, fostering comprehension of security means and the
necessity of obeying security policies is important. Users at least should be educated con-
cerning their personal relevance within the security concept, e.g., attacks against human
users for gathering sensitive information (cf. social engineering [MS03], Fig. A.7). Note that
system messages also can provide attackers with valuable information. Thus, either usabil-
ity with exhaustive information about occurred errors or concealment of information for
not supporting attackers can be realised. In fact, to follow the latter approach, users need
to have an impression of internal workflows, i.e., appropriate education of users is required
to let them track general error message back to possible reasons.
• Provide documentations and manuals
To support correct use of software, users must be appropriately informed about correct
usage and consequences of doing wrong. In the Common Criteria version 2.3 [ISO05] “op-
erational user guidance” is explicitly regarded in assurance class AGD (“Guidance Doc-
uments”), family AGD USR [ISO05, part III, p. 141]. This assurance class takes care of
guiding users to avoid human errors due to misinformation and mistakable presentation of
security relevant aspects. Thus, this means to provide users with proper manuals of how
to conduct certain activities and with documentations containing information about con-
nected systems and relevant system internal data (cf. Fig. A.15). Due to changing users
110 6. Recommendations
(in a long-term perspective) and possibly unintuitive organisation forms, obviously not all
activities and requirements for processing certain tasks can be known to learners. This also
includes information about important contact persons, e.g., for a notification in case of
security incidents. Therefore, in general, reliable and correct manuals should be available
to describe activities in understandable and comprehensible manner. This can provide sup-
port and decrease frustration. Of course, such informative and regulative material needs to
be available and correct to be useful.
• Policies and enforcement
Besides informal documentations and manuals, formal policies are sensible to demand spe-
cific behaviour by users, e.g., minimum password lengths, maximum duration of inactivity
during a session, or maximum number of simultaneous connections by using the same au-
thentication data. As far as such policies can be formalised, the e-learning system can take
care of their application by pervasively checking user activities and preventing incorrect
behaviour with respect to stated policies, i.e., policy enforcement (cf. Fig. A.15).
• Concept audit
Conceptual aspects, like an insufficient separation of duties or incomplete access control
schemes, can lead to an enormous negative impact on the success of e-learning systems.
Target group and acceptance evaluation must be considered together with balancing loss
of private data and possibly more complicated administration (cf. Sec. 2.7). Hence, ped-
agogical and psychological aspects (cf. [Gud01, KHS05]) are relevant for the concept of
e-learning systems. To achieve a concept that is acceptable for all affiliated roles, audits
may be established prior to a productive usage and, in addition, regularly for already de-
ployed systems. These audits should be processed by a team consisting of representatives
of respective roles, i.e., not only technical staff should take part, but also learners who, in
the end, will be affected by implemented concepts.
6.6 Security Agent for Practical Support
Security mechanisms often need deeper understanding of underlying structures and protocols to
be used on the network layer. This cannot be demanded from all learners. Especially in case of
complicated and time-consuming activities for security assurance, an automation is sensible to
not distract learners more than necessary from their learning process (cf. Chap. 2). For this, in
the presented research project, an open-source proxy server was developed by a students’ project
group (Oct. 2006–May 2009) under guidance and supervision of the author [ESS07]. The final
product can be downloaded at URL http://www.die.informatik.uni-siegen.de/pgproxy.
Since a proxy server logically runs on ISO/OSI (International Organization for Standardiza-
tion / Open Systems Interconnection) layer 7, the application layer (cf. [ISO94]), it is able to
examine and alter packets just like a human user could do. Thus, this proxy server as security
agent primarily aims at being sort of a personal secretary for learners, i.e., it can overtake certain
security-related tasks from the learners to keep them concentrated on their learning process. As
proof of concept and first security task, the proxy server was extended by a module to sign com-
munication contents sent to a learning management system (cf. Fig. 6.2). In the following, first,
general aspects of this security agent concept will be introduced and discussed in Section 6.6.1,
and second, the signature functionality will be presented in more detail in Section 6.6.2.
6.6.1 General Specifications
The implementation aims at a small and fast program that is available for most platforms, i.e.,
a platform independent implementation is desired for not excluding possible learners from using
this agent. Besides this, the security agent will have to cope with the following tasks:
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Figure 6.2: E-learning architecture with signing proxy
1. network adjustability,
2. task specific operations,
3. interaction with user, and
4. exclusion prevention.
1. Network adjustability: With respect to a proper operation of the network, the proxy
component of the security agent, of course, has to be fully compliant to the HTTP protocol
(cf. [FGM+99]) and to be able to cope with several simultaneous connections. That means,
every connection established through the proxy server needs its own thread. Otherwise, the first
connection would block the proxy server and no further connection could take place before the
first one has been reset. For the sake of performance of connections, we propose the restricted
storage of packets by forwarding data as fast as possible to the LMS. If storing the whole message
before forwarding data to the meant target, i.e., the e-learning server, this can get very time-
consuming when considering the transmission of large file attachments. The signature still can be
computed on a stored copy of the whole message and be attached to the end of the stream. For
being able to use the security agent in the wide variety of existing networks, it has to be highly
configurable. For example, if the network configuration is very restrictive by using particular
firewall rules or demanding other proxy servers in the network, then our proxy server must
be able to run on different ports of the client as well as supporting chains of proxy servers to
cooperate with demanded other ones.
2. Task specific operations: The concept of using a proxy server as secretary is very flexible.
In the sense of a security agent doing tasks instead of the user, different jobs are conceivable
like signing contents, encrypting contents, control routing, and others. Besides the digital signing
task as presented in more detail in Section 6.6.2, especially the authentication process could be
automated. As long as the passphrase for a private key of the user is strong and kept secret, a
digital signature can be used as the authentication method in challenge-response scenarios where
the server sends a randomly generated string and demands an encrypted version of this string
as answer. This enables a cryptographically secure authentication method that cannot be easily
repeated by an eavesdropper. Furthermore, single sign-on approaches can be realised, such that
the user only has to authenticate to the security agent and not to the LMS itself. Hence, even
automated log-outs because of long idle time on server-side would not distract learners with an
automated re-log-in. Obviously, all possible tasks require different adaptations to passing packets.
Consequently, this second task cannot be specified uniformly, but only interfaces can be given
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to enable extensions by modules and libraries implementing relevant steps and processes to fulfil
requirements for successfully realising a corresponding task.
3. Interaction with user: Although the integration of a security agent primarily is meant to
reduce technical user interaction for keeping learners concentrated on learning, a certain amount
of interaction still cannot be avoided, e.g., to inform users adequately about task specific results.
Since the security agent has to interact in some scenarios, such as warning the user if a security
task led to errors or if security problems were discovered, this should preferably take place in
the user’s language. This will allow them to be comfortable and as least distracted as possible.
Consequently, the agent should be dynamically adjustable to the language of the host system.
For system messages, different approaches are possible, e.g., providing a graphical user interface
or modifying the HTTP stream. In the latter approach, the security agent can add some messages
or a colour bar, for example, on top of the requested web page to signalise the security status of
this site. Additional possibilities for integrating more decent status messages are given by CSS
where contents can be arbitrarily placed on the delivered web page. Even translucency would be
supported with CSS in recent browsers.
4. Exclusion prevention: Since security improvements, by using the proxy server as security
agent, demand modifications and evaluation of data packets, the proxy must be able to compute
received data. This means, if client and server are trying to negotiate an encrypted connection or
a compression that is not supported by the proxy server (cf. Sec. 6.6.3), then this would lead to an
exclusion from communication. An example is given with the use of encrypted connections based
on SSL or TLS. Since such end-to-end encryptions take place between client, i.e., web browser,
and web server, the proxy server will only be confronted with an encrypted HTTP stream. For
being able to cope with such a situation, the proxy server has to adopt the client part for this
encryption. Thus, the proxy server negotiates encryption parameters with the server, and the web
browser sends its data either unencrypted to the (local) proxy server or encrypted by establishing
a separate SSL/TLS connection between browser and proxy. Of course, the proxy server has to
inform the user about server certificates used for the SSL/TLS encrypted connection. The proxy
server must not be the deciding part, whether a certificate is trustworthy or not! But with
information about most common certificate authorities it can support the user in his decision by
verifying the server certificate in advance.
6.6.2 Integrity Protection by Digital Signatures
Since the first prototype of this security agent was implemented for the specific task of integrity
protection by digital signatures, the following explanations will focus on this particular example
to get more concrete.
Considering available LMS, the assurance of integrity, e.g., of learning content, as well as parts of
non-repudiation, e.g., for proving the participation of some student, is not implemented satisfac-
torily. Digital signatures give an appropriate means for realising such concepts – they even allow
multiple signing of learning content to signalise consensus among teaching staff. Yet although
digital signatures have a mainly accepted value for security, the application of such methods
demands a lot of interaction with users. Considering the kinds of messages sent to an e-learning
system, i.e., learning content created by teaching staff or communication messages in forums and
chats (by tutors and learners), it becomes obvious that especially in case of very short messages
(like found in chats), the manual application of digital signatures would mean a lot of inconve-
niences that will enormously interrupt the learning process and disrupt the communication with
other learners. The introduced security agent concept will be used to cope with these aspects by
an automated application and verification of signatures.
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For signing and verifying contents exchanged with an LMS, specific tasks can be given as follows,
referring to the numbering as introduced above:
2a. LMS recognition: Since there are a lot of different LMS available, the extensibility of the
security agent is highly desired. Request patterns for LMS functions can be roughly described
by the tuple (host,path). The first element describes the host URL for the LMS, while the
second element describes the relative path on the target machine. For being able to recognise
whether a user tries to connect to a known LMS, the agent has to compare data like host URL
and requested site from the received packet against patterns stored in its configuration files. If
none of the patterns match to the currently requested page, the proxy server, of course, must
not alter any detail of the request and has to forward packets without any further delay, i.e.,
the network functionality must not be reduced more than absolutely necessary. Note that proxy
tasks 2b, 3 and 4 may only be applied in case of communicating with a known LMS, otherwise
the communication would (at least slightly) be disturbed by unnecessary computation of received
packets without giving any advantage. In case of exchanging data with a web server not known
to host an LMS, this results in a transparent proxy server forwarding messages conform to the
HTTP specification [FGM+99]. Thus, the user is not confronted with the proxy at all.
2b. LMS specific signing and verification: Signing contents and the verification of embed-
ded signatures, of course, are two different subtasks. Signing messages sent to an LMS requires
information about variable names contained in packets sent to a specific site on the LMS. The
agent needs such information in order to separate contents to be signed within the observed
HTTP stream from data that can be ignored. In addition, the security agent needs to know how
to combine these variables to a new simple message that finally can be digitally signed. A list
of variables appears sensible to mention the relevant variables in an ordered way. For actually
being able to sign extracted variables, the agent first has to gain access to the private key of the
logged in user. This key can be stored on a smart card, a USB stick, or, if the pair of keys was
created on the currently used computer, locally on the harddisk drive. Since private keys should
be protected by a passphrase or other authentication methods, the agent will have to ask for an
identification of the user. When the key can successfully be decrypted, it needs to be stored in
main memory to give the agent the possibility to use it several times without asking for authen-
tication again at every access. Note that, after quitting the security agent, the private key stored
in main memory should be scrambled, such that no other users, including local administrators
who get logged in later, can restore the plain private key by analysing main memory [SS99].
For the other direction, i.e., incoming messages, the security agent acts as control instance for
contained digital signatures. Note that the verification process needs a lot more descriptive infor-
mation than the signing process. Variables sent to the server can only be requested again in the
form of a flat HTML page without forms or other dividing structures. The messages as presented
by the LMS are no longer stored in variables, but are embedded in HTML page text. In the con-
figuration files, data about the recognition of digital signatures embedded in these pages and the
possible segmentation in single message blocks need to be given. To actually evaluate embedded
signatures, corresponding public keys of signers must be known to the agent. For this purpose, a
keyserver can be used that provides all known public keys, e.g., within an institution’s PKI.
6.6.3 Realisation
A main realisation goal of the security agent in general is the conformity to the protocol HTTP in
version 1.1 (HTTP/1.1) as specified in Request For Comments (RFC) 2616 [FGM+99]. Thus, the
agent has to fulfil all requirements concerning the proxy functionality itself before a particular
security functionality may be integrated. In the students’ project, a rapid prototyping approach
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was followed for this goal to be able to thoroughly test the proxy server with different web
servers and hosts. This especially turned out to be advantageous, since several web servers on
the Internet act according to rather deprecated, but still allowed protocol specialities as described
in RFC 2616 [FGM+99]. Since all protocol details like different usages of address requests and
their handling are specified in this standard, they will not be further discussed in the following.
Second, the proxy server has to be able to identify relevant parts of the HTTP stream and to react
appropriately. A main problem concerning the ability of recognising relevant parts in the stream
is that the stream itself must be kept readable for the proxy server. HTTP/1.1 allows several
ways of encoding and compressing data. Usually a web browser informs the web server about
its supported compression types. The web server, on the other hand, compares this information
to its own supported formats and decides accordingly. If the proxy server in the middle does
not support the negotiated compression, then it will not be able to work with received data.
Hence, the offerings of the web browser need to be considered and possibly be adjusted to the
capabilities of the proxy server. Of course, such adjustments are only necessary and sensible if
the connection does match a pattern as introduced in the former section, i.e., a connection to a
page or function within a known LMS is requested (cf. step 2a, Sec. 6.6.2).
With respect to the signing task, all relevant variables need to be extracted and concatenated
to sign them all at once. Note that the list of variables and their order must not be modified,
if it already has been used in the given way by any client. Otherwise, the modification of the
variable order or the number of variables would lead to a different plain text, and therefore,
will lead to another signature. Hence, old signatures would be falsified anytime they get checked
with the new verification method. Since HTTP supports different request methods affecting
the composition of messages, we have to distinguish their handling. The most commonly used
methods are post and get. The proxy server has to be able to extract the variable names and
contents of all these kinds of messages. While in get messages variables are coded into the URL,
in post messages the URL does not contain any variable, but the packet body does instead.
This means, for post requests, so-called “multipart/form-data” messages are sent, where every
variable gets its own field within the packet body. These fields are separated by a (randomly
generated) boundary string introduced in the packet header. Hence, before processing received
data, the type of message composition has to be determined.
To manage transparency for all users, it is sensible to store the signature in a way that it cannot
be seen at first sight by any learner not using the described proxy server. For achieving this, the
digital signature has to be stored in HTML tags that are not displayed. Since most LMS contain
a content management system that filters user entries, there is no general solution how to keep
signatures hidden. In the following section, emerging problems when applying this security agent
to MOODLE will be discussed.
6.6.4 Application in MOODLE
MOODLE is used at the author’s university, such that experiences could be collected concerning
its practical usage, implementation, and security concept. Consequently, for a prototype of the
introduced security agent we focused on supporting this LMS. MOODLE uses specific scripts for
each learning activity with appropriate parameters like a unique course identifier to specify the
actual course or context. Hence, only a finite number of sites representing such activities must
be observed, and therefore, the tuples representing search patterns can easily be created. For the
verification of embedded signatures, corresponding HTML pages have to be parsed. Forum entries,
for example, have hierarchical structures to separate main statements from their corresponding
answers and comments. For this, usually every entry is embedded in table data tags. Hence,
starting from the digital signature, the table data environment of the same hierarchical level can
be extracted and analysed due to the entries considered in the signature. This list of entries is
directly connected to the list of variables introduced in the signing process above.
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With respect to the signing task, an invisible embedding of digital signatures in practice turned
out to be more difficult than expected. The client can only communicate over the interface offered
by MOODLE, i.e., sites for sending and storing messages. But every message sent to MOODLE gets
controlled and if necessary is modified. MOODLE does not allow to send HTML comments or to
apply CSS instructions to some text in order to make it invisible. This, of course, is sensible from
the point of view of MOODLE programmers, since the possibility of injecting arbitrary code, e.g.,
in CSS definitions, means an enormous security problem. However, a possible solution to hide
the signature is to add it to the id attribute of an empty HTML div tag. Such tags are only
used for structuring web pages and will not be displayed by default. Hence, nothing can be seen
by users, but the signature is still there – hidden in the received HTML text.
6.6.5 Conclusion of the Security Agent Project
Within this project, the security agent was meant to be implemented as modular and flexible
as possible. Thus, already in this exemplary functional realisation for applying digital signatures
to learning contents and communication messages, extensions for integrating smart card support
instead of software-driven signing processes are considered. With respect to capabilities of proxy
servers as applications on ISO/OSI layer 7, even more security-related tasks are conceivable in
practice. For example, these include challenge-response authentication, single sign-on (for clients)
even though the infrastructure itself might not regard this comfort aspect, or security checks and
filters like stripping malicious XSS code in web pages.
Consequently, the idea of a locally deployed proxy server as personal security secretary provides
many useful applications to be implemented on top of the currently given framework. This
improves security for learners without increasing the effort of managing all those functions. An
automated processing according to programmed rules takes place. Hence, learners will not be
distracted from their learning process, since this “secretary” overtakes all time-consuming and
recurring interactions.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduced and discussed strategies for dealing with threats for e-learning sys-
tems. Recommendations for mitigating discovered threats are given in three layers distinguishing
technical mechanisms, organisational deliberations, and user education and support. It can be
concluded that organisational security and human behaviour are of major concern for e-learning
security, since technical aspects can more easily be established and controlled by protective
systems. Consequently, the focus for practical deployments of e-learning systems has to be on
appropriate security concepts including users of the system.
In the course of this chapter, several references were applied to draw relations to the fault
tree as depicted in Appendix A. This already indicates the value of stated recommendations to
cover threats as identified in this research project. However, although it would be desirable to
provide recommendations and reliable solutions to all threats as presented in this tree, this is very
unlikely especially when considering threats related to human behaviour. Although threats related
to technical aspects can be solved easily in most cases, threats related to human fallibility or
obliviousness cannot be solved reliably. Notably, the latter case is of relevance for e-learning, since
human learners are central for such learning systems. Recommendations concerning education for
all users and peer reviews for course creators are reasonable, and therefore, they have to be taken
seriously, e.g., to avoid unreliable course contents because of numerous mistakes or inattentive
publication of sensitive data by users themselves.
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Concluding this chapter, presented recommendations help increase the security level of e-learning
systems significantly. With applying these recommendations, all discovered threats will be solved
entirely or at least can considerably be mitigated. Bear in mind that different types of e-learning
systems as sketched in Section 3.2 implement different functionality. Hence, only a subset of men-
tioned threats will exist in each type, and as such, only a subset of recommendations is sensibly
applicable. Nevertheless, the deployment of a public key infrastructure with the integration of
the presented security agent can be reasonable in almost all presented types of e-learning sys-
tems. Since the agent can be flexibly extended by further processing modules, almost all security
measures that usually require interaction can be established while being kept almost invisible to
the users. Thus, distraction for learners by security measures can significantly be reduced while
also improving security.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This research project was aimed at a thorough analysis of the information security situation
for web-based e-learning systems including the identification of possible threats. The state of
research as presented in Chapter 1 showed that security deliberations for e-learning systems were
only marginally examined up to this moment. General security investigation was shown to not
be sufficient for the special domain of e-learning. Technology-driven approaches can significantly
constrain the learning process, such that the primary aim of e-learning systems would be harmed
as well. Basing on this cognisance and the lack of scientifically verifiable systematic analyses for
e-learning security, open research tasks were formulated as follows:
1. identification of e-learning criteria (with focus on educational requirements),
2. threat analysis and demonstration of case studies, and
3. development of recommendations.
Results in the following will be connected to these objectives and be discussed according to stated
evaluation criteria as given in Section 1.4.2.
Objective 1: identification of e-learning criteria
To meet the interdisciplinarity of e-learning, this domain was examined from perspectives of ed-
ucational science as well as informatics. The conducted analysis has explicitly been started from
an e-learning perspective to prevent a technology-driven research possibly neglecting domain
specialities. For coping with the fact that no well-accepted definition is available for e-learning
systems, activities and tasks for e-learning from perspectives of mentioned disciplines were con-
sidered to get an impression of what is commonly expected by an e-learning system. While
for the learning component findings from educational science, including educational psychology,
were investigated, the “e” implied an examination of informatics subdomains like software en-
gineering and information security for ensuring corresponding system components. The latter
perspective primarily resulted in activities to manage system components and functional mod-
ules, also taking care of distributed architectures. Thus, functionality, common activities, and
related requirements were extracted from related literature, including collaborative systems, for
elaborating a definition of e-learning systems to be used in this thesis. Concerning e-learning lit-
erature, a categorisation related to five design criteria was stated for classifying activities. These
criteria primarily represent expectations and demands by learners, as well as core components of
e-learning systems to meet learning theories (cf. Chap. 2). With respect to the amount of avail-
able research for e-learning and informatics subdomains, the activity-based definition outlines a
complex system for e-learning with high probability of being vulnerable. Mutual influences and
dependencies, furthermore, were introduced by learning activities and related demands. Corre-
sponding restraints for security means and for the general construction of e-learning systems
were stated in favour of user acceptance and support in the learning process. These limitations
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foremost are related to privacy demands and to distraction from learning. For preparing the
actual threat analysis, assets for e-learning were identified on the basis of introduced learning
activities and tasks (cf. Chap. 3). This investigation of relevant assets included the distinction of
e-learning systems in five different types, where each of these types is related to different sets of
functionality and corresponding demands for roles to be managed.
Objective 2: threat analysis and demonstration of case studies
For the actual threat analysis using a systematic approach to achieve reasonable results, the
standardised fault tree analysis (FTA) approach was shown to be suitable. Among a set of most
commonly used methodologies this approach turned out to be the best-fitting one for analysing
security in web-based e-learning systems (cf. Chap. 4). Applying this systematic and recursive
process, events related to actual threats for e-learning were collected and brought into relation
with each other for presenting the final fault tree (cf. App. A). In opposition to related works
(cf. Chap. 2), the threat analysis of this thesis focused on a systematic procedure with verifiable
results. Hence, available evaluation catalogues and databases of common weaknesses and attack
patterns were analysed for uncovering threats. These listings built the base for the investigation,
such that e-learning specific threats could be extracted and relations be drawn among these
threats, including mutual dependencies. This approach has proved to be successful with respect
to rare and rather unusual attack patterns. The fact of using well-maintained databases of such
patterns as being managed and extended perpetually by large expert communities drastically
reduced the probability of neglecting serious threats. Besides this, basing the analysis on assets
as deduced from an organisational perspective on e-learning has shown to be advantageous, since
discovered threats, which are specific to these assets, can easily be transferred to practically
used systems. This was verified by case studies. Theoretical analysis results were evaluated and
refined by applying them to the open-source learning management systems MOODLE and ILIAS
(cf. Chap. 5). These systems were analysed and compared in a general way, and specific concep-
tual problems were discussed with connections to formerly uncovered theoretical threats. During
the process of this research project, there were significant changes observable in both selected
learning management systems as objects of comparison. Security in this period of time gained
in importance in almost all computer scientific areas, such that the notion of security for corre-
sponding developers also changed. To cope with this, the case studies did not only focus on the
security concept at a specific point in time, but rather compared these systems concerning their
development during the run-time of this project. Besides the practical presentation of weaknesses
related to theoretically introduced threats, conceptual shortcomings in these systems were pre-
sented to illustrate the necessity for a sound security concept and disadvantages related to an
insufficient consideration of user input (cf. [Eib08d, Eib09c]). Weaknesses and security holes as
discovered during this analysis, e.g., sensitive file disclosure exploiting the TEX filter in MOODLE
[Eib09b], were reported to and discussed with corresponding developers to support them in fixing
this issue.
Objective 3: development of recommendations
In Chapter 6 former results and requirements for a usable and secure e-learning system were con-
nected to strategies and concrete recommendations for improving security in e-learning systems.
As web-based systems they are affected by threats of different kinds, i.e., technical, organisa-
tional, and user-related ones. All found threats could be covered by recommendations, but the
effect and applicability of the recommendations are very different. While recommendations for
technical threats are promising, recommendations targeting human failure must be considered
critically. Although their application is sensible, the improvement on the actual security gain is
not reliable due to non-deterministic behaviour of human beings. Basing on introduced activities,
it was shown that for e-learning security the human factor is of significant relevance. Thus, inte-
gration of security education, provision of user manuals, and guidance were considered, as well as
suggestions for involving users to increase participation and enable better identification with the
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deployed system. Furthermore, the reduction of details in error messages was discussed to not
provide excessive information about internal data structures. Decreased usability due to fewer
details in software dialogues mainly can be compensated by increased support. However, stated
recommendations require efforts to be implemented. Also, deployed security measures might re-
quire additional interactions with users. Thus, to further improve security without burdening
or distracting learners, i.e., meet restraints concerning distraction by security means, a security
agent in the form of a locally deployed proxy server was presented to overtake security critical
tasks from learners. With this, the majority of security-related interaction can be transferred
to this agent, and distraction for learners can be reduced. A prototype of this security agent
for digitally signing and verifying e-learning contents and communication data was finished and
made available to the public in May 2009.
Basing on research activities and results of this dissertation thesis, some questions have risen
and provide links for subsequent research. As discussed in Chapter 5, only open-source learning
management systems were examined. Although open-source has specific advantages for analysing
security concepts and implementation quality, these systems only represent a small amount of all
available systems. Discussions at national and international conferences, where the author has
presented conceptual weaknesses of regarded open-source learning management system, resulted
in uniform confirmations by colleagues, who work with corresponding commercial systems, that
similar weaknesses can also be found there. Nevertheless, analysis results could not be transferred
and verified accordingly, such that this is left open for future work. In addition, the security an-
alysis of this dissertation thesis was focusing on the discovery of threats to provide a base for
developing and implementing sophisticated and adequate security means for e-learning. Neither
probabilities of threat occurrence nor their impact in case of incidents were considered. Thus,
discovered threats cannot be quantitatively analysed and compared yet, and as such, no prioriti-
sation for mitigation and no classification concerning the actual relevance in practical e-learning
systems is possible. However, other analysis approaches, like the failure modes and effects an-
alysis (FMEA), can be started on top of given results to continue this research – including the
consideration of risks for presented threats. Finally, as sketched in Section 2.7, high levels of se-
curity most likely require an increased amount of sophisticated security means that additionally
demand user interaction, and therefore, can have negative influences on learning due to increased
distraction. Presented recommendations, in combination with the security agent, can be assumed
to be applicable without increased distraction for learners from their learning progress. But in
general, the optimal compromise between security improvements and acceptable distraction has
not been empirically investigated, yet. Thus, studies with different amounts of security mea-
sures and corresponding security levels will have to be examined and compared concerning their
influence on the learning progress and usability of the system.
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Appendix A
Complete Fault Tree Analysis
Results
A.1 Overview
This appendix illustrates the fault tree as a result of the threat analysis process. It represents
the core contribution of this research project. The entire fault tree in a fully expanded version,
where all transfer symbols as place holders are actually replaced by their respective subtrees,
consists of
• 1085 AND gates,
• 1830 OR gates,
• 4495 basic events, and
• 2915 interim events
⇒ sum of all events: 7410.
As described in Chapter 4, many of these events are included redundantly because of their general
character, e.g., threats to the base system components affecting all assets in comparable manner.
With neglecting redundant inclusions by not following transfer symbols and only counting unique
events and symbols, this results in
• 177 AND gates,
• 276 OR gates,
• 597 basic events, and
• 453 interim events
⇒ sum of all events: 1050.
In the following, the fault tree will be presented similarly to a world map. First, an overview of
the entire structure with all subtrees will be given in Figure A.1. Second, as next zoom level, three
subtrees will be shown representing the asset groups “e-learning”, “information security services”,
and “web services” as listed in Table 3.4 (cf. Chap. 3, p. 47). Third, after these overviews, more
detailed representations will be given in Sections A.2.1–A.2.3 with a zoom level providing human-
readable contents. In addition to the main components of the fault tree, in Section A.3, seventeen
redundant subtrees will be presented. For the sake of readability, each transfer symbol in the
detailed tree presentations is supplemented with references to corresponding figures containing
the transfer counter part. Therefore, the reader similarly to a street map will be guided to the
next relevant piece of information to continue.
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Note that, although for the threat analysis thematically grouped assets were used as starting
points, during the actual analysis process, possible reasons for undesired events get mixed, and
no clear separation in organisational and technical elements can be assured any more. Obviously,
there exist mutual influences among organisational and technical aspects for security. Hence, their
placement in different subtrees is required independently of initial asset groups. This means, the
deeper events are placed in the tree, the less specific they will probably be with respect to the
root of a corresponding subtree.
↑ Main tree
↓ Redundant subtrees (cf. Sec. A.3)
→ A.2
→ A.3
→ A.4
Figure A.1: Overview of all subtrees of the resulting fault tree
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Figure A.3: Overview of asset group “information security services”
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Figure A.4: Overview of asset group “web services”
A.2 Main Tree
The main fault tree consists of the global root element and three connected subtrees that relate to
the asset groups as introduced in Chapter 3. These subtree blocks are presented in the following
subsections.
↓ A.6 ↓ A.15 ↓ A.28
Figure A.5: Root element of fault tree, i.e., learning process disturbed
A.2.1 Block 1: E-Learning Assets
In this first block, i.e., the subtree linking assets of the first asset group, educational contents
and learning activities are considered. Due to the amount of specific events and related concepts
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affecting events in an upper level of the tree, many transfer symbols were necessary to fit the
tree on the given page size. Directly related subtrees are presented in this subsection.
↑ A.5
↓ A.40 ↓ A.41
↓ A.42 ↓ A.47 ↓ A.41 ↓ A.42 ↓ A.47
↓ A.7 ↓ A.9 ↓ A.10 ↓ A.12 ↓ A.14
Figure A.6: E-learning asset harmed
↑ A.6
↓ A.8
↓ A.47 ↓ A.48
Figure A.7: Person related data
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↑ A.7
↓ A.41
↓ A.47
Figure A.8: Data collection
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↑ A.6
↓ A.49 ↓ A.47 ↓ A.49 ↓ A.47
↓ A.42
↓ A.50
↓ A.52
Figure A.9: Course data
↑ A.6
↓ A.11
Figure A.10: Learning contents
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↑ A.10
↓ A.47
↓ A.42
Figure A.11: Unreliable information
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↑ A.6
↓ A.54 ↓ A.56
↓ A.41 ↓ A.57
↓ A.42 ↓ A.47
↓ A.13
Figure A.12: Collaboration data
↑ A.12
Figure A.13: Improper concurrency management
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↑ A.6
↓ A.47
↓ A.41
↓ A.42 ↓ A.48
Figure A.14: Communication data
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A.2.2 Block 2: Information Security Service Assets
In the second block, assets connected to information security services are considered. This pri-
marily concerns policies, authentication, and privilege settings. Related subtrees are given in the
following and marked by references to support the reader in following paths.
↑ A.5
↓ A.16 ↓ A.17 ↓ A.22 ↓ A.57 ↓ A.24
↓ A.42
↓ A.47
↓ A.47
Figure A.15: Asset for information security services harmed
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↑ A.15
↓ A.40 ↓ A.41 ↓ A.42
Figure A.16: User identity disclosed in anonymity scenario
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↑ A.15
↓ A.58
↓ A.18 ↓ A.19
↓ A.47
Figure A.17: Authentication data
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↑ A.17
↓ A.62
Figure A.18: Authentication bypass
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↑ A.17
↓ A.21
↓ A.20
Figure A.19: Exploitation of foreign authentication data
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↑ A.19
Figure A.20: Collect usernames
146 A. Complete Fault Tree Analysis Results
↑ A.19
Figure A.21: Brute force attack
↑ A.15
↓ A.62
↓ A.23
Figure A.22: Session data
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↑ A.22
↓ A.58
Figure A.23: Unauthorised modification of state data
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↑ A.15
↓ A.63
↓ A.25 ↓ A.26 ↓ A.48
Figure A.24: Privilege settings
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↑ A.24
Figure A.25: Improper access control
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↑ A.24
↓ A.41 ↓ A.42 ↓ A.47
↓ A.48
↓ A.27
Figure A.26: Exploitation of permission assignments
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↑ A.26
Figure A.27: Improper administration
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A.2.3 Block 3: Web Services Assets
The third block deals with threats affecting more generic assets inherent in almost all web services.
Concerned assets and respective events are less specific to e-learning, but affect basic components.
Note that attacks to these components could result in a circumvention of security means within
the e-learning system. Consequently, their consideration in this analysis is required as well.
↑ A.5
↓ A.29 ↓ A.30 ↓ A.33 ↓ A.35 ↓ A.37 ↓ A.38
Figure A.28: Infrastructural basis
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↑ A.28
↓ A.58
↓ A.56
Figure A.29: Network topology
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↑ A.28
↓ A.54 ↓ A.56 ↓ A.31
Figure A.30: Reliability
↑ A.30
↓ A.32
Figure A.31: Improper infrastructure management
A.2. Main Tree 155
↑ A.31
Figure A.32: Inappropriate maintenance
↑ A.28
↓ A.34
↓ A.54
Figure A.33: Software details
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↑ A.33
Figure A.34: Exploit error output
↑ A.28
↓ A.40
↓ A.41
↓ A.36
Figure A.35: Configuration details
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↑ A.35
↓ A.42 ↓ A.47
Figure A.36: Unauthorised manipulation of configuration data
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↑ A.28
↓ A.64 ↓ A.50
↓ A.66
Figure A.37: Data organisation
↑ A.28
↓ A.42 ↓ A.58
↓ A.39
Figure A.38: Log data and statistics
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↑ A.38
Figure A.39: Improper use of event logs
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A.3 Redundant Subtrees
Several subtrees of more generic relevance have to be included in redundant manner to appropri-
ately state logic relations. In the following, seventeen redundant trees are presented that, again,
may be broken into pieces for better fitting to the given page size. Note that for these redundant
subtrees several references at the top-most transfer symbols indicate all figures that require this
respective tree for inclusion. Figures that do only have a single reference at the top-most transfer
symbol represent subelements of only one of these redundant tree.
↑ A.6
↑ A.16
↑ A.35
Figure A.40: Traffic flow analysis
↑ A.6
↑ A.8
↑ A.12
↑ A.14
↑ A.16
↑ A.26
↑ A.35
↓ A.63
Figure A.41: (General) unauthorised disclosure of information
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↑ A.6
↑ A.9
↑ A.11
↑ A.12
↑ A.14
↑ A.15
↑ A.16
↑ A.26
↑ A.36
↑ A.38
↑ A.57
↓ A.43
↓ A.58 ↓ A.49 ↓ A.46
Figure A.42: Direct attack to base system
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↑ A.42
↓ A.44
Figure A.43: Privilege escalation by exploiting software vulnerabilities
↑ A.43
↓ A.45
Figure A.44: Buffer overflow
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↑ A.44
Figure A.45: Vulnerable buffer handling
↑ A.42
Figure A.46: Low level content manipulation
164 A. Complete Fault Tree Analysis Results
↑ A.6
↑ A.7
↑ A.8
↑ A.9
↑ A.11
↑ A.12
↑ A.14
↑ A.15
↑ A.17
↑ A.26
↑ A.36
↓ A.63
Figure A.47: (General) unauthorised manipulation of information
↑ A.7
↑ A.14
↑ A.24
↑ A.26
↑ A.57
Figure A.48: Import/export functionality exploited
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↑ A.9
↑ A.42
↑ A.63
Figure A.49: Direct connection to database
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↑ A.9
↑ A.37
↑ A.62
↑ A.63
↑ A.66
↓ A.51
Figure A.50: System vulnerable to injections
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↑ A.50
Figure A.51: Improper consideration of encodings
↑ A.9
↑ A.62
↑ A.63
↑ A.66
↓ A.53
Figure A.52: Script injection
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↑ A.52
Figure A.53: Script in page content
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↑ A.12
↑ A.30
↑ A.33
↓ A.55
Figure A.54: Software related denial of service (DoS)
↑ A.54
↓ A.66
Figure A.55: Active exploitation of shortcomings
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↑ A.12
↑ A.29
↑ A.30
↓ A.67
Figure A.56: Network related denial of service (DoS)
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↑ A.12
↑ A.15
↓ A.42 ↓ A.48
Figure A.57: Accountability data
↑ A.17
↑ A.23
↑ A.29
↑ A.38
↑ A.42
↓ A.59
↓ A.61
Figure A.58: Data transfer attacked
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↑ A.58
↓ A.60
Figure A.59: Improper key management
↑ A.59
Figure A.60: Dynamic session key
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↑ A.58
↓ A.67
Figure A.61: Active attacks
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↑ A.18
↑ A.22
↓ A.50 ↓ A.52
Figure A.62: Exploitation of session management
↑ A.24
↑ A.41
↑ A.47
↓ A.50 ↓ A.52
↓ A.49
Figure A.63: Learner is enrolled
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↑ A.37
↑ A.66
↓ A.65
Figure A.64: Exploitation of SQL code
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↑ A.64
Figure A.65: SQL code injection
↑ A.37
↑ A.55
↓ A.52 ↓ A.64
↓ A.50
Figure A.66: Injection attack
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↑ A.56
↑ A.61
Figure A.67: Redirect traffic
